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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study has been to provide more insights into our understanding of a 
number of issues pertaining to the evolution of ownership characteristics in the UK market, 
the impact of agency costs on firm performance and the links between the financial and 
investment decisions of firms. Our work contains a number of important and original 
aspects that potentially contribute to the literature on several grounds. 
First, we provide a detailed and systematic evidence on corporate ownership and 
governance structure characteristics for a unique database which we hand-collected of a 
large sample of UK non-financial listed firms between 1991 and 2001. This work 
significantly contributes to the existing body of knowledge, by extending and 
complementing existing US evidence (Denis & Sarin, 1999) on the evolution of ownership 
systems showing a large variability over time both in the managerial and non-managerial 
ownership and in the board composition of UK companies. 
Second, we directly analyse whether non-executive directors act independently from 
executives in determining firm performance. We exploit the documented evolution in 
ownership characteristics to investigate this link, using the GMM methodology (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991) which enables us to produce a set of systematic results which are robust 
both to the endogeneity of all the explanatory variables and to the presence of unobservable 
heterogeneity. Our analysis reveals a cubic relationship between managerial ownership and 
financial value. When we split the board between executives and non-executives we 
document that this non linear association is only linked to executives, while ownership by 
non-executives does not seem to have a significant impact. Nonetheless, a positive and 
significant effect of the number of non-executives in the board is reported. Furthermore, no 
evidence is consistent with the efficient monitoring hypothesis for institutional investors. 
Third, we analyze the potential links between financing policy and investment 
ability. More in detail we investigate whether, by employing a policy of low leverage for a 
certain number of years, firms may accumulate financial flexibility that enables them to 
have access to the external market in the future, and to be able to raise funds to invest more 
than their internal resources alone would allow. We document that a low-leverage policy is 
IX 
usually transitory. Following a period of low leverage, firms that have accumulated 
reserves of borrowing power appear able to make significantly more capital expenditures. 
Estimation results of the investment equation confirm this finding. Intertemporal 
descriptive analyses of firms' choices around the investment decision moment confirms 
that, firms with reserves of borrowing power sharply increase their capital investments after 
acquiring RBP status, issue new debt and approach their target leverage. Additionally, we 
detect a significant increase of abnormal investment (spikes) by firms after acquiring RBP 
status. A further important insight of these results is that they appear to indicate that this 
strategy is value enhancing. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study is to provide more insights into our understanding of 
ownership characteristics in the UK market, the impact of agency costs on firm 
performance and, also, the interactions between the financial and investment decisions of 
firms. 
Firm performance and financial decisions have long been studied under the 
perspective of costly agency relations that stem from the separation between ownership and 
control. One of the most debated aspects involves managers and shareholders. Shareholders 
typically invest financial capital in the firm, but generally hold a diversified portfolio, 
which affects their attitude towards risk. The investment in a particular firm generally 
represents only a fraction of their total wealth. Managers, on the other hand, are typically 
more exposed to the risks associated with the firm by which they are employed. Their 
human capital is tied up in the fortunes of the firm, as may also be part of their financial 
capital. This conflict of interests can lead to significant divergences when we consider, for 
instance, the investment policy of the firm. Shareholders, by virtue of portfolio 
diversification and limited liability, are mainly concerned with the positive side of the 
probability distribution of returns from investment, provided they have positive NPV; but 
managers are also concerned with the negative side of the distribution, as they have more to 
lose if the project fails. Therefore, managers may fail to undertake projects that might have 
proved worthwhile to shareholders. Furthermore, an ample free cash flow (or unnecessary 
financial slack), for example, may induce managers to carry on not maximizing value 
projects (Jensen, 1986), and to expropriate funds from the company to maximize their own 
utility function (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The expropriation of funds can take different 
forms. For instance, managers may spend more on luxury projects rather than on value 
maximizing projects. Another form, known as empire building, entails that managers prefer 
to run large businesses rather than small ones, even if moving from small to large may not 
yield a positive-NPV undertaking, and even if the firm grows beyond its optimal size. 
Other less obvious examples consist in transfer pricing and entrenching investment. The 
former typically involves managers selling assets or output from the company they manage 
to a company they own at below market prices (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997); the latter 
usually refers to managers making manager-specific investments, which makes it costly for 
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shareholders to replace incumbent management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). The more 
ownership is dispersed among numerous shareholders, the more important these issues 
become. Indeed, in a highly dispersed company, for each atomistic shareholder the 
difference between the costs and the benefits of monitoring the incumbent management is 
so great that nobody has the incentive to promote any action and take an organizing role in 
removing, for example, the board of directors (collective action problem). To the extent that 
the market can anticipate these expected expropriation costs, the valuation of the firm will 
be discounted accordingly. 
Although these categories are not entirely distinct, the literature has traditionally 
indicated two broad lines of solution to these issues: internal and external mechanisms 
(Jensen, 1993 and Denis, 2001). In this thesis, we will focus mainly on the role played by 
managerial ownership and board structure (internal mechanisms) and block ownership 
(external mechanism). ' 
The fact that shareholding by agents helps to align them to the interests of the 
principal is well documented in the literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is argued that 
direct equity ownership by managers reduces their natural tendency to allocate the firm's 
resources in their own best interests, and to divert resources away from value 
maximization. When managers hold shares, they bear more of the expropriation costs and 
their interests coincide more closely with those of outside shareholders. Jensen (1993) 
argues that "many problems arise from the fact that neither managers nor non-manager 
board members typically own substantial fractions of theirs firm's equity". Nonetheless, 
since Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983), a growing body of studies has started to 
recognize that the alignment effect may not be a linear function of managerial ownership. It 
is argued that increasing shareholding also delivers increasing voting power and effective 
control over the firm, which the manager may use to extract resources from the firm. 
Another ownership characteristic that may be an important instrument in monitoring 
management is the presence of a large external shareholder. As Stiglitz (1985) argues, large 
shareholders have greater incentives to be involved in the control process than small ones, 
1 Jensen, 1993 and Denis, 2001 also highlight the importance of legal mechanisms and product market 
competition as further control instrument. 
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because they can more easily bear the high fixed costs of collecting information on 
management behaviour. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide a justification for the 
monitoring role of large investors, on the basis of their relevant resources invested in the 
firm. Kahn and Winton (1998) suggest that there is a positive relation between intervention 
by institutions and some firm-specific characteristics, such as poor performance, or mature 
or low-technology companies. 
A further form of monitoring may be performed by the board of directors, which is 
supposed to act on behalf of the shareholders, as an important mechanism to monitor top 
management discretionary behavior and ratify main decisions (Hart, 1995). As a 
consequence, much emphasis is placed on the regulation of the "Board Structure". It is a 
general view that the board of directors is more independent as the number of non- 
executives increases (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Non- 
executive directors should be independent "advisors" and act as "delegated monitors", by 
the shareholders, of the actions of executive managers. The reputation effect in the 
management labor market and the expertise, derived from their career history, is expected 
to give the non-executives the appropriate incentives to guarantee effective and 
independent monitoring action inside the firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Other internal control mechanisms may lie in the financial decisions of firms. 
Easterbrook (1984) argues that corporate dividend payouts play a role in mitigating equity 
agency costs, by facilitating primary capital market monitoring of the firm's activities and 
performance. Higher dividend payouts increase the likelihood that the firm will have to sell 
common stock in primary capital markets. This in turn will induce a scrutiny of 
management by investment banks, securities exchanges and capital suppliers. Also, 
dividends commit the firm's management to pay out cash to shareholders, and cutting 
dividends may, in turn, provide a negative signal to the market. Debt, as Jensen (1986) 
argued, can be a good substitute for dividends, because managers bond their promises to 
pay out future cash flow in a very durable and enforceable way. In fact, increasing debt 
level means giving to the recipient credit holder the right to take the firm into bankruptcy 
court if manager does not meet the regular commitment to pay the due interest and 
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principal amount. In this way, the debt level reduces agency costs by limiting the cash flow 
subject to managerial discretion. 
All these theories lay the grounds for the research we conduct in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis. As the literature considers ownership structure both a potential cause of agency 
conflicts, and a solution to them, detailed knowledge of ownership characteristics at the 
firm level are crucial in this setting, because they are a representation of the expected 
agency costs to which each firm is subject. An important shortcoming, especially in the 
UK-based studies, is the limited availability of detailed panel data of ownership. Taking 
this motivation as a starting point, we hand-collected detailed information on ownership 
structure and board composition in a panel dataset of approximately 1100 non-financial 
publicly traded corporations between 1991 and 2001. 
The UK setting is a particularly interesting environment to study, for a number of 
reasons. First, during the early 1990s, it was rich in debate in the quest for effective 
solutions to the agency problems stemming from the separation between ownership and 
control. More specifically, following the corporate scandals that took place in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the UK witnessed periodical reports recommending "good corporate 
governance" (Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995; Hampel, 1998; Higgs, 2003). In addition, 
there was much criticism of the apparent low level of activism by institutional investors 
(see, e. g., Black and Coffee, 1994; Conyon and Peck, 1997; Short and Keasey, 1997). 
Despite these debates, and the measures implemented by policy-makers to improve the 
governance of UK firms, relatively few works have attempted to study in detail the 
evolution of the ownership and corporate governance structures in the UK (Dahya et al., 
2002; Dedman, 2002). 
Furthermore, a number of works has recently offered an alternative perspective on 
the separation between ownership and control, and the potential agency conflicts associated 
with it, by analyzing the ultimate ownership structure of companies (e. g., La Porta et al., 
1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Claessens et al., 2002; Attig et al., 2003; Gadhoum et al., 
2005). The analysis of ultimate ownership structures allows us to identify firm Z as the 
ultimate controller that is able to control a firm Y through its ownership relation with 
company X which is, in turn, a direct shareholder in firm Y itself. Complex structures, such 
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as pyramids, multiple control chains and cross-holdings, and multiple classes of shares, are 
devices that give the ultimate controller control rights in excess of its cash flow rights. Like 
any controller with few shares, the ultimate controller has incentives to extract private 
benefits from the firm at the expense of all other stakeholders. Nonetheless, theoretical 
studies argue that the control mechanisms proposed by the literature to mitigate managerial 
discretion cannot be applied to the ultimate controller. Therefore, it is shown that the 
agency costs associated with these particular structures are an order of magnitude larger 
than those related to the conflicts between managers and shareholders at the "direct level" 
of ownership (Bebchuck et al., 2000). 
Following this perspective, in Chapter 2 we tackle a further important aspect: to 
provide a detailed description of ultimate ownership structures in the UK market. We 
computed them at 20%, 10% and 5% cut-off levels for a sub-sample of approximately 500 
firms for the years 1993,1995,1997,1999 and 2001 only, given the complexity of this 
calculation. 
Our work documents that substantial changes in ownership structures are not uncommon, 
and that the classic argument of ownership stability may not necessarily fully apply in the 
UK case. Managerial ownership shows a sharp decreasing trend, mainly driven by 
executives' shareholding. We provide evidence that this sharp trend is rather evenly spread 
across all board ownership quintiles distribution, computed in the first year that a firm 
enters our sample. This result is particularly interesting when we consider that our figures 
also indicate a constant increase in average market capitalization by firms. This may 
suggest that, as a consequence of their risk aversion, managers have been unwilling to 
subscribe to new share issues. However, as we will show in more detail in Chapter 2, this 
trend appears to involve mainly executive directors. In fact, the average percentage of 
shares held by non-executives shows a steady increase. 
In addition, our results indicate that ownership by outsiders increases when it is 
below 45% in the first year that firms enter the sample, while it decreases sharply above the 
cut-off level. Furthermore, average board size is relatively constant over time, and we show 
a mean reversion pattern around the average size of seven members. 
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Additionally, evidence on ultimate ownership structure shows that widely held firms 
are decreasing over time at each cut-off level. Additionally, the existence of complex 
ownership structures in the UK is far from negligible. More than 11% of firms in our sub- 
sample have an ultimate controller with complex structure, although this figure is 
decreasing over time at all cut-off levels. 
The relation between ownership structure and firm performance is the subject of an 
important and ongoing debate in the literature. As we discussed above, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) formally derive a model in which the distribution of shares among the 
insiders and outsiders in a company can influence its value. More specifically, direct equity 
ownership should align managers' interests to those of shareholders (the alignment effect). 
However, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1989), an increasing percentage of shares held 
by the managers may also increase their discretion. This, in turn, would impair the ability of 
outside shareholders to monitor and influence managers (entrenchment effect). Evidence on 
this issue is mixed. A number of papers find a non-monotonic relation between ownership 
and value: among others, McConnell and Servaes (1990,1995) observe an inverse U- 
shaped relationship, whereas Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Morck et al. (1988) and Short 
and Keasey (1999) report a significant cubic relation. Other studies fail to detect any 
significant links between the two: for example, Loderer and Martin (1997), Cho (1998) and 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). 
Furthermore, the vast majority of past studies have focused on ownership by the 
whole board or, alternatively, by executive directors only, as a proxy for managerial 
ownership. Very limited evidence exists on the impact of non-executive shareholding on 
company value. It is argued in the literature that non-executive directors should act as 
delegated monitors inside boards (Hart, 1995), as emphasized by Fama (1980), and that 
both the reputation effect in the management labor market, and expertise acquired from 
their career history, could give non-executives enough incentives to guarantee effective and 
independent monitoring within the firm. In other words, to the extent that non-executive 
directors are independent and appointed by shareholders, there is no need to provide them 
with any kind of incentive. 
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However, other compelling arguments in the literature indicate that the managerial 
labor market incentives may not work in the way that is predicted, and also that they may 
be insufficient to guarantee that non-executives are effectively interested in firm 
performance. For instance, outside directors "may owe their position to management" 
(Hart, 1995); also, a reputation as a director who does not make trouble for CEOs is also 
potentially valuable to the director (Hart, 1995; Hermalin and Weisback, 2001). 
Furthermore, in their seminal work, Morck et al. (1988) maintain that although it is the 
"fiduciary duty" of non-executives to oversee the activities of top managers, these actions 
require time and effort. Therefore, outside directors should be provided with strong 
financial interests in the firm, to ensure that they are concerned about company 
performance. Similarly, Jensen (1993) states that "encouraging outside board members to 
hold substantial equity interests would provide better incentives". This is particularly 
interesting when considered in the light of the important results reported in Chapter 2, 
which document a clear increasing trend in non-executive shareholding. 
Additionally, in Chapter 3 we also exploit the evidence from Chapter 2 that 
ownership characteristics in the UK market are far from stable. The high degree of 
variability we document in our data analysis enables us to investigate the link between 
Tobin's q and ownership structure, using the GMM methodology (Arellano and Bond, 
1991). In contrast to the previous literature, this technique provides us with a set of results 
on the relationship between ownership and performance that is robust to the endogeneity of 
all the explanatory variables, and to the presence of unobservable heterogeneity. 
Therefore, in Chapter 3 we take these facts as starting points in investigating 
whether non-executive directors act independently from executives in determining firm 
performance. To this end, we first test the relationship between board ownership and firm 
value. Then, we divide the board of directors between executives and non-executives, and 
we test whether ownership by non-executives is also a relevant factor. We also check 
whether the mere presence of outside directors on the board is significantly linked to firm 
value. We also test whether the presence and identity of a large shareholder has an impact 
on firm performance. We also include a number of other control variables, such as capital 
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expenditures, leverage and firm size, which the current literature argues are potentially able 
to influence firm performance. 
Our analysis reveals a cubic relationship between Tobin's q and ownership by 
executive directors. On the other hand, no significant relationship is found between 
ownership by non-executives and performance, whereas we report a positive and significant 
effect of the ratio of non-executives to total board. Our results also suggest that the 
presence of a large outside shareholder, and in particular of large institutional investors, is 
negatively related to firm performance; whereas investment in physical capital, cash flow 
and dividend payments exerts a positive impact. Finally, no significant impact of company 
size, debt ratio or RD expenditures is detected. 
In Chapter 4 we focus on another important research issue: the interactions between 
financial and investment decisions. More specifically, we investigate the hypothesis that a 
low-leverage policy directed at maintaining flexibility can affect company investment. 
To the extent that the Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposition on the irrelevance 
of financial factors to firm value holds, firms' investment decisions are independent of 
financial decisions. Under the assumption of perfect capital markets, in fact, external funds 
provide a perfect substitute for internal capital. Firms can obtain from investors the 
necessary capital to implement profitable investments opportunities without paying an extra 
premium. Their responses to changes in the cost of capital or tax-based investment 
incentives differ only because of differences in investment demand (Fazzari et al., 1988). In 
other words, firms decide how much to invest on the basis of their growth opportunities 
alone, regardless of the sources of capital. This implies an insignificant relationship 
between investment expenditures and internal funds. 
Under the assumption of imperfect capital markets, in contrast, internal and external 
funds are no longer substitutes. The difference between the costs of internal and external 
finance is generally interpreted as the result of a premium on external finance that arises 
from contracting and asymmetric information problems, and from agency conflicts between 
insiders and outside investors. As modelled by Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) for the debt market, and by Greenwald et at. (1984), Myers (1984) and Myers 
and Majluf (1984) for the equity market, investors do not have as much information about a 
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company as its managers. Even if managers act in the shareholders' interests, for investors 
it is very costly, and in some cases even impossible, to assess firm quality. The cost of 
capital, therefore, increases with agency and asymmetric information problems, and, as a 
result, firms needing external resources to invest will pass up some projects with positive 
NPV (debt or equity rationing). In such conditions, the ability of firms to invest is 
hampered because firms are forced to base their expenditures, not only on the quality of 
growth opportunities, but also on the availability of capital. According to this view, the 
greater the capital market imperfections, the stronger the sensitivity of investment to internal 
resources. 
However, since the seminal work by Fazzari et al. (1988), the investment literature 
has mostly focused its attention on the identification of different classes of firms that are 
more (or less) likely to face higher costs of capital, in the attempt to document how 
investment cash flow sensitivities change as the costs of external finance rise (see, e. g., 
Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; and Bond and Meghir, 1994, for the UK; Hoshi et al., 
1991, for Japan; Chirinko and Schaller, 1995, for Canada; Elston, 1998, for Germany). 
The capital structure literature, on the other hand, generally considers investment as 
exogenously determined, and focuses its attention on the relative costs of debt to equity, 
testing the hypotheses of the pecking order versus the trade off theory (e. g., Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers, 1999; Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Flannery and Rangan, 
2005), as well as market timing (Baker and Wurgler (2002) and the relevance of elements 
such as taxes and financial distress (Hovakimian et al., 2001). 
However, according to Myers (1977), "too much" debt may induce firms to forego 
profitable investment opportunities, even when managers are fully aligned to shareholder's 
interests. Furthermore, according to Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Myers (1984), 
capital market imperfections may lead firms to consider it necessary to preserve financial 
flexibility, which entails "the maintenance by firms of a substantial reserve of untapped 
borrowing power" (Modigliani and Miller, 1963, p. 442). Recent international survey 
evidence on the determinants of capital structure (Graham and Harvey (2001) for the US, 
Bancel and Mitoo (2004) and Brounen et al. (2005) for Europe) has provided evidence to 
corroborate these theoretical predictions. For instance, according to the figures reported in 
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Graham and Harvey (2001), 59% of the respondent Chief Financial Officers say that 
flexibility is important (rating of 3) or very important (rating of 4), in enabling the firm to 
undertake investment in the future. 
In Chapter 4, we take these arguments as a starting point and empirically investigate 
the hypothesis that firms, anticipating financial constraints in the future, respond to these 
potential constraints by accumulating reserve borrowing power (RBP). More specifically, 
by employing a policy of low leverage for a certain number of years, firms may accumulate 
financial flexibility that allows them to have access to the external market, and to be able to 
raise funds to invest more than their internal resources alone would allow. 
We acknowledge that firms may have a target debt ratio, and may also deviate from 
it for periods of time. We employ a widely adopted set of determinants in the attempt to 
measure leverage targets. This is one of the distinguishing features of our work: this 
approach enables us to classify low-leverage firms according to the deviation between 
target and actual leverage. Low-leverage firms are then classified as having reserves of 
borrowing power (RBP) if they are identified as low-leverage for a period of three years. In 
the second stage of the analysis, we estimate an investment model, augmented with the 
RBP status dummy of firms, to investigate whether this borrowing power, accumulated in 
the previous three years, has an impact on current investment policy. 
According to our analysis, the RBP policy is a transitory one. Estimation results of 
the investment equation reveal that those firms classified as having accumulated reserve 
borrowing power are able to make significantly more capital expenditures. On the other 
hand, the impact of the RBP status dummy on the cash flow sensitivity parameter is 
consistently negative and often insignificant. This further corroborates the hypothesis that 
these firms are not more constrained in their investment decisions than others. 
We also perform an intertemporal descriptive analysis of firms' choices around the 
investment decision moment. This reveals how, consistent with previous econometric 
results, firms with reserves of borrowing power sharply increase their capital investments 
after acquiring RBP status. They do so by increasing their borrowing by issuing new debt, 
which also takes them closer to their target leverage. We detect also that the increase in 
investment of RBP firms is associated with an increase in what we define as abnormal 
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investment (or investment spikes). Finally, the results appear to indicate that this strategy is 
value enhancing, because we document an increase in average market to book ratio for this 
group of firms. Several alternative robustness checks confirm the previous set of results. 
Chapter 5 presents the overall conclusions of this work, and draws together the 
various aspects examined in this study. In particular, we emphasize how the thesis enhances 
our understanding of the types and extent of agency conflicts inside the firm, and how these 
conflicts ultimately determine company value and key corporate decisions, such as 
investment choices. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE OWNERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
IN THE UK MARKET 
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2.1. Introduction 
Since the seminal work by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the corporate finance 
literature has proposed a number of instruments related to the ownership and 
governance structure of firms (internal mechanisms) to mitigate the conflicts between 
managers and shareholders (equity agency costs). The main control mechanisms that are 
the object of this work are, in particular, managerial ownership, shareholding by large 
external investors and board composition. Several empirical studies have extensively 
analyzed the effectiveness of these mechanisms, both on corporate decisions and the 
market value of firms (for an extensive review see Short, 1994; Becht et al., 2002) and 
on the nature of the interaction between them (e. g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; 
Jensen et al., 1992). They also have compared ownership structure and board 
composition across countries (e. g., Roe, 1993; La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 
2002). 
More specifically, managerial equity ownership is an instrument for aligning 
managerial interests with those of outside shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990,1995). As managerial ownership 
becomes greater, directors bear a larger fraction of the costs of diverting resources away 
from firm value maximization. This argument has received empirical support in a 
number of studies in different strands of the corporate finance literature. Morck et al. 
(1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990,1995), amongst others, document a 
significant relation between managerial ownership structure and firm value; Berger et 
al. (1997) provide evidence of a link between managerial ownership and capital 
structure decisions; Opler et al. (1999) report a significant relationship between insider 
ownership and firm cash holding policy, while Jensen et al. (1992) show how leverage, 
dividends and managerial ownership are simultaneously determined. 
Other studies have focused on ownership concentration and large shareholders, 
as means of reducing managerial discretion when there is separation between ownership 
and control. In their seminal work, Berle and Means (1932) maintain that an inverse 
correlation should be observed between ownership dispersion and firm performance. It 
is argued that the wedge between the costs and the benefits of monitoring the incumbent 
management becomes larger as ownership dispersion increases. On the other hand, as 
Stiglitz (1985) argues, larger shareholders have greater incentives to be involved in the 
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control process than smaller ones, because they can more easily bear the high fixed 
costs of collecting information on management behaviour. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
provide a justification for the monitoring role of large investors on the basis of their 
relevant resources invested in the firm. Empirical results in this area are mixed. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990,1995) report that neither all blockholders nor the largest 
single blockholder have a significant effect on firm performance. Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) also conclude that blockholding plays no significant role. Nonetheless, Davies et 
al. (2005) document a strong negative link between blockholder ownership and firm 
value for UK companies. Further, Mehran (1992) finds a positive relation between the 
leverage ratio and ownership by large individual investors, while Goergen and 
Renneboog (2001 a) detect a positive investment cash flow sensitivity only in those 
firms whose owners have large shareholdings. 
Additionally, a great deal of work has focused attention on the identity of 
external shareholders. According to Pound (1988), institutional investors may be more 
efficient monitors than other shareholders, because of their greater expertise (the 
efficient monitoring hypothesis). However, Pound also contends that institutional 
investors may find it profitable (the strategic alignment hypothesis), or even be forced 
(the conflict of interest hypothesis), to cooperate with managers in order to protect other 
business relationships they may have with the firm. This aspect may be particularly 
relevant for the UK, where much debate was sparked during the 1990s as a consequence 
of the lack of activism of institutional investors (see, among others, Conyon and Peck, 
1997; Plender, 1997; Goergen and Renneboog, 2001b). ' Empirically, and in contrast to 
Dahya et al. 's (2002) results on the UK market, Parrino et al. (2003) find that 
institutional ownership in the US is an important determinant of both CEO turnover and 
the appointment of an executive from the market as a new CEO. Goergen and 
Renneboog (2001b) report a lower cash flow sensitivity of investments when 
institutional ownership is large. 
Several studies have also investigated the role played by board composition. 
Hart (1995) argues that, due to the separation between ownership and control, the board 
of directors is supposed to act on behalf of shareholders, as an important mechanism for 
monitoring top management discretionary behaviour. In the UK, throughout the 1990s, 
t Indeed, the Cadbury Report (1992), Hampel (1998) and Higgs' Codes of Best Practice (2003) all call for 
an increased role for institutional investors in corporate governance. 
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the Codes of Best Practice stressed the importance of board composition. In its 
guidelines, CALPERS (1998), in the US, sustains the view that companies should have 
boards that are composed of a large majority of independent directors. 2 This increased 
emphasis on the role of board composition by practitioners has sparked a large number 
of works by academics. On the one hand, several studies analyze the impact of board 
composition on how boards accomplish specific tasks. For example, Dahya et al. (2002) 
study the impact of compliance with the Cadbury recommendations on board 
composition and on CEO turnover, and report a significant increase in management 
turnover following adoption of the Cadbury recommendations. On the other hand, other 
works attempt to assess the impact of board composition on firm value. Yermack 
(1996), amongst others, reports evidence of a positive relation between the proportion of 
independent directors and Tobin's q, and a negative link between board size and firm 
value. 
Moreover, an alternative perspective on the separation between ownership and 
control is provided by the analysis of the ultimate ownership structure of firms (e. g., 
Bebchuck, 1999; La Porta et at., 1999; Bebchuck et at., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; 
Gadhoum et al., 2005). In this analysis ownership and control are measured in terms of 
cash flow and control rights. The main idea here is to take into account the impact that 
firm (or individual) Z can exercise on firm Y through its ownership relationship with 
firm X, which is itself a direct shareholder in firm Y. Firm Z is called the ultimate 
controller of firm Y, because it is the last shareholder that it is possible to retrieve along 
the control chain. Different kinds of control chains can be identified by pyramids, 
multiple control chains and cross-holding. Such complex structures, along with multiple 
classes of shares, are devices that give ultimate controllers control rights in excess of 
their cash flow rights. The potential conflicts between the ultimate controller and other 
investors in the firms are of a different nature than those described at the "direct level" 
of ownership. Like any controller with few shares, the ultimate controller has the 
incentives to extract private benefits from the firm, or, in other words, to expropriate 
resources at the expense of other shareholders. In this perspective, the problems and 
consequences of the presence of an ultimate controller are comparable with those that 
arise in a typical conflict between managers and shareholders identified at the "direct 
2 CALPERS is an acronym for California Public Employees Retirement System, Corporate Governance 
Core Principles and Guidelines. 
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level". However, previous research argues that the instruments that the literature has 
proposed to reduce managerial discretion cannot be applied in the ultimate controller 
case (Bebchuck 1999; Bebchuck et al., 2000). For instance, they show that because the 
ultimate controller may be a shareholder, it may not be subject to any market discipline 
(i. e, hostile takeovers) in the way that the controlling managers are. Also, it cannot 
benefit from any incentive scheme, such as bonuses linked to firm performance or a 
higher quantity of cash flow rights, that would align it with the incentives of the other 
shareholders. Therefore, as these studies demonstrate, the agency costs of these complex 
structures are an order of magnitude larger than those associated with conflicts between 
managers and shareholders at the "direct level" of ownership. 
Despite the large interest that the literature has paid to the links between 
ownership structure and firm value, on one side, and financial decisions on the other, a 
major shortcoming, especially for the UK based studies, is the scarcity of detailed panel 
data of ownership. This may be due to the predominant view in this research that, by its 
very nature, the characteristics of ownership are relatively stable over time (e. g., La 
Porta et al., 1999; Zhou, 2001). Therefore, although there were several debates in the 
1990s, and policy-makers and practitioners implemented a number of measures to 
improve the governance of UK firms, relatively few academic works have 
systematically documented the changes in the ownership and corporate governance 
structures in the UK market (Dahya et al., 2002; Dedman, 2002). 
Furthermore, only little research has been undertaken to assess the impact of 
ultimate ownership structures on both corporate decisions and firm value (e. g., Faccio et 
al., 2001; Classens et al., 2002; Attig et al., 2003). In addition, it is an accepted 
argument in the law and finance literature that common law countries tend to have more 
widely held companies, that is, firms without an ultimate controller (e. g., La Porta et al., 
1999; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). Also, studies in this literature argue that common 
law legal systems prevent the controlling shareholders from expropriating minority 
stakeholders through the use of complex ownership structures (e. g., Bebchuck, 1999; 
Wolfenzon, 1999). 
Taking all these arguments as a starting point, in the initial phase of our thesis 
we hand-collected ownership and board composition data for a panel of approximately 
1,100 non-financial UK listed firms for the years 1991-2001, for a total of 10,112 
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observations. Additionally, we also computed ultimate ownership structures. Because of 
the complexity of computation, we calculated the ultimate ownership and control of a 
sub-sample of approximately 550 non-financial firms for the years 1993,1995,1997, 
1999 and 2001, for a total of 2,310 observations. The purpose of this chapter is therefore 
to present this unique database and to provide, through extensive descriptive statistics, 
stylized facts on the ownership, both direct and ultimate, and governance structures in 
the UK. All definitions of variables are provided in Table 2.1. 
Our analysis shows a significant evolution of ownership structure and board 
composition over the last decade. Managerial ownership shows a sharp decreasing 
trend. In particular, the average shareholding by executive directors shows a decreasing 
trend, while the opposite holds for non-executive directors. More specifically, we single 
out changes between the first and last years in which a firm is present in the sample, and 
so document that this sharp decreasing trend is relatively evenly spread across all initial 
board ownership quintiles. 
Unlike the case of directors, ownership by outsiders does not appear to follow a 
specific trend over time. Nonetheless, further investigations reveal that non-managerial 
shareholding increases when it is below 45% in the first year that firms enter the 
sample, while it decreases sharply above that level. 
Furthermore, average board size is relatively constant over time, and we 
document a mean reversion pattern around the average size of seven members. It 
appears that small boards tend to increase their size, while larger boards seem to be 
curtailed. Among directors, non-executives constitute a progressively increasing 
proportion of the board, although they decrease when the proportion reaches two-thirds 
of the board. 
Overall, we provide evidence that substantial changes in ownership structures are not 
uncommon, and that the argument of ownership stability developed by, among others, 
La Porta et al. (1999) may not necessarily apply fully in the UK case. Indeed, our work 
complements other US evidence that ownership is far from stable. For example, 
Holderness et al. (1999) report an average increase in managerial shareholding of about 
13% between 1935 and 1995. Similar arguments are borne out by Denis and Sarin 
(1999), who report significant changes in both ownership structure and board 
composition for US listed companies between 1983 and 1992. 
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In addition, our findings indicate that, when they are reported as the largest 
owners non-financial shareholders and executive directors are the two main categories 
among largest owners. According to our figures, they appear to have control of around 
40% of our sample firms, despite the fact that the undisclosed shareholding is more than 
50% of the market. 
Evidence on ultimate ownership structure reports that widely held firms are 
decreasing over time at each cut-off level. In line with Faccio and Lang's (2002) 
findings, our data show that the existence of complex ownership structures in the UK is 
far from negligible. Furthermore, our data also indicate that the presence of complex 
structures is decreasing in time at any cut-off level. Concentration is achieved through 
direct holding of shares, not through complex structures. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a 
detailed description of the data collection and methodological issues. Section 3 provides 
preliminary descriptive statistics of the entire sample. Section 4 documents the 
evolution of ownership structure and board composition over time. Section 5 
investigates the ultimate ownership structure. Section 6 sets out our conclusions. 
2.2. Data Collection and Sampling 
In the initial stage, a sample of approximately 1,100 non-financial firms listed on 
the London Stock Exchange was selected from Datastream constituent lists3. Ownership 
data were hand-collected from the Price Waterhouse Corporate Register (the December 
issue for each year in the sample period was used). Economic and market data were 
downloaded from Datastream. 
In following companies over time, from two different datasets, it was necessary 
to put a great deal of effort into tracking all name changes and defunct companies. This 
was particularly critical for the computation of ultimate ownership, when we had to 
retrieve the ownership structure of a company when it or its owners changed their name 
in a certain year. This information was mainly collected from the London Stock 
Exchange Yearbook, which reports systematic information on name changes, entries 
removed from the companies section, companies in liquidation, in receivership and in 
administration. As a further check, we used the Companies House website, which also 
3 Our sample includes firms listed in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). 
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provides information on companies, such as previous names and the nature of the 
business (SIC 03). This has the advantage over the LSE Yearbooks of making it 
possible to perform searches of firms using either their old or their new name. 
As we described in the introduction, it has been common in the literature to 
consider ownership as static in time. In order to assess how much the UK market 
reflects this behaviour, the data were initially collected in a bi-annual fashion. The 
preliminary analysis conducted on this initial dataset encouraged us to proceed to collect 
the data for the even years too, because it became apparent that the classical "static" 
view does not seem to prevail in the UK. 
Table 2.2 presents some introductory facts about the dataset. Information was 
collected on an unbalanced panel of 1,181 firms, for a total of 10,112 observations. To 
avoid survivorship biases, we did not require firms to be present in all time periods. 
Particular care was also taken in investigating the presence of attrition biases in 
the sample. In particular, to verify how representative of the UK market this sample is, 
we introduce in Panel A the total number of UK non-financial firms, the total sample 
firms, the corresponding percentage of the UK market that they represent and the total 
non-financial entries removed from LSE. 4 
As Table 2.2 shows, the dataset used for this study includes a minimum of 682 
firms, accounting for around 45% of all UK (non-financial) firms across years. Most 
important, however, is that this sample is representative not simply in terms of the 
absolute number of firms, but also in terms of trend. As reported in the 3id column, since 
1997, with a peak in 1999, there has been a significant increase of de-listed firms. As a 
consequence, the number of companies (that were present in previous years) drops 
accordingly. This trend is reflected in our sample, and it is the reason for the low figure, 
especially in 2001. Therefore, our sample seems to reflect what takes place in the 
market, and does not appear to be biased in any direction. 
A further robustness check was carried out to verify the representativeness of the 
dataset. We compared descriptive statistics for a series of key financial variables 
(leverage, company size, cash holding and market-to-book ratio) for the whole sample 
of listed non-financial firms available in Datastream, against the sample of firms for 
which ownership information were collected. As reported in Table 2.2 Panel C, it 
4 This kind of detailed information is taken from the LSE Yearbooks and is not available prior to 1995. 
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appears that sample companies are very similar to the whole population in terms of 
mean, median and distribution. This further corroborates the fact that the sample we 
collected does not appear to be distorted and can be considered representative of the UK 
market. 
We went to considerable lengths to check for consistency in the data, which we 
inspected thoroughly in several directions. For example, we double-checked that neither 
the individual shares nor the sum of all the shares collected exceeded 100%. 5 In such 
cases, we cross-checked the information with other issues of the Hemscott volumes 
(using the September edition of the same year or the March edition of the following 
year) and/or with the London Stock Exchange Yearbook, which includes some 
ownership information. If it proved impossible to find coherent information from the 
different sources of data, this observation was dropped from the sample. 
Further, one of our main goals was not only to identify company blockholders, 
but also to distinguish between financial and non-financial shareholders. The 
Companies House website proved of inestimable value in this case, by enabling us to 
make this distinction for unlisted companies. 
As we will describe later, we also aimed to describe compliance with the Codes 
of Best Practice. One issue was represented by the fact that a large proportion of firms 
did not report a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) but featured a Managing Director (MD). 
A small survey was then conducted, by contacting 20 of these firms via email. All the 
firms responded (mostly through the company secretary) that whenever the CEO was 
not present, the MD acted on his behalf. This was further corroborated by telephone 
conversations with Charles Bridge, a member of the Higgs Review Team, who 
confirmed that the MD should be considered as the CEO whenever this figure was not 
reported among the company's directors. 
Additionally, to minimize the influence of human error, a series of computer 
programs was generated to compute and inspect first differences of each variable. This 
routine alerted us when significant spikes in ownership data were detected between 
years. This data was then checked to verify whether the changes were real or the result 
of typing mistakes. 
6 
5 This would not apply to firms reporting dual class shares. 
6A non-negligible difficulty in the creation of the dataset was of a computational nature. In order to 
check, clean and merge the dataset with the Datatream database, and generate all the relevant variables, a 
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We collected ownership data for outsiders and insiders. We define outsiders as 
the shareholders who do not sit on the board of directors. More specifically, we 
identified financial shareholders (institutional investors, insurance companies, banks), 
and non-financial shareholders (non-financial corporations and individuals). For the 
ultimate ownership dataset, on the other hand, we collected more detailed data. In 
particular, for the financial shareholders, we distinguished between institutional 
investors, insurance companies and banks (all of them listed and unlisted), and, for non- 
financial shareholders, between non-financial corporations (listed and unlisted) and 
private individuals. In addition, we also identified any stakes held by the Government or 
local authorities. We collected information on ordinary shares held above 3%. 7 
In the case of directors, we have information on both "sides" of the board, 
executives and non-executives. Unlike non-manager owners, UK quoted companies are 
required to disclose in their financial statements the names of all the board members, 
and the proportion of shares held directly and indirectly (beneficial and non-beneficial) 
by executive and non-executive directors, even if the ownership stake is zero 
(Companies Act, 1985)8. This allows us to detect the presence of managers even when 
they hold no shares. We collected information on board composition, namely the total 
number of executives and non-executives. Moreover, inside the boards we are able to 
identify the Chief Executive Officer (or Managing Director when a CEO is not 
reported), and the Chairman of the Board. Additional information concerns the industry, 
the total number of shares, the use of multiple class shares and the number and names of 
creditors. 9 
series of computer programs had to be created. Overall, they constitute a 144-page Word document. One 
particularly challenging task was the "re-ranking" of ownership information. Since Hemscott reports 
information by dividing between outsiders and insiders, it was necessary to create a set of Stata do-files in 
order to invert the data matrix and re-rank it, in order to be able to single out the largest owners, also 
divided by category. Help by the Statalist usergroup is kindly acknowledged. 
The requirement to disclose share blocks was introduced in 1976, at 10%; it was then lowered to 5% 
until 1989, and further reduced to 3% from 1990 on (Crespi-Cladera and Renneboog, 2003; Franks et al., 
2003). However, the Corporate Register (1991 edition) maintains the disclosure threshold at 5%. 
8 Non-beneficial shares give voting rights without cash rights. Typically they are held on behalf of 
spouses or relatives. Hemscott Corporate Register reports shareholdings and transactions by a director's 
spouse or children as part of that director's beneficial shareholding, unless the company has specifically 
expressed that the holding should be treated as non-beneficial when announcing the transaction. Own 
computation reveals that non-beneficial shareholding appears negligible. 
9 This allows us to identify, for example, banks that are at the same time creditors and shareholders of 
firms. 
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Given the complexity of calculating ultimate ownership, we computed the 
ultimate ownership structures for a sub-sample of approximately 550 firms for the years 
1993,1995,1997,1999 and 2001, for a total of 2310 observations. 
In order to find the ultimate controller for each firm, we followed the procedure 
adopted by the majority of previous research that analyzed ultimate ownership 
structures (e. g., La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; 
Gadhoum et al., 2005). The first step is to define the cut-off threshold, as the amount of 
shares that enables the ultimate controller to have a certain control in the firm. The 
computation of the ultimate controller of firm Y is carried on only at ownership levels 
above the cut-off points. The cut-off thresholds most commonly employed in this 
literature are 20%, 10% and 5%. They are used also to simplify the picture of the 
ultimate ownership structure, and to identify only those ultimate controllers that are 
more likely to influence the main decisions of the company. Since the investigation of 
the ultimate controller consists in searching for the owner of the owner until no further 
link back can be retrieved, the a priori imposition of a cut-off level effectively limits the 
number of backward links to be searched. Therefore, the ultimate ownership structure of 
a firm can change, depending on the particular cut-off levels employed. 
In the second step, cash flow and voting rights are computed. Cash flow rights 
refer to the claims that a shareholder has on the company's cash flow (ownership). They 
are the rights, for example, to receive dividends. We can measure these rights by the 
percentage of shares that are currently disclosed for UK companies at the 3% threshold. 
To compute the cash flow rights of the ultimate controller, we calculate the product of 
the ownership stakes in each link along the control chain, when the shares in each link 
are above the chosen cut-off level. Control rights, on the other hand, refer to the control 
that a shareholder has in the company and are defined as the shares of the weakest link 
along the control chain. 10 For instance, if company Z owns 20% of firm X that owns 
10 Alternatively, some studies have adopted probabilistic voting models (such as the Shapley or Banzhaf 
indices) to measure the actual control rights of shareholders (Cubbin and Leech, 1983; Leech and Leahy, 
1991; Leech, 2002,2003; Crespi-Cladera and Renneboog et al., 2003). The basic intuition of such method 
is to define the degree of control as the probability of the controlling shareholding securing major support 
in a contested vote (pivotal shareholder). However, this methodology requires the complete distribution of 
shares of all shareholders in a single company, in order to compute their control rights. Therefore, it 
cannot capture the multi-level dimension typical of an ultimate ownership structure. In fact, along each 
control chain, the total shares cannot be summed to 100 because the shareholders belong to different 
companies. They are linked to each other by ownership relationships and they are not independent, as in 
the direct ownership dimension. 
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15% of firm Y, then this company Z owns 3% of the cash flow rights of firm Y (the 
product of the ownership stakes along the chain) and controls 15% of firm Y (the 
weakest link along the control chain). 
Cash flow and control rights may differ, because of pyramids and holdings 
through multiple control chains and cross-holdings. In particular, these complex 
structures are devices to enhance control rights over cash flow rights. Their definitions 
are included in Table 2.1. Figure 2.1 shows the ultimate ownership structure of one firm 
in our sample, Acal Plc in 1997, with all the disclosed shareholders above 3%. It is a 
useful case study in illustrating how we calculated cash flow and control rights, and 
how we identified pyramids and multiple control chains. Detailed explanation of the 
procedure is in Appendix 2.1. 
2.3. Descriptive statistics 
In this section, we detail some of the general characteristics of our ownership 
sample in a static framework. 
Panel A of Table 2.3 reports information on shareholding by both outside 
investors and insiders. It shows that outside shareholders are the largest group of owners 
in the UK, with an average of around 32% of shares across the entire time series. In line 
with Goergen and Renneboog's (2001a) results, we document that financial firms 
(Instit) are the largest group of investors, and hold around two-thirds of all the non- 
managerial ownership. Our figures are also comparable with those of Short and Keasey 
(1999) and Stapledon (1996). " 
This predominance by financial institutions can be traced back to the 
considerable increase in funds available to the institutions for investment since World 
War II. Another reason lies in the new disposition of insurance companies and pension 
funds, since the 1960s, towards equities, given the concern of institutions to protect their 
investments during the high inflation period, and higher performance by equities than 
by gilts or cash (Stapledon, 1996). 
Board ownership accounts for about 12% of total shares, of which 10% are held 
by executive (Exec) and 2% by non-executive directors (Nonex). Of the executives, the 
chairman owns the highest amount of shares, an average of 3%, and when the chairman 
11 It should be kept in mind that these authors report values for outsider ownership after rescaling it to 
100. 
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is also the chief executive officer (joint CH-CEO) he holds more than 2%. Non- 
executives are the shareholder category with the lowest amount of shares: in the mean 
and median firms they hold respectively 2.5% and 0.143%. 
Panel B reports information on the composition of both outside shareholders and 
board of directors. It shows that, on average, UK companies have four non-managerial 
owners, of which three are financial institutions (Totinstit) and one is a non-financial 
owner (Totexternal). On the other hand, UK boards appear to be composed of an 
average of seven members, four executives (Totexec) and three non-executives 
(Totnonex). The average proportion of non-executives on the board (Ratio) is, therefore, 
42%. These figures provide a preliminary indication of the relative dispersion of UK 
ownership structures, which add up to an average of ten owners. 
Panel C provides other characteristics of the sample firms for which we have 
data. In line with other UK based studies (i. e, Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Davies et al., 
2005), the size of the average firm, measured as the logarithm of total assets, is equal to 
11.12%; the percentage of total debt to total assets is around 17%, and the market 
capitalization is 800 million GBP. 
Table 2.4 provides, by industry, details of the average values of the same 
ownership and composition features presented earlier. We combined the information on 
sectors provided by both Datastream and Price Waterhouse Corporate Register in order 
to identify the industry groups reported in this table. Ownership characteristics seem to 
change significantly across sectors. In particular, firms belonging to the regulated sector 
show an average value of outside ownership of 27%, which is significantly lower than 
that reported for the other sectors. The same argument holds for shareholdings by 
financial companies and directors, which hold 14.8% and 4.1%, respectively. Overall, 
these figures document a certain degree of inter-industry variability of ownership 
structures. Shareholdings by financial investors and executive directors show the 
highest values of the inter-industry standard deviations, equal to 5.55 and 3.39, 
respectively. One possible interpretation of this preliminary analysis is that average firm 
size is significantly different across sectors. For this purpose, we report average size in 
the last column of the table. For instance, it can be seen how firms in the Utility industry 
are the largest ones. Consequently, it is natural to find that average shareholding levels 
in this industry are significantly lower than in other sectors. Our own calculations reveal 
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that the correlation between ownership characteristics and size is negative and 
statistically significant at one percent level. 
A further interpretation may be that different sectors may reflect different 
growth opportunities for firms, and this may have an impact on the expected agency 
costs of firms. For example, firms with low growth options may be expected to suffer 
more, ceteris paribus, from the free cash flow problem (Jensen, 1986). This, in turn, may 
be reflected in different characteristics of the ownership structure by firms. However, no 
clear pattern appears to emerge from the average market-to-book ratio of firms. 12 
Table 2.5 further investigates different groups by size. We measure firm size by market 
capitalization (reported in thousands of pounds), and we divide its distribution in 
terziles in order to identify small, medium and large firms. As we would expect from 
the corporate finance literature (see, e. g., Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990), Panel A 
shows that larger stakes of ownership are held in smaller firms, by both outsiders and 
insiders. More specifically, insider ownership seems to be more significantly affected 
by firm size in that, on average, board members own around 21% of small firms but 
only about 4% of large ones. One possible explanation for this result may relate to 
portfolio diversification. Investors usually tend to hold diversified portfolios to hedge 
against risk. This issue may be particularly important in the case of managerial 
ownership, because managers are typically less diversified than other stakeholders. For 
example, the majority of their human capital is invested in the firm. Consequently, a 
manager who holds an increasing number of shares of the firm he manages increases his 
exposure to its specific risk. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Himmelberg et al. (1999), 
among others, provide evidence that managerial ownership is determined by the 
riskiness of the firm. 
Moreover, in Panel B, in accordance with what was reported in the Codes of 
Best Practice (Hampel, 1998), larger firms tend to have significantly larger boards, and 
also more equal representation of executives and non-executives. Our own calculations 
reveal that very similar patterns are identified when we use the natural logarithm of total 
assets as a size clustering criterion. 
Panel C confirms that smaller firms (in terms of total assets) also tend to have 
lower leverage the difference between the two subgroups is always statistically 
12 Own calculations reveal how, the correlation between ownership characteristics and the proxy for 
growth opportunities is not stable in sign and only in few cases is statistically significant. 
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significant at any conventional level. Tests of differences in means between small and 
large firms (last column Panel A and Panel B) show that the difference between the two 
subgroups is always statistically significant at any conventional level. 
2.4. Evolution of ownership and governance structures 
In this section we investigate the time-series properties of the data. First, we 
show the main trends on an annual basis. Second, we examine the changes, on average, 
between the first year a firm enters our sample and the final year. Third, we document 
the frequency distribution of the changes for individual firm-years. Finally, we provide 
comparative results for the standard deviations of the main variables between and within 
firms. 
2.4.1 Ownership structures 
Table 2.6 provides detailed information on the evolution of ownership structures 
during the 1990s. We report data on average ownership by outsiders and insiders, which 
are also divided into their respective sub-categories of financial (Instit) and non- 
financial firms (External) for the former, and executives (Exec) and non-executives 
(Nonex) for the latter. We also describe the annual percentage of the undisclosed 
shareholding (Float), and finally the average total shares outstanding. The figures 
reported for 1991 for outside ownership are not directly comparable to the following 
years, due to the different disclosure still being reported by Hemscott. 13 
The figures in this table illustrate one important feature of UK companies: 
according to our sample, more than half of the market is held below the disclosure 
threshold. 
On the other hand, among the disclosed shareholders, the distribution of outside 
ownership shows, in general, a certain degree of volatility over time, but it does not 
seem to reveal a clear trend. Across the different typologies, financial institutions are 
the largest class of investors in the UK. As already shown in Table 2.3, more than 20% 
of shares are held either by institutional investors, insurance or banks over time. On the 
other hand, non-financial investors appear to increase their average shares from about 
11% in the first half of the decade to more than 13% in the second half. 
13 Hemscott still reports non-managerial shareholding with the 5% cut-off level in 1991, despite the fact 
that the disclosure rule decreased the threshold to 3% in 1990. 
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In contrast, insider ownership shows a marked decreasing pattern. The average 
ordinary shareholding by all directors decreases by approximately 6 percentage points 
in eleven years, and half of this decrease appears to occur between 1991 and 1993, from 
16.5% to 13.6%. This trend is in line with what Franks et al. (2003) show for UK firms 
over the last century. These authors argue that decreasing board ownership can be 
explained by acquisitions, rights issues and placings, in particular in the first half of the 
century; rather than by the sale of shares by directors in the secondary market. 
Our figures on average shares outstanding may corroborate this argument, in that 
they suggest that companies increased their capital from 1991 to 2001 while managers 
do not appear to have subscribed to the new issues. 
However, the reduction in managerial ownership seems to involve mainly 
executive directors, whose average shareholding nearly halves in ten years. Conversely, 
the average percentage of shares held by non-executives, although always lower, shows 
a steady increase. In 1991 non-executives held, on average, one seventh of the shares 
that executives hold, about 2%, but by 2001 their average shareholding was almost half 
of it, at 3%. Consequently, the negative correlation between insider ownership and 
number of shares seems to hold mainly for executive directors, but not for the rest of the 
categories identified in our data set. One possible interpretation of this opposite trends 
between executives and non-executives may be that, in time, a number of executive 
directors became non-executives. However, with the detail of data available at the 
moment it is not possible to further investigate this suggestive hypothesis. 
More insights on the nature of changes in different groups of shareholders are 
provided in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. We plot the average shareholding (for the categories 
shown in each Panel) in the initial and final year that a firm is present in the dataset, 
similarly to what presented by Denis and Sarin (1999) for US companies between 1983 
and 1992. Firms are grouped according to the distribution (in 5% intervals) of their 
ownership in the first sample year along the horizontal axes. 
Figure 2.2 Panel A shows a marked increase in average shareholding between 
the first and the last year for each quintile of the distribution up to 25%. In fact, it seems 
that outsiders in the final year hold twice as many shares as in the initial year. For 
instance, in the third quintile (10-15%), non-managerial shareholding is about 12% in 
the initial year, while it increases to 31% in the final year. Nonetheless, this tendency 
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decreases as shareholding in the initial year increases, up to the ninth quintile (40%- 
45%), and then becomes negative. This means that firms with higher outside ownership 
in the initial year have then experienced a relevant decrease in the non-managerial 
shareholding. For instance, in the tenth quintile (between 50% and 55%), the negative 
change amounts to about 11% of total shares between the initial and final years. Panels 
B and C document similar tendencies for financial (Instit) and non-financial firms 
(External), respectively. Additional information we obtain from these Panels, however, 
shows that negative changes occur after the seventh quintile for financial ownership, but 
after the third quintile for non-financial. 
In contrast to outside ownership, the results for board ownership in Figure 2.3 
Panel A indicate a sharp decrease in managerial ownership across all ownership 
intervals, except for the lowest quintiles of the distribution (0-5%). Similar trends are 
reported for both executive (Exec) and non-executive (Nonex) shareholding in Panels B 
and C14. 
We also investigate the frequency distribution of yearly variations in ownership 
for individual firms, in the attempt to analyse how evenly these changes take place over 
time. Table 2.7 reports the percentage of firm-year observations that exhibit average 
yearly changes in the main categories analysed above. For each category, these changes 
are divided into intervals from 10% decrease to 10% increase. 
The first column reports that in 12.3% of the observations in our sample the 
decrease in outside ownership is more than 10%. The magnitude of change differs 
significantly between outside ownership and board ownership. In fact, more firm-years 
experience significant variations in outside ownership. For example, in 32% of cases, 
outside ownership varies by more than 10% (in absolute value), while only 17% of 
firm-years display a variation of 2% in absolute value. This result indicates that, even if 
outside ownership does not follow a sharp trend over time, it is characterized by a 
significant degree of time-series variability that is relatively evenly spread across firms. 
On the other hand, as far as board ownership is concerned, the majority of firms (about 
64% of observations) experience changes of 2% in absolute value every year. This may 
14 Some studies have linked ownership changes to firm age. For example, Denis and Sarin (1999) provide 
evidence of the fact that large changes (both positive and negative) of managerial ownership appear to be 
more common in younger firms. This argument however does not appear to hold when changes in board 
composition are analyzed. In their analysis the authors define firm age as the number of years that a firm 
has been incorporated. Unfortunately we do not currently have access to this kind of information 
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suggest that managerial ownership varies more slowly (though significantly) over the 
time span. 
Taken together, all these findings suggest that substantial changes in ownership 
structures are not uncommon, and that the classic argument of ownership stability may 
not necessarily apply fully in the UK case. 
2.4.2 Board composition 
As far as board structure is concerned, Table 2.8 reports detailed information on 
board size and composition. In 1991, the board is composed, on average, of seven 
individuals, and this value is, albeit marginally increasing, relatively constant in time. 
This is in line with Peasnell et al. (2003) and Young (2000), who report an average of 8 
individuals in 1991 and 1995. This difference may be due to fact that, in those studies, 
the initial sampling of firms starts from the largest 1000 corporations listed on the LSE, 
while our sampling also includes smaller firms. Our results are also in line with Lasfer 
(2002), who reports on average 3.99 executives and 3.01 non-executives for 1996-1997. 
Despite the stability of board size, board composition seems to change quite 
significantly. In 1991, the average firm's board consists of 4.57 executives (Totexec) 
and 2.50 non-executives (Totnonex), but by 2001 these two groups are almost equal, 
with 3.67 and 3.57 average members respectively. A similar pattern is documented for 
the average number of executives and non-executives who actually hold shares (cum 
shares). Consequently, the proportion of non-executives to total number of directors 
(Ratio) increases significantly over the decade, from 36% at the beginning of the 1990s 
to almost 50% in 2001. The same tendency is reported in Peasnell et al. (2003). 
As in the previous section, we investigate the evolution of board composition, 
and provide further analyses of the nature of the changes that characterize it. Figure 2.4 
plots the average levels of board size, number of executives and non-executives and 
proportion of non-executives on the board for the first and last year that the firm is 
present in the sample. Distributions by number of all directors, executives and non- 
executives are shown along the horizontal axes of the first three panels, while 
distribution by proportion of non-executives to total board (ratio) is in the last panel. 
Overall, Figure 2.4 clearly shows that board composition is subject to significant 
changes over time. More specifically, in Panel A the number of directors exhibits some 
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mean reversion. For boards with less than seven directors in the first year that a firm 
enters the sample, companies seem to enlarge their board size by, at most, two 
individuals, while for boards larger than seven members they show the opposite pattern, 
reducing the size by on average three directors. An analogous mean reversion tendency 
is detected for executives and non-executives in Panels B and C, respectively. 
Furthermore, boards with a very low proportion of non-executives (Ratio) in the 
initial year show a sharp increase in the final year by on average 0.17 percentage points, 
while boards on which the ratio initially exceeds 50% tend to revert towards this value 
in the last year (Panel D). 
Further insights into this evolution are provided by investigation of the 
frequency distribution of yearly changes in board composition proxies for individual 
firms. Table 2.9 presents the percentage of firm-year observations that experience 
average yearly changes in those variables. The changes intervals are defined as less than 
-2 and greater than 2 for board size, executives and non-executives, and less than -0.2 
and greater than 0.2 for the ratio. 
According to the results, a large percentage of firms seems to remain stable in 
time in terms of board size and composition. For instance, more than 43% of 
observations do not show on average any yearly change in the total number of directors. 
Nonetheless, almost the majority of firms display variations from 1 to 2 members in 
absolute values on the board. Only 6% of observations experience large changes by 
more than two members. Similar figures are reported for the number of executive 
directors and non-executive directors. Furthermore, the results document that a non- 
negligible fraction of companies, more than 8%, significantly changes the proportion of 
non-executives on the board (Ratio), although in more than 73% of cases this variation 
is slow. 
The reason for these dynamics may lie in the increasing attention devoted to 
corporate governance reorganization, after the corporate scandals in the UK in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. These were followed by the introduction of a number of codes 
of best practice. The recommendations included in the codes aim at enhancing financial 
accountability to shareholders, on the basis of improved information, continued self- 
regulation, more independent boards and audit committees (Cadbury Report, 1992; 
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Hampel Report, 1998; Higgs Report, 2003), and setting directors' remuneration 
(Greenbury Report, 1995). 15 
To investigate this issue in more detail, we singled out measurable 
recommendations included in the main codes, in order to be able to describe the 
distribution of firms that complied through time. The first recommendation, common to 
all the reports, regards the separation of the two leading roles of Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer. Further, the Cadbury Report (1992) recommends that there should be 
at least three non-executives on the board (provided that the Chairman is not also the 
CEO). The subsequent Hampel Report (1998) recommended that at least 33% of the 
board should be composed of non-executives. 
Table 2.10 shows that, in 1991, before the issue of the Cadbury report, 73% of 
firms already split the roles of Chairman and CEO. An increase in compliance with this 
recommendation is detected in 1993 (79% of firms now split the two roles), by which 
time the LSE required firms to follow it. This is in line with Conyon (1994), who 
reports that 77% of firms in his sample, for 1993, comply. The level of compliance 
reaches 90% in 2001. Similar figures are described in the Higgs Report (2003). 
In addition, an increasing number of firms also complies with the board 
composition recommendations. At the beginning of the sample period, only 38% of the 
firms in our sample seem to have implemented the Cadbury recommendation. However, 
by the end of the decade this percentage has risen to 71%. Similar trends are 
documented for compliance with the Hampel Report. 
In general, all the results for board composition show significant changes over 
time. This suggests that the hypothesis of the stability of corporate governance 
structures may be rejected for the UK companies. 
In summary, the findings in this section document that ownership and board 
structures have varied considerably in the UK market over the last decade, and that 
these changes have affected a large majority of firms. To provide final evidence on this 
issue, we compute the fraction of firms in our sample that do not show any type of large 
change over the period analyzed. We define large changes in outside ownership as a 
change of more than 10% of shares; in board ownership, as a change of more than 5%; 
in board composition, as a change in the number of directors of more than two 
15 For an overview of the debate that occurred during the 1990s, refer to Demirag et al. (2000). For a 
review of compliance and performance impacts see Dedman (2002). 
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members; and, finally, a change in fraction of non-executives on the board of more than 
0.2. Of the entire sample of 1,181 firms, only 65 firms (5.5% of our sample) show stable 
ownership and stable corporate governance structures over time. In contrast, almost all 
companies, 93% of the sample, seem to have significantly (10% of the shares in 
absolute terms) altered their outside shareholders' ownership at least once during their 
presence in the sample; 50% of firms have experienced at least once an important 
change in management's shareholding (5% of the shares in absolute terms), while 64% 
have experienced marked changes in their total number of directors (2 members in 
absolute terms). 
2.4.3 Controller in direct ownership structure 
Some of the previous analyses have already provided evidence concerning 
ownership dispersion. First, we show that the total average number of blockholders is 
11 (Table 2.3 Panel B16); further, we document that half of the market is on average 
held below the 3% threshold (Float, Table 2.6). As we argued in the introduction, this is 
an important aspect that has potentially critical implications for, for example, manager 
shareholder conflicts. Therefore, in this part of our investigation, we analyse ownership 
concentration, and the identity of the controllers in the UK firms. 
Table 2.11 Panel A provides some preliminary evidence on the average 
shareholding by the largest owner, divided by category. Overall, the average ownership 
of the largest stakeholder (Largest Ownership) is around 18%, and it seems to decrease 
slightly over time. 
More specifically, among non-managerial shareholders, a financial institution, as 
a largest shareholder (Large Instit), exhibits on average a stockholding equal to 13%, 
which is lower than other non-managerial owners. Nonetheless, it also shows an 
increasing trend over time, from 12% at the beginning of the 1990s to more than 13% at 
the end of the sample period. Conversely, a non-financial largest shareholder (Large 
External) owns twice as much as a financial institution, with a modest decrease towards 
the end of the period. The results for the largest outside shareholder (Largest) show an 
average of 16.5% of shares. This finding is lower than that reported by Davies et al. 
(2005), 18.82% for 1997. Peasnell et al. (2003) present even lower figures, 12.85% and 
16 The average number is actually 10 when we consider figures for managers who effectively own shares 
(cum shares). 
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12.88%, for 1991 and 1995, respectively. However, the difference from our data may be 
because the standardization was computed on the total sample firms, rather than on the 
number of firms where there actually is a largest shareholder. 
Moreover, we document that when managers actually are the largest owners 
(Largest Manager), their average shareholding is more than 22%, and increases 
somewhat over time. The data also indicate that, in line with what was previously 
detected; executive directors are the predominant figures on the board when they are 
also the largest owners (Large Exec), with more than 23% of shares. 
In Panel B we show the distribution of firms by the identity of the largest 
shareholder. Most frequently, outsiders appear to be the largest owner in the firm. For 
example, in 1992 about 70% of firms have a non-managerial largest shareholder, while, 
at the end of the sample period, this figure increases to 78%. Conversely, the number of 
manager-controlled firms has nearly halved, from 43% in 1991 to 23% in 2001. 
Financial institutions, on the other hand, more frequently appear as the largest owner 
in the sample firms; however, on average they tend to hold considerably fewer shares 
than other investors. For example, in 2001, managers hold an average of 23% of shares 
when they are the largest owners. Non-financial owners hold an average of 21% of 
shares, while financial institutions hold about 13%. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that, although the undisclosed 
shareholding (Float) is more than 50% of the market in all years, there appears to be a 
relatively significant degree of concentration in the hands of the largest owners in the 
firm. 
2.5. Ultimate ownership structure 
In this section, we describe the main features of the ultimate ownership structure 
that emerged from the analysis of our database. All the results will be shown for every 
year by different cut-off, calculated with respect to the control rights. 
2.5.1 Widely held firms and ultimate controllers 
Table 2.12 shows the distribution of companies with respect to the identity of the 
ultimate controller. Widely Held firms are those companies without an ultimate 
controller at a certain cut-off level. The ultimate ownership literature refers to these 
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firms as firms with dispersed ownership. The difference between the figures relative to 
widely held firms at 20% cut-off and 10% cut-off is immediately evident. For example, 
in 1993 about 70% of companies do not have an ultimate controller at 20% cut-off, 
while only approximately 30% do not have an ultimate controller at 10% cut-off. This 
implies, in other words, that the ultimate controller has controlling rights of between 
10% and 20% in the majority of firms. The result is relatively in line with what 
Gadhoum et al. (2005) report for US in 1996, although at 10% cut-off US companies 
seem more dispersed than UK ones. It should be underlined that their study includes all 
US listed firms, whereas our sample includes only non-financial companies. 
Moreover, we document a decreasing trend over time of the widely held firms 
for each cut-off. For example, at 10% cut-off, in 1993 30.07% of companies have no 
ultimate controller, while the figure decreases to 21.41% in 2001. This may suggest that 
a degree of re-concentration of ownership has occurred over the last decade in the UK. 
Keeping in mind potential bias due to the peculiar nature of the unlisted firms, 
we report that unlisted companies are the predominant type in every year at the lowest 
cut-offs. The second most recurrent type among ultimate controllers is manager, 
particularly at the lowest cut-off of 5%. However, this figure is gradually decreasing 
over time, supporting what the previous analyses reported on direct ownership. Widely 
held financial institutions are more common as ultimate controllers at lower cut-off 
levels, that is, 10% and 5%. This means that financial institutions generally are ultimate 
controllers with a percentage of control rights between 5% and 20%. This seems to be in 
line with our findings in Table 2.11 Panel A. 
2.5.2 Identity of the ultimate controller 
Table 2.13 documents that unlisted non-financial companies are the dominant 
typology at the highest cut-off of 20%. In 1997, about 28% of firms have an unlisted 
non-financial firm as ultimate controller. Conversely, unlisted institutional investors are 
the predominant category at the 10% and 5% cut-offs. '? In 1997, at the 10% level, 30% 
of firms have an unlisted institutional investor as controller. 
17 We have to highlight the strong presence of listed Institutional shareholders in 1997, at 10% and 5% 
cut-off. The value is so different from the other years (5.69% and 5.16% at 10% and 5% cut-off 
respectively) because of the presence of Mercury Asset Mgmt as ultimate controller. In that year, 
Mercury Asset Mgmt had only one disclosed owner, Munich Reinsurance, with 4.17%. Due to this low 
35 
As far as widely held financial institutions are concerned, dominance by listed 
insurance companies and listed banks as first ultimate controllers is reported. 
Finally, among managers, executives are the dominant typology in every year 
and at each cut-off level. Furthermore, firms with executive directors as ultimate 
controllers decrease over time at each cut-off, while those with non-executives display 
the opposite trend, in line with what we described earlier for direct equity ownership. 
In general, we can say that, on the one hand, financial institutions, both listed 
and unlisted (defined as the sum of institutional investors, insurance and banks), are the 
predominant ultimate controller type in our sample. Their presence increases over the 
entire decade, with a slight inflexion in 2001. On the other hand, ownership by 
managers, both executive and non-executive, shows exactly the opposite trend. 
Additionally, when the control rights span between 5% and 20%, financial institutions 
are more frequently the ultimate controllers. Above the 20% threshold, managers 
become the predominant type. 
2.5.3 Complex structures which separate cash flow rights from control rights 
We now investigate whether ultimate controllers in the UK adopt complex 
structures to enhance control over their cash-flow rights (complex ultimate controller). 
Table 2.14 Panel A provides details of the fraction of firms with ultimate controllers 
using (or not) such complex structures at each cut-off level. These figures illustrate that, 
although the majority of firms does not show any complex structure for the ultimate 
controller, a non-negligible fraction of companies do adopt them, in particular at the 
lowest cut-off levels. For instance, at 10% in 1995,16.3% of companies display a 
complex ultimate controller, while at 5% in the same year the fraction of firms with a 
complex ultimate controller increases to 21%. Our findings are in general in line with 
Faccio and Lang (2002) in 1996, at 20% cut-off. 
Nonetheless, a non-linear trend emerges in the decreasing use of such structures 
over the entire decade, with a peak, generally, in 1995, and with a steady increase of 
simple shareholding structures. 
shareholding, Munich Reinsurance was not considered in the computation of the pyramid chain. Mercury 
Asset Mgmt was therefore identified as the ultimate controller. This ownership structure was different 
both in the previous years, when Mercury Asset Mgmt was owned by SG Warburg, with about 75%, and 
in the following year, when Mercury Asset Mgmt became unlisted and, consequently, untraceable for 
calculation of the ownership structure. 
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As a robustness check, we singled out a balanced panel of 264 firms that are 
present for the entire period. We detect, as above, similar trends in the decreasing use of 
complex structures, and a gradual increase of simple structures, with a rather sharp drop 
in the widely held firms. 
On the other hand, Panel B shows the distribution of those firms with a complex 
ultimate controller by different categories of complex structures. In particular, it reports 
that the pyramidal structure is the most common device, even if its use decreases over 
time at the lowest cut-off levels. For example, at the 10% level in 1995, in 67.09% of 
firms the ultimate controller uses the pyramidal holding chain to lock its control inside 
the firm, while this percentage drops to 60.87% by 2001.18 The multiple control chain 
shows almost the same trend over time. Cross-holding is the most complex structure of 
ultimate ownership, and it is the least adopted in our sample: in 1995, at 10%, 6% of 
firms have a complex ultimate controller. 
As a further investigation, we document in Table 2.15 the percentage of firms 
that adopt complex structures over all their shareholdings (complex structure firms), and 
which category of complex structure these companies adopt most. In other words, we 
detect whether, in a firm, either the first or the second or other controllers use complex 
structures. The results in Panel A show that the number of complex structure firms is 
higher than that for complex ultimate controller. For the same figure as above (at 10% 
in 1995), 19% of firms have complex structures. In addition, the same decreasing trend 
detected above holds even in this case. In Panel B, symmetrically with Table 2.14, we 
report the distribution of complex structure firms by category of complex structures. 
The results are virtually identical to the previous table. 
Among the complex structures described so far, we were also able to detect 
those companies in our sample with multiple classes of shares. For brevity, we do not 
include a table here, but we report that in our sample there are 26 firms with multiple 
shares. This finding is in line with the cross-country analysis by Nenova (2003), which 
reports 27 UK firms with dual class shares in 1997. These results, however, are lower 
than those documented by Faccio and Lang (2002), with more than 400 companies for 
1997. The difference is due to the fact that Faccio and Lang's sample also includes 
financial firms, which seem to use multiple classes of shares more than non-financial 
1 Pyramids are common not only in the UK firms, but even in other countries, both Western European 
and East-Asian (Claessens et al., 2000,2002; Faccio and Lang, 2002). 
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companies. Moreover, in our sample we take into account only those dual-class firms 
with all the classes of shares listed in the official market. 
2.5.4 Divergence between ownership and control 
All the complex structures described above create a divergence between cash- 
flow rights and control rights. Panels A and B in Table 2.16 illustrate that, across the 
years, the average ultimate controller has 20.6% of cash flow rights at 10% cut-off, 
while its control rights are 22.3% at 10% cut-off. 
Panel C presents the divergence defined as the difference between control rights 
and cash-flow rights for the first ultimate controller, as in La Porta et al. (2002). The 
minimum value, zero, represents "no divergence", which means that the ultimate 
controller does not use complex structures. At each cut-off level, the mean of the 
divergence is wider in 1995, while the lowest value is in 2001. On average, this figure is 
1.72 at 10% cut-off. La Porta et al. (2002) report a mean value equal to 0.1% for the 
same variable calculated for the 20 largest companies at 10% cut-off in 1996. This 
contrast in results is due to the sample differences. 19 
Taken together, these results document that the majority of our firms has indeed 
an ultimate controller, and also that the presence of complex structures among ultimate 
controllers is not uncommon. 
2.6. Conclusions 
We presented descriptive statistics on the direct ownership structure of a sample 
of approximately 1100 UK non-financial listed firms, for the decade 1991-2001, and on 
ultimate ownership and control of a sub-sample of approximately 550 firms for the 
years 1993,1995,1997,1999 and 2001, for a total of 2310 observations. As far as direct 
ownership is concerned, our data show that outside ownership is relatively volatile but 
does not show a net trend over time, while inside ownership shows a clear decreasing 
tendency. Our analysis shows a significant evolution of ownership structure and board 
composition over the last decade. Managerial ownership shows a sharp decreasing trend. In 
particular, average shareholding by executive directors shows a decreasing trend, while the 
19 We perform calculations on o second measure used in this literature, namely the ratio of cash-flow 
rights to control rights. On average, this figure is 0.89 over time for each cut-off. This is in line with the 
findings of Faccio and Lang (2002), who report a value of 0.88. 
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opposite holds for non-executive directors. More specifically, we single out changes between 
the first and the last year in which the firm is present in the sample, and document that this 
sharp decreasing trend is rather evenly spread across all initial board ownership quintiles. 
Unlike ownership by directors, ownership by outsiders does not appear to follow 
a specific trend over time. However, further investigations reveal that non-managerial 
shareholding increases when it is below 45% in the first year that firms enter the 
sample, while it decreases sharply above the cut-off level. 
Furthermore, average board size is relatively constant over time, and we document 
a mean reversion pattern around the average size of seven members. It appears that small 
boards tend to increase their size, while larger boards seem to be curtailed. Among 
directors, non-executives constitute a progressively increasing proportion of the board, 
although they decrease when the proportion reaches two-thirds of the board. 
Additional analyses of the stability of ownership structure in the UK also reveal 
that a non-negligible sub-set of our sample observations experience large changes in 
ownership structure or board composition. In contrast, only about 5% of all sample 
firms show stable ownership and governance structures. 
Overall, we provide evidence that substantial changes in ownership structures 
are not uncommon, and that the classic argument of ownership stability may not 
necessarily apply fully in the UK case. 
Further, our findings indicate that non-financial shareholders and executive 
directors are the two main categories of largest owners. According to our figures, they 
appear to have control of around 40% of our sample firms, despite the fact that the 
undisclosed shareholding is more than 50% of the market. 
Evidence on ultimate ownership structure reports that widely held firms are 
decreasing over time at each cut-off level. Additionally, our findings do not appear to 
support the orthodox view in the law and finance literature, according to which we 
would not expect to find complex structure in common law countries. In fact, in line 
with Faccio and Lang (2002), our data show that the existence of complex ownership 
structures in the UK is far from negligible, although the presence of complex structures 
is decreasing in time at any cut-off level. 
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Table 2.1. Variables definitions. 
Panel A. Direct ownership variables 
Outside Ownership Sum of all external shareholding above the disclosure threshold 
Instil Total percentage of shares held by the disclosed investment companies, insurance 
and banks in each firm 
External Total percentage of shares held by the disclosed non-financial corporations and 
individuals in each firm 
Board Ownership Total percentage of ordinary shareholding by all directors (%) 
Exec Percentage of ordinary shareholding by executive directors (%) 
Nonex Percentage of ordinary shareholding by non-executive directors (%) 
Float Total percentage of ordinary shareholding held below the disclosure threshold 
Number of Outsiders Sum of all external shareholders 
Totinstit Sum of all external shareholders that are financial institutions (pension funds, banks, 
insurance companies, fund managers) 
Totexternal Sum of all external shareholders that are private individuals, other non-financial 
companies 
Board Size Sum of all executive and non-executive directors 
Totexec Sum of all executive directors 
Totnonex Sum of all non-executive directors 
Ratio The proportion of non-executive directors on total board 
Num. of Executives cum 
Shares 
Sum of all executive directors who hold shares in the firm 
Num. ofNon-executives cum 
SHares 
Sum of all non-executive directors who hold shares in the firm 
Largest Ownership Percentage of shares by the largest shareholder in the firm 
Largest Percentage of shares by the first non-managerial shareholder 
Large Instit Percentage of shares by the first non-managerial shareholder when it is an 
institutional investor, insurance company or bank 
Large External Percentage of shares by the first non-managerial shareholder when it is a non- 
financial company or an individual 
Largest Manager Percentage of shares by the first shareholder when it is a manager 
Large Exec Percentage of shares by the first managerial shareholder when it is an executive 
Large Nonex Percentage of shares by the first managerial shareholder when it is a non-executive 
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Table 2.1. Variables definitions. (continued) 
Panel B. Ultimate ownership variables 
Widely Held Company in the sample without an ultimate controller at the chosen cut-off level 
Widely Held Financial 
Institution 
Company that has as ultimate controller a financial firm that is widely held at the 
chosen cut-off level 
Widely Held Corporation Company that has as ultimate controller non-financial firm that is widely held at the 
chosen cut-off level 
Unlisted Company that has as ultimate controller a financial or non-financial firm that has an 
unknown ownership structure 
Managerial Company that has a director as ultimate controller 
Individual Company that has an individual (non director) as ultimate controller 
State Company that has the State (Government or local Authorities) as a ultimate 
controller 
Pyramid Firm Y is said to be controlled through a "pyramid" at a certain cut-off level if it has 
an ultimate shareholder who controls it indirectly through another corporation (or 
more than one company) that he/she does not wholly control with respect to chosen 
cut-off level 
Multiple Control Chain Firm Y is said to be controlled through a "multiple control chain" if it has an 
ultimate shareholder who controls it via a multitude of control chains (both direct 
and indirect), each of which includes at least 3% of the control rights at each link 
Cross Holding Firm Y is said to be controlled through a "cross holding" if a firm X owns some 
shares (above the chosen cut-off level) of firm Y and firm Y, in turn, owns some 
shares (at the same cut-off level) of f inn X, or firm Y holds directly its own stock (at 
the cut-off level) 
Dual Class Shares Company Y itself issues two or more different kind of shares with different voting 
rights 
Complex Structure Pyramid, multiple control chain, cross holding (cash flow rights are lower than 
voting rights) 
Simple Structure Direct ownership (cash flow rights are equal to voting rights) 
Complex Structure Firm Firm with at least one complex structure in its shareholding 
Simple Structure Firm Firm without complex structure in its shareholding 
Complex Ultimate Controller Firm having the first ultimate controller using a complex structure 
Simple Ultimate Controller Firm with the first ultimate controller corresponding to the direct shareholder 
Cash Flow Rights The product between different links along the holding chain with respect to the 
chosen cut-off level at each link 
Control Rights The minimum holding between the links along the chain 
Divergence Control rights minus cash-flow rights 
CF/CO Ratio of cash flow rights to control rights 
Panel C. Economic variables 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices 
Lev Ratio of total debt to total assets 
Market Value Of Equity Product of the total number of outstanding shares and the share price. This is 
expressed in thousands of pounds) 
Cash Ratio of total cash and equivalents to total assets 
Dividends Ratio of ordinary dividends net of Advance Corporation Tax, to total assets 
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Table 2.2. Characteristics of the Sample. 
Panel A. Number of Companies in Each Year 
Year Non-Financial (IIemscott) Sample Sample % Entries removed (LSEY) 
1991 1339 846 63.18 N/A 
1992 1313 891 67.86 N/A 
1993 1348 903 66.99 N/A 
1994 1356 1006 74.19 N/A 
1995 1429 1042 72.92 122 
1996 1507 1110 73.66 112 
1997 1630 1089 66.81 198 
1998 1588 956 60.2 210 
1999 1493 863 57.8 449 
2000 1510 724 47.95 200 
2001 1511 682 45.14 249 
Panel B. Structure of the Panel 
Number of Records per company 123456789 10 11 
Number of Companies 2 11 26 43 77 123 122 140 98 65 474 
Panel C. Comparative Descriptive Statistics 
Population mean median 25% 75% obs 
Lev 0.178 0.141 0.024 0.271 19286 
Size 10.804 10.571 9.142 11.854 19286 
Tobin's q 1.612 1.242 0.958 1.798 19286 
Sample Mean median 25% 75% obs 
Lev 0.177 0.161 0.060 0.258 10112 
Size 11.121 10.841 9.856 12.210 10112 
Tobin's q 1.600 1.303 0.998 1.818 10112 
This table reports the characteristics of the sample in terms of its proportion with respect to the market of non-financial 
firms and its intertemporal structure. In Panel A the second column shows the total number of non-financial firms in 
each year, as reported by Hemscott (Price WaterHouse); the third column contains the total number of the sample, and 
fourth column shows the proportion of our sample with respect to the figures in Hemscott; the fifth column displays the 
total number of firms that either voluntarily exit the stock market or that are delisted by LSE, as reported by London 
Stock Exchange Yearbook. Panel B displays the intertemporal structure of the panel by number of observations for each 
company. Panel C reports comparative descriptive statistics for a series of key variables for the whole population of 
listed non financial firms as reported in Datastream (population) and for the sub-sample for which ownership data have 
been hand-collected (sample). Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total 
assets in 1991 prices. Tobin's q is the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market 
value of equity to book value of assets. 
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Table 2.5. Distribution of Ownership Characteristics by Firm Size. 
Panel A. Average Shareholding 
Small Firms Medium Firms Large Firms Diff. In mean 
(p-value) 
Outside Ownership 35.29 34.95 25.39 0.000 
Instit 20.16 25.11 18.95 0.000 
External 15.13 9.85 6.44 0.000 
Board Ownership 21.27 12.74 4.46 0.000 
Exec 17.38 10.20 3.64 0.000 
Chairman (Executive) 4.54 3.22 1.95 0.000 
Ceo/Md 3.45 2.12 0.60 0.000 
Joint CH-CEO 4.35 2.09 0.62 0.000 
Nonex 4.17 2.63 0.84 0.000 
Chairman (Non-Executive) 0.99 0.70 0.19 0.000 
Panel B. Ownership and Board Composition 
Small Firms Medium Firms Large Firms p-value 
Number Of Outsiders 4.52 4.89 3.68 0.000 
Totinstit 
Totexternal 
Board Size 
Totexec 
Totnonex 
2.74 3.71 
1.78 1.18 
5.74 6.66 
3.54 3.90 
2.20 2.76 
2.93 0.000 
0.74 0.000 
9.03 0.000 
4.84 0.000 
4.19 0.000 
Ratio 0.38 0.41 0.46 0.000 
Panel C. Other Characteristics 
Small Firms Medium Firms Large Firms 
Lev 0.14 0.16 0.22 
Market Value of Equity 18,553 81,188 2,161,807 
This table reports descriptive statistics on average shareholding by different categories of owners (Panel A), 
average number of owners divided by category of owners (Panel B) and average values for firm size, leverage and 
average market value of equity. The reported zeroes for non-managerial ownership are not to be interpreted 
literally. They only represent the absence of any reported shareholding above the disclosure threshold of 3%. 
Outside Ownership is the sum of all external shareholding above the disclosure threshold; Instit is equal to the 
total percentage of shares held by the disclosed investment companies, insurance and banks in each firm; External 
is the total percentage of shares held by the disclosed non-financial corporations and individuals in each firm; 
Board Ownership is defined as the total percentage of ordinary shareholding by all directors (%); Exec represents 
the percentage of ordinary shareholding by executive directors (%); Nonex is the percentage of ordinary 
shareholding by non-executive directors (%); Number of Outsiders is equal to the sum of all external shareholders; 
Totinstit is the sum of all external shareholders that are financial institutions (pension funds, banks, insurance 
companies, fund managers); Totexternal is equal to the sum of all external shareholders that are private 
individuals, other non-financial companies; Board Size is the sum of all executive and non-executive directors; 
Totexec is the sum of all executive directors; Totnonex is equal to the sum of all non-executive directors; RATIO 
is defined as the proportion of non-executive directors on total board; Size is defined as the natural logarithm of 
total assets in 1991 prices; Lev is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets; Market Value of Equity is the 
product of the total number of outstanding shares and the share price. The last column in Panel A and Panel B 
represents the tests of the difference in means between large and small firms. P-values are reported. 
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Appendix 2.1 
How to measure cash flow rights and control rights 
in ultimate ownership structure. An example. 
Figure 2.1 shows a case study that usefully illustrates how we calculated pyramids 
and multiple control chains. It describes the ultimate ownership structure of Acal Plc in 
1997 with all shareholders with more than 3% reported. 
Acal Plc has six direct shareholders: Curry JAH (13.93%), Mercury Asset Mgmt 
(11.9%), Laughton AJ (8.94%), 3i Plc (7.11%), Thompson Clive Invs (5%), Prudential 
Corporation (4.33%) and 3 links in the the control chains. 
We can identify three different holding chains (from Mercury Asset Mgmt, 3i Plc 
and Thompson Clive Invs) that must be analysed back in order to find the ultimate 
controllers of Acal. Mr. Curry and Mr. Laughton are individuals and they can be already 
defined as ultimate controllers of Acal and, then, Prudential Corporation that is widely held. 
First, we can trace back the ownership of Mercury Asset Mgmt as far as Munich 
Reinsurance, which has CF= 0.49% (4.17%* 11.9%) and CO= 4.17% (min [4.17,11.9]) in 
Acal. 
Second, we do the same for 3i Plc, and again we find Munich Reinsurance with CF= 
0.038% (7.11*13*4.17) and CO= 4.17% (min [7.11,13,4.17] ) in Acal; and Prudential 
Corporation with CF= 0.78% (11*7.11) and CO= 7.11% (min [7.11,11]) in Acal. 
Third, we trace back the ownership of Thompson Clive Invs. It has five direct 
owners: two of them, Scottish Value and Scottish Inv Tr, have complex ownership 
structures. M&G Fund and Refuge are considered ultimate owners of Acal, with CF= 0.3% 
(6.05*5) and CO= 5% (min [6.05,5]) and CF= 0.3% (6.05*5) and CO= 5% (min [6.05,5] 
) respectively. There is also Equitable Life Ins with CF= 0.66% (13.2*5) and CO= 5% (min 
[13.2,5] ). We trace back the ownership of Thompson Clive Invs through Scottish Value as 
far as the Bank of England Pens Fund (CF= 0.09% (9.24*20.1*5); CO= 5% (min [9.24, 
20.1,5]) in Acal) and Abbey Life (CF= 0.07% (6.99*20.1 *5); CO= 5% (min [6.99,20.1, 
5] ) in Acal), as ultimate controllers in Acal, and Prudential Corporation again (CF= 
0.046% (4.61*20.1*5) and CO= 4.61% (min [4.61,20.1,5]) in Acal). Finally, the 
ownership of Thompson Clive Invs through Scottish Inv Tr finds as ultimate controller Sun 
Life (CF= 0.015% (7.74*4.07*5); CO= 4.07% (min [7.74.4.07,5]) in Acal) and as other 
shareholder again Equitable Life Ins (CF= 0.011% (5.66*4.07*5); CO= 4.07% (min [5.66, 
4.07,5]) in Acal). 
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At different cut-off levels the firm has different ultimate ownership structures. 
1) At 20% cut-off level, Acal is defined as widely held. 
2) At 10% cut-off level, we identify Prudential Corporation as the Acal ultimate 
controller through a multiple control chain identified from the above calculations. 
We sum up the CF and CO of Prudential that we found in each control chain. 
Therefore, Prudential Plc has CF=5.151% (4.33 + 0.04 + 0.78) and CO=16.05% 
(4.33 + 4.61 + 7.11) in Acal Plc. 
Curry JAH (CF=CO=13.93%) is the second ultimate controller. An Mercury Asset 
Mgmt is the third one (CF=CO=11.9%). 
3) At 5% cut-off level, besides Prudential and Mr. Curry, we identify two other 
companies that are the third and fourth ultimate controllers through multiple control 
chains. 
Munich Reinsurance is the third ultimate controller with CF= 0.528% (0.49+ 0.038) 
and CO= 8.34% (4.17 + 4.17 ), respectively. 
Mr. Laughton (as direct shareholder) is the forth controller with CF=CO=8.94. 
With the same amount of CO=5% we define Bank of England Pens Fund and 
Abbey Life (as ultimate owners along the pyramidal chain of Acal-Thompson Clive 
Invs- Scottish Value), M&G Fund and Refuge (as ultimate owners along the 
pyramidal chain of Acal-Thompson Clive Invs) and Equitable Life Ins (as ultimate 
owner along the multiple control chain Acal- Thompson Clive Invs and Acal- 
Thompson Clive Invs-Scottish Inv Tr) as the remaining ultimate controllers in Acal 
Plc. 
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CHAPTER3 
FIRM PERFORMANCE: Do NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS HAVE MINDS 
OF THEIR OWN? 
EVIDENCE FROM UK PANEL DATA 
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3.1 Introduction 
The relation between ownership structure and firm performance is the subject of an 
important and continuing debate in the corporate finance literature, dating back to Berle and 
Means' (1932) thesis, that a negative correlation should exist between dispersed 
shareholding and firm performance. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) formally derive a model in which the distribution of 
shares between the insiders and outsiders in a company can influence its value. Provided 
that managers' natural tendency is to allocate the firm's resources in their own best interests, 
then the greater the managerial ownership, the less inclined managers are to divert 
resources away from value maximisation, since their interests coincide more closely with 
those of outside shareholders. Firm performance then increases uniformly (the alignment 
effect). 
However, the impact of managerial ownership may be non-monotonic. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989) contend that, as the percentage of shares held by the manager increases, his 
discretion increases. He may pursue private benefits, or use this discretion to appoint a 
board of directors that is unlikely to monitor. This in turn would impair the capacity of 
outside shareholders to monitor and influence managers (the entrenchment effect). 
Empirical evidence of the effect of managerial ownership on firm performance is 
mixed. A number of papers find a non-monotonic relation between ownership and value, 
but little consensus has been reached on its form. Amongst others, McConnell and Servaes 
(1990,1995) observe an inverse U-shaped relationship, whereas Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991), Morck et al. (1988), and Short and Keasey (1999) report a significant cubic relation 
between the two. In a recent study on the UK market, Davies et al. (2005) hypothesize a 
quintic relationship. 
However, a growing body of evidence fails to detect any significant links between 
ownership and performance. For example, using a simultaneous equation model in which 
Tobin's q and insider holdings are endogenous, Loderer and Martin (1997) report no 
relationship between the two (whilst firm value is a negative predictor of ownership). Cho 
(1998) also estimates a system of equations in which insider ownership and q-ratio are 
determined simultaneously, and suggests that the latter affects ownership structure but not 
vice versa. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) use a 2SLS approach to show that, once 
endogeneity is considered, the direction of causality runs only from value to ownership. 
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A possible explanation for this wide variety of results is that they are driven by the 
different empirical approaches adopted. The first set of studies typically does not allow for 
the endogeneity of managerial ownership, an issue that was first discussed by Demsetz 
(1983). ' It is argued that a positive correlation between managerial ownership and firm 
performance can be interpreted as evidence that owning ordinary shares aligns the interests 
of managers with those of external shareholders, resulting in a positive effect in 
performance. However, it is also possible that managerial ownership is higher in better 
performing firms, simply because managers are more willing to accept ordinary shares as 
part of their payment scheme in those firms that perform better. Studies that fail to control 
for this cross causality may be capturing a spurious relationship. 
Although the second set of studies discussed above adopts appropriate econometric 
techniques to control for this cross causality, it typically neglects another important issue. 
According to Himmelberg et al. (1999), estimating the impact of managerial ownership on 
firm value by regressing Tobin's q on variables such as the percentage of equity held by 
managers "is potentially mis-specified because of the presence of firm unobserved 
heterogeneity". To the extent that managerial ownership is strongly correlated with 
unobservable firm-specific characteristics (i. e., the contracting environment in the firm), 
studies that fail to control for this effect would obtain biased and inconsistent estimates. 
Our work contributes to the literature on several grounds. First, in the present work, 
the relation between firm performance and managerial ownership is investigated using the 
GMM methodology (Arellano and Bond, 1991). This technique provides a set of results 
robust to the endogeneity of (all) the explanatory variables, and to the presence of 
unobservable heterogeneity. 
Second, to carry out this study, a novel panel data set of UK firms for the period 
1991-2001 was collected by hand, gathering information on ownership by the board of 
directors and by external shareholders, as well as information on board composition. This 
indicates, amongst other things, that the argument of La Porta et at. (1999), that ownership 
is stable in time (subsequently utilized by Zhou 2001), may not be universally valid. It is 
shown how ownership, and more particularly managerial ownership, varies significantly in 
the UK, with the result that a panel data technique can be used to retrieve results that are 
' Two notable exceptions are Davies et al. (2004), who use a SEM, and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) who 
use a IV approach. 
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robust not only to endogeneity, but also to fixed effects, as suggested by Himmelberg et al. 
(1999). 
Third, this data and this methodology are used to test whether non-executive 
directors act independently from executives in determining firm performance. Previous 
studies in this area have typically used shareholding by the entire board as a proxy for 
managerial ownership. 2 Many papers, however, have noted that different board members 
have different incentives. Whereas the board of directors is supposed to act on behalf of the 
shareholders, to monitor management discretionary behaviour, non-executive directors 
should act as "delegated monitors", charged by the shareholders with observing the actions 
of executive managers (Hart, 1995). According to Morck et al. (1988), since non-executive 
(outside) directors must monitor the performance of the executives (officers), they should 
be provided with strong financial interests in the firm. Other authors correspondingly 
contend that non-executives do not have sufficient financial interests to be concerned about 
company performance (Hart, 1995), and that they may even lack the necessary expertise to 
participate efficiently in financial planning (Jensen, 1993). Consequently, we argue that it is 
important to make a distinction between the stakeholding of the two categories, when 
investigating the determinants of firm performance. 
The UK provides an ideal case study for this matter. In the US, boards generally 
have a predominance of outside (non-executive) directors, but UK boards have tended until 
recently to be dominated by a high proportion of executives3. However, following corporate 
scandals in the early nineties and the consequent issue of the "Codes of Best Practice", 
corporate governance has evolved considerably. In particular, the average number of non- 
executives per firm has steadily increased over time, so that by the end of the decade the 
ratio of non-executives to executives was close to one. Furthermore, as shown below, while 
share ownership by executive directors has been steadily decreasing, the opposite holds for 
non-executives. 
Given these arguments, we first test the relationship between board ownership and 
firm value. Then the board of directors is divided between executives and non-executives, 
and we test whether ownership by non-executives is also a relevant factor. We also check 
whether the mere presence of outside directors on the board is significantly linked to firm 
2 One notable exception is Lasfer (2004). 
3 For example, Dahya et at (2002) report that in 1988 just 21 of the FT500 companies has an outsider 
dominated board while outsiders comprised the majority of the boards for 387 Fortune 500 firms. 
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value. To account for the possibility that non-executives may have stronger incentives to 
monitor effectively when they own greater amounts of shares, we introduce an interaction 
term between non-executive ownership and board composition (ratio). In this way we are 
able to test for the presence of a conditional effect of non-executive ownership on board 
composition, besides the main effects (impact of non-executive ownership and impact of 
board composition). 
We also investigate whether the presence and identity of a large shareholder have an 
impact on firm performance, in addition to firm capital and financial structure. A number of 
papers show the interdependence of these agency control mechanisms (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996). For example, Stiglitz (1985) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) maintain that 
large shareholders have greater incentives to become involved in the control process than 
smaller ones, because they can more easily bear the high fixed costs of collecting 
information on management behaviour. Some authors also emphasize that different types of 
shareholders have different incentives (and costs) to act as monitors of the business 
activities in the firm (Brickley et al., 1988; Pound, 1988). 
It is also argued that an appropriate level of external debt (Jensen, 1986), or an 
appropriate size of dividend payments (Easterbrook, 1984), can curb managerial discretion, 
by restricting the amount of free resources. 
Our analysis reveals that the alignment/entrenchment effect as detected on the total 
board is driven by the executive positions on the board. No significant relationship is found 
between ownership by non-executives and performance, whereas we report a positive and 
significant effect of the ratio of non-executives to total board. Our results also suggest that 
the presence of a large outside shareholder, and in particular of large institutional investors, 
is negatively related to firm performance, whereas investment in physical capital, cash flow 
and dividend payments exert a positive impact. Finally, no significant impact of company 
size, debt ratio or RD expenditures is detected. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the 
hypotheses tested in this work. Section 3.3 presents the data and the methodology. Section 
3.4 presents the empirical results, and Section 3.5 presents the main conclusions. 
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3.2 Hypotheses 
3.2.1 Managerial ownership and the role of non-executives 
Direct equity ownership may serve as an alignment mechanism, since it provides 
directors with economic incentives towards firm value maximization (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). As their direct equity ownership increases, managers bear an increasing part of the 
cost of undertaking non-value maximizing actions. Accordingly, a positive relationship is 
then expected. However, starting from Fama and Jensen (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985), it has been increasingly recognized that the alignment effect may not be linear in 
managerial ownership. This is because increasing the shareholding also delivers increasing 
voting power and effective control over the firm, which may enable the manager to extract 
company resources. At higher levels of ownership, a negative relation with firm value may 
therefore be anticipated. Furthermore, at very high levels of director ownership, the 
relationship may be expected to become positive again, since the manager is then 
effectively the manager-owner. 
In line with these arguments, a cubic relationship is tested in this work. This choice 
of functional form is also corroborated by a preliminary data investigation. Figure 1 shows 
a plot of the average Tobin's q versus board ownership quintiles. Consistent with the 
incentive-alignment argument, the average q-ratio first increases with the equity ownership 
of directors; beyond 10% to 15% of shares, the association becomes negative, providing 
some support for the entrenchment effect. This decrease is not monotonic either, since the 
relationship becomes positive again at very high levels of managerial ownership (between 
30% and 40%). 5 
As discussed earlier, we initially approximate managerial ownership as the total 
shares held by the board of directors. However, a number of papers have highlighted the 
differing incentives existing amongst various board members. This distinction is 
particularly relevant when considering the institutional differences between the US and the 
UK. American boards generally have a predominance of outside directors, and the Chief 
Executive Officer is usually also the Chairman and strictly controls the board (Charkham, 
1994). In the UK, in contrast, following the corporate scandals of the early nineties, 
4 Table 3.1 gives the definitions of all variables used in this work. 
S In the Appendix we report results from univariate analysis using deciles rather than quintiles and show that 
results remain virtually unaltered (Figure A. 1). Further tests reveal statistically significant differences in 
means across the three clusters. Results are reported in Appendix A. 3.1. 
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emphasis has been placed on the importance of independent monitoring by non-executives. 
Until the early nineties, UK boards were characterised by a high presence of executive 
directors, but since the issuing of the Codes of Best Practice, the number of non-executives 
has steadily increased, as has their average shareholding. 
As a second step in our analysis, we explicitly investigate the impact of each of the 
two groups of board members in determining firm performance. To the best of our 
knowledge, only two previous papers have addressed this issue, both on the US market, and 
they reach different conclusions. Bhagat and Black (2002) find a generally insignificant 
relation between non-executive shareholding and performance, but Morck et al. (1988) 
report that "outside board members, like officers, respond to financial incentives and 
contribute more to corporate wealth as their ownership stakes rise. In addition ... outside 
board members are capable of becoming entrenched". 
No theoretical work indicates the shape of this relationship, so we try different 
functional forms. While maintaining the cubic relationship for executive directors, we 
allow for a cubic, a quadratic and finally a linear specification for non-executive ownership. 
Further, some theoretical studies have analyzed the effect of board structure on firm 
value, highlighting the possibility of an effective monitoring role by non-executives, 
irrespective of their shareholding interests. Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that both the 
reputation effect in the management labour market, and expertise acquired from their career 
history, could give non-executives enough incentives to guarantee effective and 
independent monitoring within the firm. This would imply a positive correlation between 
firm performance and the presence of non-executives. This hypothesis may be particularly 
relevant in the UK market, where voting at shareholders meetings is usually done by a 
show of hands (Goergen and Renneboog, 1999). Unless an issue is controversial, each 
shareholder counts as one vote, independent of his percentage of shares. However, some 
authors argue that the reputation effect in the management labour market could also work in 
the opposite direction. For example, Hart (1995) argues that "non-executives may owe their 
position to management". Jensen (1993) highlights the relative lack of expertise of non- 
executives, and emphasizes that oversized boards are easier for the Chief Executive to 
control. In such cases, a null or negative relationship may be anticipated. 
A growing number of empirical works have analyzed the effect of board 
composition on firm performance, and the results are not unambiguous. Rosenstein and 
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Wyatt (1990) used an event study methodology on US companies, and reported a positive 
(but small) impact on the stock price following the appointment of an additional outside 
director. In the fixed effects specification, Yermack (1996) found a positive association 
between the proportion of outside directors and Tobin's q. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 
studied the impact of several agency control mechanisms and, in line with Bhagat and 
Black (2002), observed a negative link between the percentage of board seats held by non- 
officers and Tobin's q. However, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Mehran (1995) found 
no relationship between the proportion of outside directors and firm performance. 
As we described earlier, the Codes of Best Practice gave a set of recommendations 
on the structure and responsibilities of the board of directors, making the UK a very 
interesting setting in which to test the hypothesis that non-executive directors play a 
significant role in determining firm performance. This may be significant in view of 
comments in the recent Higgs Report (2003, p. 39,10.5): "A high level of informality 
surrounds the process of appointing non-executive directors. Almost half of the non- 
executive directors surveyed for the Review, were recruited to their role through personal 
contacts or friendships. Only four per cent had a formal interview and one per cent had 
obtained the job through answering an advertisement". The implication is that the 
independence of monitoring action by English non-executives may be blurred and, as Hart 
(1995) surmises, only "quiet non-executives" are appointed. 
Furthermore, all codes of best practice specifically indicate that non-executives 
should not hold share options, as this may shift their focus from the underlying firm 
performance to the share price. Along the same lines, it is suggested that they should not 
take part in any incentive or pension schemes (see, for example, Higgs Report 12.27, pg 
57). However, there is no recommendation that non-executive directors should not hold 
ordinary shares, because ordinary shareholding may help to align the interests of the 
director with the long-term interests of the shareholders (Higgs Report 12.26 pg 57). 
Similar to the US findings, the empirical studies for the UK companies show mixed 
results. Faccio and Lasfer (1999) find little evidence for the hypothesis that firm value is 
affected by the combination of managerial ownership and board structure. However, Weir 
et al. (2002) show that UK firms with high performance have a greater proportion of 
independent non-executives, both on the board and in the audit committees. Young (2000) 
shows that there is an increased demand for non-executive directors among firms with 
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manager-dominated boards, and that compliance with the Cadbury recommendation 
concerning the minimum number of non-executives is positively related to the expected net 
benefits of adding further non-executives to the board. Peasnell et al. (2003) show that the 
potential contribution of outside directors to internal corporate control mechanisms is 
significant at any level of managerial ownership in the UK, and that, even in manager- 
owned companies, the boards are far from passive. In a recent study, Dahya and McConnell 
(2002) report a significant increase in management turnover following adoption of the 
Cadbury recommendations, and an increased sensitivity of turnover to performance, as a 
result of the increasing number of non-executives in the board. 
To test the effectiveness of the non-executives, we use the number (Ratio) of non- 
executive directors on total board, in line with the argument that "a greater use of outside 
directors can lead to more effective internal monitoring" (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). 
Moreover, to investigate whether the effect of the Ratio on Tobin's q depends on the level 
of non-executive shareholding, we include an interaction term (Non-Exec 
ownership *Ratio). 
3.2.2 The role of the external shareholders: Blockholding 
Several theoretical papers have investigated the effectiveness of monitoring by large 
shareholders. Admati et al. (1994) argue that there is a trade-off between different 
ownership structures. More specifically, they focus on the trade-off between achieving a 
high degree of monitoring, which is promoted by concentrated ownership, and realizing 
risk-sharing gains, which requires more diffuse ownership. In their model, shareholding is a 
commitment device to monitor: to extract the surplus generated by increased monitoring, 
the large shareholder must increase his holdings. Khan and Winton (1998) also analyze the 
relationship between liquidity and monitoring by large shareholders, and provide a theory 
in which the choice between exercising monitoring and trading is determined by the 
relative payoff structure of these strategies. 
Maug (1998) further develops the analysis of the incentives of large shareholders to 
monitor. Monitoring is a costly activity that is often described as a public good, because the 
costs are borne by one agent, but the benefits of the monitoring actions are enjoyed by all 
the shareholders in the company. This generates free-riding problems among shareholders. 
Maug (1998) argues that a higher degree of liquidity in the market exacerbates this issue, 
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because it makes is easier for (large) owners to sell their stock, rather than take action 
against the incumbent managers. In this perspective, higher market liquidity may, ceteris 
paribus, reduce the effectiveness of monitoring action by large shareholders. 
Additionally, Stiglitz (1985) argues that larger shareholders have greater incentives 
to involve themselves in the control process than smaller ones, because they can more 
easily bear the high fixed costs of collecting information on management behaviour. In 
addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) justify the greater monitoring role of large investors 
because of the resources they invest in the firm. These arguments suggest a positive 
relationship. 
The presence of a large shareholder may, however, lead to higher agency costs 
inside the firm, since larger shareholders may seek the maximization of their own wealth to 
the detriment of other investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Additionally, Burkart et al. 
(1997) show that the efforts exerted by managers to boost their private benefits may be 
beneficial for firms. They suggest that even if tight control by shareholders is ex-post 
efficient, it may constitute an ex-ante expropriation threat that reduces managerial 
initiative. As a consequence, ownership concentration in the hands of external shareholders 
may be detrimental to firm performance. 
The empirical literature on this issue is extensive, and generally suggests that the 
largest shareholders play an insignificant role. Holderness and Sheehan (1988), for 
instance, find no difference in the performance of various firms, whether shareholding in 
their corporations is concentrated or dispersed. McConnell and Servaes (1990,1995) also 
report that the largest single blockholder has an insignificant effect on firm performance. 
Similar results arise for all the blockholders and the dummy indicating the presence of a 
blockholder in the firm. In line with this, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) also conclude that 
no significant role is played by blockholding, whereas for the UK companies analyzed by 
Faccio and Lasfer (2000), there was a significant negative effect of blockholding. Davies et 
al. (2004) find little evidence of a significant impact by the largest stakeholder, but report a 
strong negative link between blockholder ownership and firm value. 
We investigate these hypotheses by including two different proxies for ownership 
concentration: one for blockholding (Blockholding), defined as the sum of the ownership 
held by non-managerial shareholders with more than 3% of firm stakes; the other 
70 
representing the shares of the largest non-manager owner (Largest non-managerial 
ownership). 
3.2.3 Identity of the external shareholders: Institutional owners 
It may be relevant to distinguish outside shareholders according to their identity, 
since different types of owner may have different incentives. 
According to the thesis proposed by Pound (1988), institutional investors are more 
efficient monitors than other categories of shareholder because of their greater expertise 
(the efficient monitoring hypothesis). However, Pound also contends that institutional 
investors may find it profitable (the strategic alignment hypothesis), or even be forced (the 
conflict of interest hypothesis), to cooperate with managers in order to protect other 
business relationships they may have with the firm. 
It does seem important to allow for the differences in monitoring incentives between 
different categories of shareholders, particularly given the peculiarities of the UK 
institutional setting. 
First, while traditionally, private individuals have been the largest category of 
shareholders in the US, UK financial institutions have increased their ownership of UK 
equities since 1963 (Stapledon, 1996). 
6 As reported in Table 3.2, institutional investors 
have been the largest category of shareholders over the last decade. Second, UK 
institutional investors face no legal restrictions on stock ownership, whereas US insurance 
companies are bound not to invest more than 2% of their assets in a single company. 
Finally, UK institutions face no legal barrier against activism. 7 
In spite of this relative institutional freedom, the lack of activism by institutional 
investors has been the focus of many debates (see, amongst others, Conyon and Peck, 
1997). Plender (1997) reports that UK institutional investors seldom exercise their voting 
power, and Goergen and Renneboog (2001) provide evidence that they tend not to exercise 
their voting power effectively, thus increasing "the already significant power of directors". 
6 The recent work of Gadhoum et al. (2004) on ultimate ownership in the US shows that in 1996 about 37% of 
all listed firms in the US market are controlled by families, and only 16% are owned by financial institutions. 
7 In the US, for example, schedule 13D filing obliges a shareholder group with more than 5% shares to 
disclose the group's plans in regard to the company. However, in trying to understand the institutional 
governance in the UK, it is necessary to take into account the well-developed network of informal 
communication and coalitions among the institutional investors within the "London Square Mile" (Short and 
Keasey, 1997) which can contribute to reducing free riding problems for institutions. 
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Additionally, Faccio and Lasfer (2000) observe that UK pension funds are not effective 
monitors, and Cosh and Hughes (1997) also fail to detect any strong influence of 
institutional investors in determining either executive pay or dismissal policies. These 
observations are borne out in a recent paper by Dahya and McConnell (2002), who report 
no evidence that ownership by institutions is relevant in determining management turnover. 
Indeed, both the Hampel (1998) and Higgs Code of Best Practice (2003) contain specific 
recommendations for an increased role for institutional investors in corporate governance 
(Webb et al., 2003). A preliminary investigation of the present data provides some insight 
into these matters. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 reveal that, while the average shareholding of 
institutional investors as a group is around 20% in all years, this stake is held by an average 
of three institutions. Consequently, institutions appear individually to hold even less shares 
than their non-institutional counterparts. 
Based on these arguments, an insignificant or negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm value may be expected. 
The existing empirical evidence is mixed. Among others, Short and Keasey (1999) 
find that, while institutional ownership plays no role in determining firm value, ownership 
by non-institutional owners is statistically significant in the UK, and is positively related to 
performance. For US firms, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) detect no influence of 
institutional ownership on firm value. In contrast, McConnell and Servaes (1990) not only 
report that the percentage of shares owned by institutions is positive and significant, but 
also that the inflection point between alignment and entrenchment increases when this 
proxy is included in the model. This result is interpreted as support for Pound's (1998) 
efficient monitoring hypothesis. In contrast, Seifert et al. (2005) find a negative correlation 
between ownership by institutional investors and Tobin's q. Parrino et al. (2003) find that 
institutional ownership changes are negatively associated with the likelihood of forced 
CEO turnover, and that an executive from outside the firm is appointed CEO. Moreover, 
Duggal and Millar (1999) find no evidence for the claim that institutional investors have 
superior monitoring abilities. 
We investigate these hypotheses with the inclusion of four proxies. First, ownership 
by all the external shareholders (Blockholding) is divided into ownership by institutional 
investors (Institutional Ownership) comprising banks, pension funds, fund managers and 
similar, and ownership by non-financial institutions (Non-Institutional Ownership) 
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comprising private individual and non-financial companies. As a robustness check, we also 
divide ownership by the largest non-managerial investor into institutional ownership 
(Largest Institutional Ownership) and non-institutional ownership (Largest Non-Institutional 
Ownership). 
3.2.4 Control variables 
We include a number of control variables that the current literature argues are 
potentially able to influence firm performance. 
Total debt is included to account for a number of factors. On the one hand, a 
positive effect may be expected as a result of monitoring by lenders. As Jensen (1986) 
argues, the raising of external debt limits managerial discretion, since managers are 
committed to paying out future cash flow in a durable and enforceable way. Similarly, 
Stiglitz (1985) maintains that effective monitoring of managerial behaviour is exercised 
mainly by lenders rather than shareholders. Modigliani and Miller (1963) also predict a 
positive correlation between leverage and performance on the basis of valuable tax shields, 
as does Ross (1977), on the basis that leverage increases may convey positive news 
concerning the firm's ability to service a larger amount of debt. On the other hand, 
(existing) leverage may hamper the firm's capability to raise new debt, and consequently 
force it to pass up valuable investment opportunities. This is related to the problem of 
underinvestment, analyzed by Myers (1977). Furthermore, higher leverage increases the 
risk of bankruptcy, which may, in turn, worsen the market perception of the firm. Under 
these arguments a negative relationship could be anticipated. We define leverage 
(Leverage) as the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
We control for the effect of firm size, since larger firms may find it easier to generate 
funds internally and access external resources. Moreover, larger firms could benefit from 
economies of scale by creating entry barriers, with positive effects on performance (Short 
and Keasey, 1999). However, average managerial shareholding is larger in smaller firms, 
and this could create scope for greater managerial entrenchment (McConnell and Servaes, 
1990; 1995). According to Jensen (1986), size may also be a proxy for agency conflicts. 
For example, managers have an incentive to increase firm size beyond optimal, as this 
implies more power, because the amount of resources under their control is larger. In our 
work, size (Size) is equal to the natural logarithm of total assets at 1991 prices. 
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Following Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Cho (1998), we 
include a proxy for investments, both in intangible assets using reported R&D expenses 
(RD Expenditures) and investment in fixed capital (Capital Expenditures). It has been 
argued that investment may positively affect firm performance (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Moreover, there is evidence of a positive reaction by the US stock market to 
announcements of increases in planned capital expenditure (McConnell and Muscarella, 
1985) and R&D expenses (Chan et al., 1990). In line with these findings, an increase in 
investments should have a positive impact on firm performance. 
As Jensen (1986) argued, agency conflicts between managers and shareholders can 
become more severe when managers exercise more discretion on liquid assets. Free cash 
flow would then be a negative predictor of firm performance. However, a higher cash flow 
may also mean that firms can finance their investments through internal funds. This allows 
firms to reduce the risk of facing underinvestment and bankruptcy problems, so that a 
positive connection between performance and cash flow would be observed. Furthermore, 
the inclusion of a proxy for the availability of internal funds is appropriate, because this 
may be strongly correlated with investments (Fazzari et al., 1996). Consistent with Ozkan 
and Ozkan (2004) we approximate the free cash flow (Cash Flow) as the ratio of pre-tax 
profits plus depreciation to total assets. 
A number of papers contend that dividend payments, like leverage, may in fact 
reduce free resources in the firm and mitigate potential manager-shareholder conflicts 
(Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). A positive link between dividend payout and firm 
performance is then expected. However, it may also be argued that higher dividends are 
related to the presence of low growth opportunities: firms with low profitable investment 
opportunities may pay higher dividends, rather than undertake negative net present value 
projects (Smith and Warner, 1979; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). In line with Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004) dividend payouts (Dividends) are defined as the ratio of ordinary dividends 
net of Advance Corporation Tax, to total assets8. 
8 Alternative definitions of dividends would suggest using, for example, earnings as a denominator. Eiere they 
are standardized on total assets, mainly for consistency with the definitions of the other economic variables. 
Robustness checks tend to indicate that the results are not sensitive to the specification of the denominator for 
dividends (especially regarding the impact of ownership and governance characteristics). 
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3.3 Data and methodology 
3.3.1 Data collection and sampling 
In the initial stage, a random sample of around 1100 listed non-financial firms was 
selected from Datastream constituent lists. Ownership data were hand-collected from the 
Price Waterhouse Corporate Register (Dec. issue), and economic and market data were 
downloaded from Datastream. In following companies over time from two different 
datasets, much effort went into tracking all name changes and defunct companies. This 
information was mainly collected from the London Stock Exchange Yearbook, which 
reports systematic information on name changes, entries removed from the companies 
section, companies in liquidation and companies in receivership and in administration. As a 
further check, the Companies House website was used to provide information on 
companies. 
To run the empirical analysis, a number of steps were undertaken. First, the dataset 
was cleaned of outliers. The ownership part of the dataset was thoroughly inspected in 
several directions. For example, we double-checked that the sum of all the shares collected 
did not exceed 100%. In such cases, we tried to cross check the information with other 
issues of the Hemscott volumes (using the September edition of the same year or the March 
edition of the following year), and/or with the London Stock Exchange Yearbook, which 
includes some ownership information. If it proved impossible to find coherent information 
from the different sources of data, this observation was dropped from the sample. 
We then checked for outliers in the "economic" variables, as reported in 
Datastream. There is no fixed rule for dealing with outliers, so as a general rule of thumb, 
data were trimmed to the 99% percentile. The trimmed data were then always benchmarked 
with descriptive statistics reported in other papers. 
Next, firms in the broadcasting sector and public utilities were excluded, because of 
the peculiarities in their operational and regulatory conditions. Firms with dual class shares 
were also excluded, since they violate the "one share one vote" rule. 9 Also, all firm-year 
missing observations for any variable were dropped. Finally, only firms that have at least 
five consecutive years of observations were kept. This is a standard step necessary to 
retrieve asymptotically efficient second order serial correlation tests (Arellano and Bond, 
1991). Keeping only firms with a minimum number of consecutive observations may help 
9 In line with Nenova (2003), only 26 firms in our sample have dual class shares. 
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in limiting survivorship bias (Yermack, 1996). There remained an unbalanced panel of 672 
firms and 6340 observations. 
We have gone to considerable lengths to check for consistency in the data and, in 
particular, for the absence of any attrition bias. Comparative descriptive statistics analysis 
shows that the selection process outlined above does not result in any distortion in the final 
sub-sample. The firms actually used for the empirical analysis are not systematically 
different from those excluded. The sample fully reflects market trends and does not appear 
to be biased in any direction. 
3.3.2 Ownership structure 
Data on ordinary shareholding by managers and external shareholders were 
collected, as well as data on board composition. Among the external owners, ordinary 
shares held above the 3% threshold are reported. 
1° We also collected information on the 
category of the external owners, distinguishing between financial firms, non-financial 
firms, individuals and the state. In contrast to external shareholders, ownership by directors 
must always be disclosed, so it is possible to detect the presence of managers even when 
they hold no shares. Preliminary descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3.2. The figures 
suggest that the distribution of ownership by external shareholders shows some volatility 
but no clear trend. Average blockholding remains around 30%, of which 20% is 
institutional ownership, while ownership by non-institutions averages around 10%. 
Average shareholding by the largest non-managerial owner appears to be increasing over 
time. 
However, the opposite is true for board ownership: on average, the total ordinary shares 
held by the board of directors decreased by approximately 5% in ten years, half of this 
reduction taking place between 1991 and 1993, immediately after the Cadbury Report was 
issued (1992). Further, Table 3.3 shows that while the average board size is relatively stable 
in time, the composition of the board changed significantly. In 1991, there was an average 
of 4.73 executives and 2.44 non-executives, but by 2001 non-executives constituted almost 
half of the average board. Despite the different time periods analysed, these figures are in 
line with Faccio and Lasfer (1999), Peasnell et al. (2003), and Dedman (2003). 
10 The requirement to disclose share blocks was introduced in 1967. Until 1976 it was set at 10%, then 
lowered to 5% until 1989 and was further reduced to 3% from 1990. However, the Corporate Register for the 
1991 edition maintains the disclosure threshold at 5%. 
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Similar trends are found when considering the average number of executives and 
non-executives who actually hold shares (cum shares). 
3.3.3 Economic performance 
A key issue in the literature is which variable should be used to measure firm 
performance. Almost all the existing literature has focused attention on Tobin's q, defined 
as the ratio of the market and replacement values of a firm's assets, for which various 
approximations have been proposed. Tobin's (1969) original idea was that the replacement 
cost of assets would be a logical measure of their "alternative use". So, if firms cannot 
employ assets to create as much (market) value as their opportunity cost, then they are not 
being efficient. Calculating the replacement cost of assets does however pose a number of 
problems. As Claessens et al. (2002) noted, "the data required to calculate the replacement 
values are generally not available". Various studies have therefore proposed 
approximations to this measure, all belonging to the family of "market-to-book-ratios". We 
approximate Tobin'q according to the following definition: the ratio of the book value of 
total assets minus the book value of equity, plus the market value of equity to the book 
value of assets-" Brief descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3.4. 
3.3.4 Methodology 
As mentioned earlier, two factors must be accounted for in estimating the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance: i. e., unobservable 
heterogeneity and endogeneity. However, one should note that all regressors are potentially 
endogenous. Endogeneity arises because shocks that affect corporate value are also likely 
to affect regressors such as its investments, leverage or dividends choices. Furthermore, this 
problem may also derive by cross causality. As stated previously, the level of direct equity 
holding by managers may influence the value of the firm; and managerial ownership may 
" This definition is consistent with, among others, Guedes and Titman (1996), Johnson (2003), Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004) and Datta et al. (2005). Robustness checks of the empirical results were conducted using an 
alternative definition of Tobin's q similar to the one used in Himmelberg et al. (1999), Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and a proxy for Market-to-Book ratio similar to Lasfer 
(2004). Results are virtually unaltered. For robustness purposes, we also test the relation with a proxy of 
Returns on asset. When we use this book-based measure, the signs are in general consistent (especially with 
regards to the impact of ownership and governance characteristics) but lose statistical significance. All these 
tests are presented in the Appendix. 
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itself also be determined by corporate value. A further source of endogeneity arises if there 
are unobservable firm-specific characteristics that are correlated with the regressors. 
These problems require the use of an Instrumental Variables estimation method that 
also makes it possible to control for fixed effects. As a consequence, in this work we 
estimate the following model with the GMM technique: 
Q,, = aº Qn 
-, 
+' 
Zkk 
W /gk 
X,, + 77, +77, + u,, 
where rl; represents the time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity, and ilt represents a firm- 
invariant time effect that is able to account for macro-economic factors (such as market- 
wide shocks). For the moment, we assume the idiosyncratic term u, t to be homoschedastic 
and serially uncorrelated. 
The choice of a dynamic model was motivated by the results of preliminary 
autocorrelation tests, which hint at the misspecification of the mean function in the static 
form. 12 The dynamic setting seems, instead, to yield consistent estimates. This tallies with 
the argument by Bond (2002) that "even when coefficients on lagged dependent variables 
are not of direct interest, allowing for dynamics in the underlying process may be crucial 
for recovering consistent estimates of other parameters". 13 
The i1; parameter is a proper fixed effect that accounts for the correlation existing 
between firm-specific characteristics and regressors. Himmelberg et al. (1999) emphasize 
the importance of this factor in estimating the relationship between value and ownership. 
They provide the following example. Assume that firms have different capabilities in 
monitoring managers. Better firms will be able to minimize the diversion of resources and 
thus register higher valuations. They will also have less need to use the alignment 
instrument. Consequently, the amount of shares held by managers is negatively correlated 
to the firm's ability to monitor, and the ownership value relationship will be negative 
simply because of this omitted variable bias. OLS estimations would then be biased and 
inconsistent. Furthermore, as noted in Bond (2002), the dynamic specification implies that 
at least the lagged endogenous variable is (positively) correlated with the time-invariant 
component of the error term. In this case, the OLS estimation of the autoregressive 
parameter of Model 1 would be biased upwards. 
12 Results are reported in Table A. 3.2 
13 Robustness checks were also conducted on a static GMM specification. Results are virtually identical to 
those obtained under the dynamic specification. 
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The usual solution to this problem is to adopt some transformation of the data in 
order to partial out i 1i. For example, the standard procedure of the Within Group (WG) 
estimation is to transform all the variables in differences from their time means. Since the 
term rl; is time invariant, the WG transformation would eliminate it. Nonetheless, a major 
shortcoming of this procedure is that unless all right hand side variables are strictly 
exogenous, this procedure introduces a non-negligible correlation between non-exogenous 
variables and the time-demeaned error term. Consider the case in which managerial 
ownership (Man) is predetermined: E(Man,,, u;, _, 
) ý0 but E(Man, t , u;, 
) = 0. In this case, 
following Bond (2002), the time-demeaned regressor is 
Man,, =Man - T' 
(Mani2 +Man, 3 +.... Man,,. ) while the error term can 
be expressed as 
follows: u;, =u (u12 +u, 3 +.... u,,. ). 
Now, Man,, and u;, are correlated since all Man,, 
T-1 
terms are correlated with all the corresponding u; t_i terms. Another interesting fact is that the 
autoregressive parameter estimated via the WG transformation is known to be biased 
downwards, due to the negative correlation which this methodology introduces with the 
time-demeaned error term 14. The fact that the OLS and WG estimators are biased in 
opposite directions has been used in a number of studies to infer that a consistent estimator 
should lie between them (Bond, 2002). 
Arellano and Bond (1991) derived a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM- 
DIFF) estimator. They take the first differences of the model and then use suitable lagged 
levels of the dependent variables as instruments. If we first difference model 1, we obtain: 
OQ =Oa, Q-1 +k=, AQkX +Orý, +Au, j (2) 
Although the process of first differencing effectively transforms predetermined 
variables into endogenous ones, it does not introduce all realizations of the disturbances 
into the error term. We can therefore use second (and earlier) lags as instruments for any 
endogenous variables, under the assumption that there is no serial correlation in the error 
term. 15 However, if the error term in Model(l) is in fact MA(1), then the first differenced 
'a See Bond (2002) and Nickell (1981) for a more technical treatment. 
" Suppose again, for example, that managerial ownership is predetermined. In Model I it is only influenced 
by past values of the error term (E(Man,, , u,,., ) #0), but when we use Model 2 we are effectively introducing 
contemporaneous correlation since E[(Man - Man,,., ), (u,,., - u,,. 2 )] * 0. However, in contrast to the WG 
procedure, the second lagged level Man,, -2 
is now a valid instrument since it is orthogonal to the error term. 
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error term is MA(2). The second lag would not then be a valid instrument, but the third 
(and earlier) lags are. 
Additionally, even if the error term is not serially correlated, the first differencing 
methodology introduces serial correlation of order one by construction. Because the 
validity of the GMM relies heavily on the absence of serial correlation of higher order, two 
tests of correlation in the error term of order one and two are included (ml and m2). 
The choice of an appropriate set of instruments is crucial in this type of analysis. 
The validity of the instrument set can be tested via the Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions, which tests the null hypothesis of the absence of correlation between the 
instruments and the error term. Rejection by the Sargan test would cast doubt on the 
validity of the instruments. A potentially serious issue in this setting relates to the power of 
the Sargan statistic. As Bowsher (2002) shows, the power of the Sargan statistic in 
detecting invalid restrictions can decline dramatically given too many moment conditions. 
Consequently, to reduce the possibility of severe overfitting bias (Bond, 2002), a 
parsimonious number of instruments (lags) is used throughout the analysis. 
Another concern arises when there is a high degree of persistence in the data. 16 
Under such conditions, lagged levels have a low correlation with the first differences, and 
the standard linear GMM-DIFF estimator has been found to suffer from a "weak 
instruments problem", because it displays poor finite sample properties. In particular, 
Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer (2000) show that in multivariate models where the 
individual series are highly persistent, the standard GMM difference estimator may have 
serious finite sample biases. 
Arellano and Bover (1995) propose an estimator that considers the equation in 
levels, with both lagged first-differenced and lagged level terms as instruments in the first- 
difference equation. Blundell and Bond (1998) examined this procedure in detail, and 
illustrate significant asymptotic efficiency gains in this GMM-SYS estimator. They also 
emphasize that the finite sample bias of the GMM-DIFF is likely to be in the direction of 
the WG estimator when weak instruments are present. 
In the light of all the issues described above, we used the GMM-SYS methodology 
for analysis. The Sargan Difference test is reported in order to test the restrictions imposed 
by GMM-SYS and its validity with respect to the GMM-DIFF. Since instruments lagged at 
16 A preliminary analysis of the persistency of the data revealed that most of the autoregressive coefficients 
were close to 0.8. Results are provided in Table A. M. 
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t-2 appear to be correlated with the error term, according to the Sargan statistic in Model 3, 
all GMM estimations are carried out using the lagged levels at t-3 and t-4 of all variables 
for the equations in first difference, and the difference lagged at t-2 for all variables in the 
level equation. ' 7 
3.4 Empirical Results 
In Table 3.5, following the sequence of ideas outlined above, we compare the results of the 
OLS, WG, GMM-DIFF and GMM-SYS estimations. As the theoretical arguments by Bond 
(2002) lead us to expect, the OLS estimates of the autoregressive parameter appear 
positively biased, and the results obtained via the WG methodology appear biased in the 
opposite direction. 
In line with the predictions outlined in the previous section, the GMM-DIFF 
estimator appears biased in the direction of the WG, while the GMM-SYS estimator seems 
to provide consistent and efficient estimates, because the coefficient of the autoregressive 
component now lies between the OLS and WG values 18. The Wald (joint) test provides 
evidence that the regressors included in the model are all jointly significant, and the Wald 
(time) test provides support for the inclusion of time dummies. The Sargan statistic 
confirms the validity of the instrument set, while the Sargan Difference test provides strong 
evidence in support of the restrictions imposed by the GMM-SYS. As expected, we detect 
serial correlation of the first order, but not of order two. 
3.4.1 Ownership and control characteristics: Managerial Ownership 
To investigate whether the non-monotonic relation between managerial ownership 
and firm performance is significant, we first analyze the impact of ownership held by all 
directors on the board. In the GMM-SYS model shown in Table 3.5, we find support for the 
cubic relationship between insider ownership and firm performance. For low values of 
board ownership, up to around 15% (in about 67% of all sample firms) and consistent with 
the alignment hypothesis, we detect a positive effect on firm performance. This may 
alternatively imply that the market perceives insider ownership as a positive signal of 
reduced agency problems inside the firm. Nonetheless, a further rise in managerial 
17 The result in the Sargan statistic in Model 3 could be due to persistency in the data. Consider the case of an 
endogenous variable. If X,,. 2 is very similar (highly correlated) to X;,. 1, this may result in correlation between 
X;,. 2 and the first differenced error term. 
IS See Bond (2002) for a more technical treatment. 
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ownership between 15% and 45% (comprising about 22% of the companies) increases the 
likelihood that managers will become entrenched, and this has a negative effect on firm 
value. Only at very high levels of ownership does the relationship turn positive again 
(nearly 11 % of firms feature managers with more than 45% of shares), possibly because 
managers actually become the owners of the firm, at which point manager-shareholder 
conflicts fade. Our findings suggest that managers become entrenched at higher levels of 
ownership than their US counterparts (see, for instance, Morck et al., 1988). As Faccio and 
Lasfer (1999) and Short and Keasey (1999) argue, this may be a consequence of the 
differences between the UK and US systems regarding legal restrictions on stock 
ownership, and legal activism in corporate control and board composition. 
In our second step, to test whether the estimated alignment/entrenchment effects 
apply to both categories of directors, we divided board members into executives and non- 
executives (Table 3.6). Since there is no clear theoretical prediction of the functional form, 
we specify three distinct models in which ownership by non-executives follows a cubic, 
quadratic and then linear relation to firm value. Further, to account for the possibility that 
ownership by non-executives also influences performance according to their relative 
presence in the board, we introduce an interaction term. All four models in Table 3.6 
provide consistent figures in terms of the control variables and estimated turning points. 
Results indicate that executive directors follow the previously detected cubic relationship, 
and that the connection between ownership by all board members and performance is 
linked only to the executive positions in the board. The relative stability in the estimated 
turning points tends to corroborate this conclusion. Conversely, no model supports the 
hypothesis that share ownership by non-executives plays any role in determining firm 
performance. 
These findings tally with Bhagat and Black (2002) but contrast with those of Morck 
et al. (1988) for US companies whose results indicate that outside board members respond 
to financial incentives and contribute to corporate wealth as officers do, and also that they 
tend to become entrenched. 
The figures in our analysis may be consistent with different interpretations. On the 
one hand, they may indicate that outside directors are truly independent in the UK, and so 
are not subject to any alignment/incentive effects in terms of their shareholding. On the 
other hand, the results may be seen as evidence of executive directors' ability to create a 
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board that is unlikely to monitor. In line with Hart (1995), it may also be interpreted as 
evidence that non-executives in the UK still do not have sufficient financial incentives to be 
active monitors of executive decisions. In fact, as reported in Table 3.2, ownership by non- 
executives is substantially lower than ownership by executives, especially in the early 
nineties. 
However, our results indicate that the larger the fraction of outside directors in the 
board, the better a firm performs. This is in line with the findings by Yermack (1996) and 
Baysinger et al. (1985) for the US. It is also consistent with UK findings by Dahya and 
McConnell (2002), who detect an increased sensitivity of turnover to performance, due to 
an increase in non-executives' presence in the board. Dahya and McConnell (2003) also 
conclude that firms that increased the number of non-executives underwent a significant 
improvement in performance. This evidence may corroborate the hypothesis that UK non- 
executive directors are effectively independent. The peculiar "one hand one vote" feature of 
the UK governance system might explain why non-executives positively influence firm 
value, irrespective of their shareholdings. Several robustness checks were next performed 
to test the reliability of these results. 
First, all estimations were run again using the ratio of non-executives cum-shares, 
rather than all non-executives on total board, to verify whether the results are driven mainly 
by this peculiar UK governance feature. The figures reported in Table 3.7 (Model 10) show 
that the results are relatively stable. This suggests that the results obtained for the overall 
ratio are driven by the fact that the majority of non-executives actually hold some shares. 
However, the estimated coefficient for the ratio cum-shares is almost half of that for the 
overall ratio of all non-executives (Table 3.6 Model 9). 19 This suggests that market 
perception is also an important driving force. It appears that the market perceives a board 
with numerous non-executives as indicating good governance. In a further analysis, all 
estimations were run without, in turn, the ratio of non-executives (cum shares), and then 
their direct equity holding (Models 11 and 12). This makes it possible to verify whether, 
due to the one hand one vote rule, these two variables are proxies for the same thing. To the 
extent that the results are driven by this feature, when we exclude the ratio (cum shares) 
from the estimations we may expect direct equity holding to show a statistically significant 
19 Results from all the unreported results indicate this same pattern. 
83 
coefficient. Conversely, Table 3.7 confirms that the ratio of non-executives on the total 
board is always significant and that their shareholding never is. 
These results cast doubt on the efficacy of direct equity ownership as an alignment 
mechanism for outside directors. 
As a further robustness check, we also investigated whether results on non- 
executive shareholding depend on the choice of the functional form. Dummy variables 
corresponding to several threshold values of non-executive ownership were generated and 
interacted with the level of non-executive ownership. For example, Dum. Non-Exec 
own>25% is a dummy that takes value 1 when non-executive ownership is larger than or 
equal to 25%. This reveals whether the relation with Tobin's q is in fact linear rather than 
nonlinear, and enables us to verify whether the relationship becomes statistically significant 
only at high levels. Indeed, since non-executive ownership is usually rather low, the aim 
with this robustness test is to isolate those firms where non-executive ownership is high, to 
verify whether the lack of statistical significance is due to low financial incentives. Table 
3.8 reports a selection of these robustness checks. 20 The reported figures are not in line with 
Hart's (1995) argument, since the relationship remains insignificant even when we isolate 
high non-executive ownership firms (Model 15, Table 3.8). 
3.4.2 Ownership and control characteristics: Large External Shareholders 
As far as ownership concentration is concerned, we find a negative relation between 
blockholders and Tobin's q. A possible explanation is that disclosed shareholding is too 
dispersed, so that no individual shareholder has the incentive to actively monitor 
managerial behaviour, because the coordination costs are higher than the benefits singly 
received by each owner. Our findings are in line with those of Faccio and Lasfer (2000), 
Lasfer (2004) and Davies et al. (2004), but contrast with those of Dahya and McConnell 
(2002), who fail to detect any significant role for blockholders in determining CEO 
turnover in UK companies, between 1989 and 1996. This result is also in accord with the 
argument of Burkart et al. (1997), who contend that too much block ownership will overly 
constrain management and reduce its ability to take value maximizing investment 
decisions. 
20 Several more dummies at 5% intervals were tested. All results are virtually identical to those reported in the 
table and are available upon request. 
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This interpretation is supported when we take into account only the first largest non- 
managerial owner. In fact, Model 16 in Table 3.9 shows, as before, the same negative 
relation between the largest non-managerial shareholder and q-ratio. Furthermore, results 
for both blockholding and individual largest shareholding contrast with the findings 
reported by McConnell and Servaes (1990; 1995), who fail to detect any significant impact 
of large external shareholders on firm performance in the US. 2 
3.4.3 Ownership and control characteristics: Identities of Large External Shareholders 
The identity of owners also provides insight into the relation between external 
shareholders and firm performance. In Table 3.9, we sub-divide ownership by external and 
largest non-managerial investors (Models 17 and 18) into ownership by institutions and 
non-institutions. We find no evidence for the hypothesis that different owners have a 
different impact on firm value, whether as a group or as a largest shareholder. 
Our results suggest that non-institutional owners can negatively affect firm value. 
This may happen, for instance, if they collude with managers in the company at the expense 
of the minority investors, or in cases where they are passive and unwittingly allow 
managers to expropriate firm resources. 
This is not in line with Short and Keasey (1999), who report a positive impact of 
non-institutional shareholders on firm value. Also, Frank et al. (2001) report a positive 
relation between individuals and industrial companies with regard to executive board 
turnover, for the worst performing English companies. This result is cited in support of the 
hypothesis that this kind of shareholder engages in a certain degree of monitoring action on 
manager behavior. 
Moreover, contrary to the "efficient monitoring hypothesis", the results for 
institutional shareholders support the thesis that institutional investors are either passive or 
they connive and collaborate 'with managers. As already stated, much empirical evidence 
shows how UK institutions are passive investors. The results presented here suggest that 
this "absentee landlord syndrome" results in increased managerial discretion, which is in 
turn detrimental to firm value. Alternatively, these results are consistent with the strategic 
alignment hypothesis of Pound (1988), which holds that institutional investors may find it 
profitable to cooperate with managers, or may even be forced to cooperate with them in 
21 With the exception of low-growth firms in the years 1986 and 1988, when all outside shareholders seem to 
contribute positively to firm value 
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order to protect other business relationships that they may have with the firm (conflict of 
interest hypothesis). This may happen in cases where the value of the business with the firm 
is larger than the value of the equity holding by the institution. For example, an institution 
may be a shareholder in the company and also its main insurer. In a similar situation, the 
institution may find it detrimental to vote against the incumbent management, since this 
may jeopardize business relations with the firm (Pound, 1988). 
These results are in line with Seifert et al. (2005), who find a negative relation 
between ownership by institutional investors and Tobin's q. Similarly, Parrino et al. (2003) 
report that changes in ownership by institutions are negatively associated with the 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover, and that an executive from outside the firm is appointed 
CEO. Similar results are reported by Duggal and Millar (1999), who find no evidence to 
sustain the claim that institutional investors have superior monitoring abilities. Results 
reported in Jennings (2005), from Granger causation tests, also reveal how, while quality 
firms attract institutional investment, these institutions do not then appear to monitor 
properly, and firm value subsequently declines. Similar results are borne out in a paper by 
Faccio and Lasfer (2000) who report that occupational pension funds are not effective 
monitors in the UK. 
Contrarily, Dahya and McConnell (2002) fail to detect any significant effect of UK 
institutional shareholders on management turnover from 1989 through 1996. This figure is 
also in line with Short and Keasey (1999), who report no significant positive impact of 
English institutional owners on their proxy for Tobin's q. In contrast, McConnell and 
Servaes (1995) provide evidence that the influence of institutional investors on q for US 
companies is highly significant. 
3.4.4 Economic variables 
We find that dividends, cash flow and capital expenditures are all highly significant 
in determining firm value. The positive relation between dividends and the q-ratio supports 
the argument of Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) that dividends are a means to 
mitigate manager-shareholder conflict within the firm, producing an improvement in its 
market valuation. This result is partly in line with findings by Farinha (2003) of an increase 
in dividend payments for UK firms when managers are entrenched. This is also consistent 
with the idea that markets positively perceive dividend increases. 
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On the other hand, the positive impact of cash flow on firm value suggests that the 
availability of internal funds may have a positive impact on the valuation of the company. 
One interpretation of this result is that internally generated funds allow the firm to reduce 
the risk of underinvestment and pursue valuable growth opportunities. In all the models we 
detect a positive relation between investments and firm value, although only expenditures 
in tangible assets are statistically significant. 22 Our results are consistent with those 
reported by Davies et al. (2004), while for US firms Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell 
and Servaes (1990; 1995) show a significant impact on R&D expenditures as well. 
Finally, in none of the models estimated do we detect any significant impact of 
leverage or size. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This paper has studied the relation between firm performance and the ownership 
structure of firms, using an original panel data set of UK listed non-financial firms for the 
period 1991-2001. It has investigated whether non-executive directors play a separate role 
from executives in determining firm performance. 
Our analysis fails to detect any significant relation between ownership by non- 
executive directors and Tobin's q. It emerges that the alignment/entrenchment effect, as 
detected on the total board, is driven by the executive positions on the board. This result is 
robust to a number of robustness checks. In particular, the proportion of non-executives in 
the board remains positive and statistically significant when we augment the model, by 
introducing an interaction effect with the proxy for board composition. Also, the results are 
unaltered when we try different proxies for board composition, and when we specify 
different functional forms. 
These results cast doubt on the efficacy of direct equity ownership as an alignment 
mechanism for outside directors. One interpretation of these results may be that non- 
executive directors are truly independent in the UK, and, as such, not sensitive to incentive 
mechanisms. On the other hand, in line with Hart's (1995) argument, the results may also 
indicate that financial incentives for non-executives are still insufficient. This interpretation 
is particularly interesting when considering the recent increasing trend in non-executive 
22 One explanation for the insignificance of intangible assets expenses is that a large number of firms reported 
zero RD expenditures. As a result, the data may not have sufficient variability to show a significant 
relationship. 
87 
shareholding in UK firms. However, even when we isolate high non-executive ownership 
firms, we still fail to detect any significant link with firm value. 
Nonetheless, our results suggest that the proportion of non-executives on the board 
exerts a positive role on corporate value. This is a very important when we consider it in the 
light of increasing attention that was placed on the importance of non-executive directors in 
the UK during the 1990s. The Cadbury (1992), Hampel (1998) and, recently, Higgs (2003) 
reports have all recommended an increasing presence of non-executives on boards of 
directors as a rule of good governance. It could be argued that market expectations of board 
composition may have been shaped by these codes of best practice. Moreover, in the long 
run, it is also possible that the market has increased the level of scrutiny of the quality of 
non-executives, thus creating pressures on the managerial labour market. This, in turn, may 
have led to an improvement in the average quality of non-executives, thus leading boards to 
take better decisions. For instance, this interpretation is consistent with Dahya and 
McConnell (2005), who indicate that UK companies that increased the proportion of non- 
executives, to be in compliance with the Cadbury recommendations, experienced 
significant improvements in operating performance. Also, Lasfer (2004) reports that the 
positive relationship between the ratio of non-executives and performance is stronger in the 
post-Cadbury period, and this may confirm that these recommendations have enhanced the 
quality of boards in the UK. This finding may be a crucial contribution of this study, 
because it has a direct bearing on policy decisions being made in many countries, as they 
formulate codes of best practices similar to the Cadbury Code in the UK. 
In line with recent findings for the UK, we also detect a negative link between 
performance and blockholding. Further investigations separated the identity of external 
owners, and the results suggest that institutions and private investors influence corporate 
value in the same way. We also analyzed the role of the largest non-managerial owner and 
its identity. The results tend to confirm the negative role played by external shareholders on 
firm performance. 
These results also indicate that investment in physical capital, cash flow and 
dividend payments play an important positive role in determining firm performance. 
Finally, the present results are valid after allowing for the presence of individual 
heterogeneity, and for all dependent variables to be endogenously determined. 
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Table 3.1. Definitions of variables. 
Variable Definition 
The ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus 
Tobin's q the market value of equity to book value of assets 
Board ownership Sum of ordinary shareholdings by all directors (%) 
Executive ownership Sum of ordinary shareholdings by executive directors (%) 
Non-Executive ownership Sum of ordinary shareholdings by non-executive directors (%) 
Dum. Non-Exec own>5% Dummy equal to I if Non-Executive ownership is greater or equal to 5% 
Dum. Non-Exec own>15% Dummy equal to 1 if Non-Executive ownership is greater or equal to 15% 
Dum. Non-Exec own>25% Dummy equal to I if Non-Executive ownership is greater or equal to 25% 
Blockholding Sum of all external shareholdings above 3% 
Institutional Ownership Ownership by financial institutions (pension funds, banks, insurance 
companies, fund managers) 
Non-Institutional Ownership Ownership by private individuals, other non-financial companies 
Largest non-managerial Ownership by the largest non-managerial shareholder in the firm 
Ownership 
Ratio The proportion of non-executive directors on total board 
Float Percentage of shares held under the disclosure threshold 
Board Size Total number of directors 
Executive Directors Total number of executive directors 
Non-Executive Directors Total number of non-executive directors 
Blockholders Total number of external shareholders 
Institutional Investors Total number of financial institutions (pension funds, banks, insurance 
companies, fund managers) 
Non-Institutional investors Total number of private individuals, other non-financial companies 
Size Defined as the natural logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices 
Dividends The ratio of ordinary dividends net of Advance Corporation Tax, to total 
assets 
Leverage Defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets 
RD Expenditures Research and Development expenditures on total assets 
Capital Expenditures Defined as capital expenditures on total assets 
Cash Flow Defined as the ratio of pre-tax profit plus depreciation to total assets 
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Table 3.7. Robustness checks for the ratio of non-executives. 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
Tobins'q (-1) 0.543 0.000 *** 0.543 0.000 *** 0.542 0.000 *** 
Executive ownership 0.044 0.0 17 ** 0.032 0.084 * 0.032 0.056 * 
Executive ownership2 -0.002 0.025 ** -0.002 0.079 * -0.002 0.060 * 
Executive ownership3 2.67E-05 0.031 ** 2.21E-05 0.075 * 2.16E-05 0.084 * 
Non-Executive ownership -0.017 0.417 -0.025 0.216 
Non-Exec ownership*Ratio(cum shares) 0.034 0.526 0.061 0.229 
Blockholding -0.004 0.06 * -0.004 0.09 * -0.005 0.074 * 
Ratio(cum shares) 0.592 0.032 ** 0.497 0.04 ** 
Leverage 0.076 0.807 0.036 0.92 0.118 0.725 
Size -0.042 0.292 -0.048 0.21 -0.046 0.250 
Dividends 4.876 0.025 ** 5.045 0.01 ** 5.029 0.018 ** 
RD Expenditures 1.289 0.297 0.877 0.51 1.002 0.418 
Capital Expenditures 1.577 0.045 ** 1.428 0.07 * 1.593 0.026 ** 
Cash flow 0.950 0.055 * 1.075 0.04 ** 0.958 0.048 ** 
Constant 0.7131 0.171 0.7775 0.098 * 0.910 0.060 * 
Observations 6340 6340 6340 
Implied Turning Points (12.98; 42.71) (11.97 ; 40.73) (11.70; 42.82) 
Wald (joint) 512.9 0.000 *** 491.1 0.000 *** 563.8 0.000 *** 
Wald (time) 37.71 0.000 *** 35.57 0.000 *** 37.48 0.000 *** 
Sargan 322 0.265 269.6 0.393 292.6 0.532 
ml test -6.791 0.000 *** -6.773 0.000 *** -6.801 0.000 *** 
m2 test -0.8828 0.377 -0.8045 0.421 -0.8252 0.378 
In this table we report robustness checks of our results using the ratio of non-executives who do hold shares (cum shares) on 
the total board. All estimations are carried out with the GMM-SYS methodology. For the equations in first differences, 
levels dated [t-3, t-4] of all the regressors are used as instruments. In the equations in levels, first differences dated [t-2] are 
used as instruments. Time dummies were included in all estimations. Asymptotic standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity were used in the estimations. ml and m2 are tests for the absence of first and second-order correlation in 
the residuals, and are asymptotically distributed as N (0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test statistic is 
a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a XZ under the null of valid instruments, with k 
degrees of freedom. The Wald (joint) test reports a test on the joint significance of all regressors. Wald (time) reports a test 
of joint significance of the time dummies. Tobin's q is the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity 
plus the market value of equity to book value of assets. Executive Ownership is the sum of ordinary shareholdings by 
executive directors. Non-Executive ownership is the sum of ordinary shareholdings by non-executive directors. 
Blockholding is the sum of all external shareholdings above 3%. Ratio(cum shares) is the he proportion of non-executive 
directors (who own shares) on total board. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of 
total assets in 1991 prices. Dividends is the ratio of ordinary dividends net of Advance Corporation Tax, to total assets. RD 
Expenditures is total research and development expenditures on total assets. Capital Expenditures is total capital 
expenditures on total assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of pre-tax profit plus depreciation to total assets 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3.8. Robustness checks on the functional form of non-executive shareholding. 
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
Tobin's q (-1) 0.533 0.000*** 0.5269 0.000*** 0.517 0.000*** 
Executive ownership 0.040 0.053* 0.0423 0.029** 0.035 0.068* 
Executive ownership2 -0.002 0.064* -0.0022 0.040** -0.002 0.088* 
Executive ownership3 2.49E-05 0.068* 2.70E-05 0.044** 2.1E-05 0.071* 
Non-Executive ownership 0.012 0.800 0.0181 0.379 -0.018 0.388 
Non-Exec own* Dum. Non-Exec own>5% -0.020 0.666 
Non-Exec own* Dum. Non-Exec own>15% -0.026 0.354 
Non-Exec own* Dum. Non-Exec own>25% 0.019 0.348 
Blockholding -0.005 0.073* -0.006 0.027** -0.007 0.020** 
Ratio 0.853 0.003*** 0.658 0.020** 0.792 0.007*** 
Leverage 0.036 0.910 -0.097 0.767 0.011 0.973 
Size -0.057 0.209 -0.047 0.243 -0.070 0.116 
Dividends 4.827 0.020** 3.802 0.014** 4.199 0.014** 
RD Expenditures 1.725 0.187 1.121 0.398 1.297 0.288 
Capital Expenditures 1.466 0.035** 1.499 0.037** 1.504 0.037** 
Cash flow 1.090 0.044** 1.168 0.037** 1.245 0.014** 
Constant 0.7024 0.224 0.7340 0.142 0.8905 0.117 
Observations 6340 6340 6340 
Implied Turning Points (12.9; 41.11) (12.7; 40.91) (13.3; 42.23) 
Wald (joint) 624.1 0.000*** 533 0.000*** 584.7 0.000*** 
Wald (time) 31.97 0.000*** 28.53 0.001*** 40.96 0.000*** 
Sargan 319.2 0.318 323.3 0.263 317.2 0.347 
ml test -6.704 0.000*** -6.66 0.000*** -6.600 0.000*** 
m2 test -0.8848 0.376 -0.956 0.339 -0.824 0.410 
All estimations are carried out with the GMM-SYS methodology. For the equations in first differences, levels dated [t-3, t-4] 
of all the regressors are used as instruments. In the equations in levels, first differences dated [t-2] are used as instruments. 
Time dummies were included in all estimations. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity were used in the 
estimations. ml and m2 are tests for the absence of first and second-order correlation in the residuals, and are asymptotically 
distributed as N (0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test statistic is a test of the over-identifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a x2 under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom. The Wald (joint) 
test reports a test on the joint significance of all regressors. Wald (time) reports a test of joint significance of the time 
dummies. Tobin's q is the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to 
book value of assets. Executive Ownership is the sum of ordinary shareholdings by executive directors. Non-Executive 
ownership is the sum of ordinary shareholdings by non-executive directors. Dum. Non-Exec own>5% is a dummy equal to I if 
non-executive ownership is greater or equal to 5%. Dum. Non-Exec own>15% is a dummy equal to I if non-executive 
ownership is greater or equal to 15%. Dum. Non-Exec own>25% is a dummy equal to 1 if non-executive ownership is greater 
or equal to 25%. Blockholding is the sum of all external shareholdings above 3%. Ratio(cum shares) is the he proportion of 
non-executive directors (who own shares) on total board. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices. Dividends is the ratio of ordinary dividends net of Advance Corporation Tax, to total 
assets. RD Expenditures is total research and development expenditures on total assets. Capital Expenditures is total capital 
expenditures on total assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of pre-tax profit plus depreciation to total assets. *significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3.9. Identities of the external shareholders. 
Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
Tobin's q (-1) 0.5424 0.000*** 0.5249 0.000*** 0.5469 0.000*** 
Executive ownership 0.0402 0.045** 0.0414 0.017** 0.0439 0.044** 
Executive ownership2 -0.0020 0.059* -0.0020 0.032** -0.0021 0.055* 
Executive ownership3 0.0000 0.064* 0.0000 0.044** 0.0000 0.059* 
Non-Executive ownership 0.0055 0.759 0.0034 0.847 0.0043 0.801 
Non-Exec ownership *Ratio -0.0185 0.642 -0.0167 0.644 -0.0180 0.623 
Largest Non-Managerial Ownership -0.0054 0.081 * 
Institutional Ownership -0.0061 0.023** 
Non-Institutional Ownership -0.0077 0.025** 
Largest Institutional Ownership -0.0057 0.133 
Largest Non-Institutional Ownership -0.0058 0.045** 
Ratio 0.9059 0.001*** 0.9668 0.002*** 0.8998 0.002*** 
Leverage 0.2138 0.526 0.0549 0.854 0.1092 0.732 
Size -0.0207 0.639 -0.0597 0.168 -0.0159 0.695 
Dividends 5.0954 0.016** 4.8318 0.012** 4.5649 0.011** 
RD Expenditures 1.9908 0.175 1.7565 0.217 1.6356 0.26 
Capital Expenditures 1.6528 0.031 ** 1.3644 0.082* 1.4339 0.072* 
Cash flow 1.2154 0.025** 1.2114 0.017** 1.1758 0.021** 
Constant 0.1583 0.746 0.8530 0.145 0.1186 0.796 
Observations 6340 6340 6340 
Implied Turning Points (13.50 ; 40.60) (13.39 ; 42.01) (13.96; 40.63) 
Wald (joint) 556.5 0.000*** 558 0.000*** 579.3 0.000*** 
Wald (time) 34.97 0.000*** 42.56 0.000*** 36.12 0.000*** 
Sargan 326.6 0.343 329.4 0.499 363.3 0.205 
ml test -6.889 0.000*** -6.773 0.000*** -6.84 0.000*** 
m2 test -0.8495 0.396 -0.9529 0.341 -0.8759 0.381 
All estimations are carried out with the GMM-SYS methodology. For the equations in first differences, levels dated [t-3, t-4] of all the regressors are 
used as instruments. In the equations in levels, first differences dated [t-2] are used as instruments. Time dummies were included in all estimations. 
Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity were used in the estimations. ml and m2 are tests for the absence of first and second-order 
correlation in the residuals, and are asymptotically distributed as N (0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test statistic is a test of the 
over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom. The Wald (joint) test 
reports a test on the joint significance of all regressors. Wald (time) reports a test of joint significance of the time dummies. Tobin's q is the ratio of 
book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of assets. Executive Ownership is the sum of 
ordinary shareholdings by executive directors. Non-Executive ownership is the sum of ordinary shareholdings by non-executive directors. Largest 
Non-Managerial ownership is the shareholding by the largest non-managerial shareholder in the firm. Institutional Ownership is the sum of all 
shareholding by financial institutions (pension funds, banks, insurance companies, fund managers) above 3%. Non-Institutional Ownership is the 
sum of all shareholding by private individuals, other non-financial companies. Largest Institutional Ownership is the shareholding by the largest 
financial institution in the firm. Largest Non-Institutional Ownership is the shareholding by the largest non-financial institution in the firm. Ratio(cum 
shares) is the he proportion of non-executive directors (who own shares) on total board. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices. Dividends is the ratio of ordinary dividends net of Advance Corporation Tax, to total assets. RD 
Expenditures it total research and development expenditures on total assets. Capital Expenditures is total capital expenditures on total assets. Cash 
Flow is the ratio of pre-tax profit plus depreciation to total assets *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
99 
U 
f 
Q 
0 
n 
0 0 
ö 
0 
ö 
v 
0 
v 
ö 
M 
0 
M 
0 
N 
O 
N 
6 
0 
ö 
(0 N Co (O 
OO 
bS ul(10 L aYraanr. 
VNO 
OO 
L 
Y 
r. + 
C 
.ý 
L 
'fi 
L 
v 
C 
i 
O 
:3 
O 
c 
U 
U 
0 
QJ 
CV (l: 
6O L .U 
nO 
yO 
t ., 
N ý. 
SU 
yO 
Ö 
c3 
_U 
U 
.. 2 
.oi. ö '_' 
-- 
r1. ý 
G 
i '11 
r 
O1 
Lv 
O R% 
F" Ö 
V 
04 G 
V 
ro 
O1 
O 
ÖG 
-L 
r 
N 
.G 
GL 
vy 
'L J L .. 
c 
Table A. M. Test for difference in means. 
Board Ownership Cluster Average Tobin's q Test for difference in means p-value 
1) 0-15% ql) 1.559 (q2-q1) -0.0713 0.0713 
2) 15-40% q2) 1.514 (q3-q1) 0.14585 0.0026 
3)45-% q3) 1.660 (q3-q2) 0.10168 0.0085 
This table reports t tests on the equality of means. Board ownership is the sum of ordinary shareholdings by all 
directors. Tobin's q is the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of 
equity to book value of assets. 
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Table A. 3.2. Alternative definition of Tobin's 
Model5 Mode16 Mode17 
Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
Tobins'q (-1) 0.524 0.000*** 0.518 0.000*** 0.518 0.000*** 
Executive ownership 0.043 0.013** 0.041 0.019** 0.044 0.015** 
Executive ownership2 -0.002 0.042** -0.002 0.049** -0.002 0.028** 
Executive ownership3 0.00002 0.066* 0.000 0.073* 0.00003 0.040** 
Non-Executive ownership -0.002 0.947 -0.029 0.201 -0.010 0.138 
Non-Executive ownership 2 -0.001 0.556 0.001 0.189 
Non-Executive ownership 3 0.00003 0.244 
Non-Exec ownership *Ratio 
Blockholding -0.006 0.032** -0.005 0.034** -0.005 0.027** 
Ratio 0.907 0.002*** 0.896 0.002*** 0.888 0.001*** 
Leverage 0.174 0.611 0.219 0.549 0.282 0.386 
Size -0.044 0.176 -0.044 0.211 -0.057 0.123 
Dividends 3.279 0.003*** 3.241 0.004*** 3.747 0.016** 
RD Expenditures 1.412 0.326 1.762 0.222 2.065 0.162 
Capital Expenditures 1.826 0.032** 1.804 0.018** 1.529 0.029** 
Cash flow 1.615 0.004*** 1.711 0.002*** 1.654 0.002*** 
Constant 0.6631 0.151 0.5154 0.324 0.6549 0.243 
Observations 6340 6340 6340 
Implied Turning Points (14.49; 42.73) (14.00; 42.82) (13.71; 42.78) 
Wald (joint) 652.1 0.000*** 651.4 0.000*** 613.2 0.000*** 
Wald (time) 32.63 0.000*** 36.99 0.000*** 34.99 0.000*** 
Sargan 339.1 0.258 316.1 0.264 292.6 0.276 
ml test -6.757 0.000*** -6.681 0.000*** 6.6698 0.000*** 
m2 test 0.1569 0.873 -0.208 0.835 0.03081 0.704 
All estimations are carried out with the GMM-SYS methodology. For the equations in first differences levels dated [t-3, t-4] 
of all the regressors are used as instruments. In the equations in levels, first differences dated [t-2] are used as instruments. 
Time dummies were included in all estimations. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity were used in the 
estimations. ml and m2 are tests for the absence of first and second-order correlation in the residuals and are 
asymptotically distributed as N (0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test statistic is a test of the over- 
identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a x2 under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom. 
The Wald (joint) test reports a test on the joint significance of all regressors. Wald (time) reports a test of joint significance 
of the time dummies. Tobin's q is the ratio of market value of equity plus the book value of total liabilities plus the book 
value of preferred stock to book value of total assets. Executive Ownership is the sum of ordinary shareholdings by 
executive directors. Non-Executive ownership is the sum of ordinary shareholdings by non-executive directors. Ratio is the 
he proportion of non-executive directors on total board. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices. Dividends is the ratio of ordinary dividends net of Advance Corporation Tax, to 
total assets. RD Expenditures is total research and development expenditures on total assets. Capital Expenditures is total 
capital expenditures on total assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of pre-tax profit plus depreciation to total assets 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A. 3.3. Results using a definition of Market-to-Book Ratio. 
Models Mode16 Modell 
Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
Mtbv (-1) 0.546 0.000*** 0.539 0.000*** 0.537 0.000*** 
Executive ownership 0.039092 0.036** 0.040143 0.039** 0.041088 0.039** 
Executive ownership 2 -0.00178 0.081 * -0.00182 0.092* -0.00196 0.065** 
Executive ownership3 2.08E-05 0.079* 2.11E-05 0.061* 2.32E-05 0.081** 
Non-Executive ownership -0.00453 0.881 -0.02827 0.130 -0.01065 0.133 
Non-Executive ownership 2 -0.0011 0.573 0.000703 0.279 
Non-Executive ownership3 3.36E-05 0.241 
Non-Exec ownership *Ratio 
Blockholding -0.00596 0.022** -0.00512 0.043** -0.00532 0.033** 
Ratio 0.855264 0.003*** 0.846055 0.002*** 0.862882 0.001*** 
Leverage 0.133235 0.687 0.192549 0.575 0.29782 0.335 
Size -0.05275 0.124 -0.04055 0.290 -0.05183 0.215 
Dividends 3.59665 0.011** 3.76972 0.016** 4.30157 0.032** 
RD Expenditures 1.1599 0.389 1.5929 0.253 1.89306 0.192 
Capital Expenditures 1.64799 0.046** 1.68307 0.039** 1.44483 0.056* 
Cash flow 1.4022 0.008*** 1.45653 0.007*** 1.43351 0.006*** 
Constant 0.5812 0.212 0.4222 0.423 0.5279 0.356 
Observations 6340 6340 6340 
Implied Turning Points (14.84; 42.21) (14.84; 42.80) (13.99; 42.27) 
Wald (joint) 621.7 0.000*** 636.8 0.000*** 620.4 0.000*** 
Wald (time) 32.67 0.000*** 40.15 0.000*** 39.03 0.000*** 
Sargan 344.5 0.280 318.6 0.327 301.2 0.256 
ml test -7.028 0.000*** -6.938 0.000*** 6.668 0.000*** 
m2 test 0.05881 0.953 0.1415 0.887 0.2990 0.765 
All estimations are carried out with the GMM-SYS methodology. For the equations in first differences levels dated [t-3, t-4] 
of all the regressors are used as instruments. In the equations in levels, first differences dated [t-2] are used as instruments. 
Time dummies were included in all estimations. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity were used in the 
estimations. ml and m2 are tests for the absence of first and second-order correlation in the residuals and are 
asymptotically distributed as N (0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test statistic is a test of the over- 
identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as af under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom. 
The Wald (joint) test reports a test on the joint significance of all regressors. Wald (time) reports a test of joint significance 
of the time dummies. Mtbv is the ratio of market value of equity plus book value of debt (long and short term) divided by 
the book value of assets. Executive Ownership is the sum of ordinary shareholdings by executive directors. Non-Executive 
ownership is the sum of ordinary shareholdings by non-executive directors. Ratio is the he proportion of non-executive 
directors on total board. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in 1991 
prices. Dividends is the ratio of ordinary dividends net of Advance Corporation Tax, to total assets. RD Expenditures is 
total research and development expenditures on total assets. Capital Expenditures is total capital expenditures on total 
assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of pre-tax profit plus depreciation to total assets 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A. 3.4. Results using a definition of Returns on Assets. 
Model5 Model6 Mode17 
Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
ROA (-1) 0.2008 0.000*** 0.1946 0.000*** 0.1929 0.000*** 
Executive ownership 0.0018 0.362 0.0018 0.389 0.0015 0.294 
Executive ownership Z -0.0001 0.504 -0.0001 0.527 0.0000 0.590 
Executive ownership 3 0.0000 0.503 0.0000 0.583 0.0000 0.700 
Non-Executive ownership 0.0032 0.229 -0.0002 0.914 0.0000 0.974 
Non-Executive ownership2 -0.0002 0.205 0.0000 0.965 
Non-Executive ownership3 0.0000 0.154 
Non-Exec ownership *Ratio 
Blockholding -0.0001 0.675 -0.0002 0.666 0.0000 0.906 
Ratio -0.0520 0.251 -0.0471 0.359 -0.0276 0.574 
Leverage -0.1821 0.000*** -0.1843 0.001*** -0.1961 0.000*** 
Size 0.0180 0.001*** 0.0147 0.004*** 0.0175 0.001*** 
Dividends 0.2323 0.112 0.1713 0.307 0.1827 0.280 
RD Expenditures -0.4848 0.017** -0.4199 0.066* -0.4700 0.047** 
Capital Expenditures -0.1403 0.062* -0.1214 0.097* -0.0934 0.235 
Mtbv 0.0224 0.001*** 0.0228 0.004*** 0.0225 0.002*** 
Constant 0.0859 0.200 0.0435 0.473 0.0886 0.134 
Observations 6340 6340 6340 
Implied Turning Points (23.49; 46.62) (24.16; 42.84) (26.71; 47.31) 
Wald (joint) 300.9 0.000*** 131.7 0.000*** 183.1 0.000*** 
Wald (time) 27.30 0.001*** 21.32 0.011 ** 19.99 0.018** 
Sargan 350.1 0.214 330.0 0.186 309.3 0.164 
ml test -5.686 0.000*** -5.653 0.000*** -5.674 0.000*** 
m2 test 1.541 0.123 1.529 0.126 1.561 0.128 
All estimations are carried out with the GMM-SYS methodology. For the equations in first differences levels dated [t-3, t-4] 
of all the regressors are used as instruments. In the equations in levels, first differences dated [t-2] are used as instruments. 
Time dummies were included in all estimations. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity were used in the 
estimations. ml and m2 are tests for the absence of first and second-order correlation in the residuals and are asymptotically 
distributed as N (0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test statistic is a test of the over-identifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a x2 under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom. The Wald 
(joint) test reports a test on the joint significance of all regressors. Wald (time) reports a test of joint significance of the time 
dummies. ROA is the ratio earnings before interest, tax depreciation and amortization to total assets. Executive Ownership is 
the sum of ordinary shareholdings by executive directors. Non-Executive ownership is the sum of ordinary shareholdings by 
non-executive directors. Ratio is the he proportion of non-executive directors on total board. Leverage is the ratio of total 
debt to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices. Dividends is the ratio of ordinary dividends net 
of Advance Corporation Tax, to total assets. RD Expenditures is total research and development expenditures on total assets. 
Capital Expenditures is total capital expenditures on total assets. Mtbv is the ratio of market value of equity plus book value 
of debt (long and short term) divided by the book value of assets. 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A. 3.5. Static vs dynamic OLS models. 
Model I Model 2 
Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
Tobins'q (-1) 0.6888 0.000*** 
Board ownership 0.008309 0.279 0.0009 0.818 
Board ownership 2 -0.00041 0.246 -5.39E-06 0.977 
Board ownership 3 4.63E-06 0.273 3.53E-07 0.873 
Blockholding -0.00609 0.000*** -0.0018 0.000*** 
Ratio 0.443465 0.001*** 0.1906 0.002*** 
Leverage 0.203498 0.233 0.1466 0.123 
Size -0.03661 0.024** -0.0240 0.001 
Dividends 6.29927 0.000*** 2.3387 0.000*** 
RD Expenditures 6.9109 0.000*** 2.4142 0.000 
Capital Expenditures 1.64571 0.000*** 0.3278 0.016** 
Cash flow 1.92373 0.000*** 0.7936 0.000*** 
Constant 1.028 0.000*** 0.4877 0.000"' 
Observations 6340 6340 
Implied Turning Points N/A N/A 
Wald (joint) 237.5 0.000*** 2412 0.000*** 
Wald (time) 83.88 0.000*** 141.1 0.000*** 
ml test 9.230 0.000*** 1.952 0.051** 
m2 test 8.400 0.000*** 0.5822 0.560 
m3 test 7.354 0.000*** 1.67 0.221 
m4 test 6.762 0.000*** -1.251 0.211 
m5 test 5.636 0.000*** 0.4372 0.662 
Modell and Model2 are estimated with OLS in levels. Time dummies are included in all estimations. Asymptotic standard 
errors robust to heteroskedasticity were used in the estimations. m are tests for the absence of correlation in the residuals. 
These test statistics are asymptotically distributed as N (0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Wald (joint) test 
reports a test on the joint significance of all regressors. Wald (time) reports a test of joint significance of the time dummies. 
ml and m2 m3 m4 and m5 are tests for the absence of first, second, third, fourth and fifth order correlation in the residuals 
and are asymptotically distributed as N (0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Tobin's q is the ratio of book value of 
total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of assets. Board ownership is the 
sum of ordinary shareholdings by all directors. Ratio is the he proportion of non-executive directors on total board. 
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices. Dividends is the 
ratio of ordinary dividends net of Advance Corporation Tax, to total assets. RD Expenditures is total research and 
development expenditures on total assets. Capital Expenditures is total capital expenditures on total assets. Cash Flow is 
the ratio of pre-tax profit plus depreciation to total assets 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
105 
Table A. 3.6. Persistency of the individual series. 
Variable autoregressive parameter p-value obs R-square 
Tobins'q 0.78 0.000 5667 0.597 
Board ownership 0.87 0.000 5667 0.812 
Executive ownership 0.87 0.000 5667 0.814 
Non-Executive ownership 0.75 0.000 5667 0.542 
Blockholding 0.79 0.000 5667 0.632 
Institutional Ownership 0.78 0.000 5667 0.597 
Non-Institutional Ownership 0.78 0.000 5667 0.589 
Largest Non-Managerial 
Ownership 0.80 0.000 5667 0.634 
Largest Institutional Ownership 0.70 0.000 5667 0.475 
Largest Non-Institutional 
Ownership 0.73 0.000 5667 0.517 
Ratio 0.79 0.000 5667 0.665 
Leverage 0.84 0.000 5667 0.667 
Size 0.99 0.000 5667 0.978 
Dividends 0.42 0.000 5667 0.172 
RD expenditures 0.92 0.000 5667 0.722 
Capital Expenditures 0.23 0.000 5667 0.062 
Cash Flow 0.52 0.000 5667 0.250 
This table reports the OLS estimated autoregressive parameter (as in Bond, 2002) in order to assess the 
persistency of the individual series. Tobin's q is the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of 
equity plus the market value of equity to book value of assets. Board ownership is the sum of ordinary 
shareholdings by all directors. Executive Ownership is the sum of ordinary shareholdings by executive directors. 
Non-Executive ownership is the sum of ordinary shareholdings by non-executive directors. Blockholding is the 
sum of all external shareholdings above 3%. Institutional Ownership is the sum of all shareholding by financial 
institutions above 3%. Non-Institutional Ownership is the sum of all shareholding by private individuals, other 
non-financial companies. Largest Non-Managerial Ownership is the shareholding by the largest non-managerial 
shareholder in the firm. Largest Institutional Ownership is the shareholding by the largest financial institution in 
the firm. Largest Non-Institutional Ownership is the shareholding by the largest non-financial institution in the 
firm. Ratio is the he proportion of non-executive directors on total board. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to 
total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices. Dividends is the ratio of ordinary dividends 
net of Advance Corporation Tax, to total assets. RD Expenditures is total research and development expenditures 
on total assets. Capital Expenditures is total capital expenditures on total assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of pretax 
profit plus depreciation to total assets*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS: EVIDENCE 
FROM LOW-LEVERAGE FIRMS 
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4.1. Introduction 
Since the seminal work by Fazzari et al. (1988), the investment literature has 
mostly been concerned with the identification of different classes of firms that are 
more (or less) likely to face higher costs of capital, in the attempt to document how 
investment cash flow sensitivities change as the cost of external finance rises (see, 
e. g., Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; and Bond and Meghir, 1994, for the UK; 
Hoshi et al., 1991, for Japan; Chirinko and Schaller, 1995, for Canada; Elston, 1998, 
for Germany). Generally, the investment models supporting these empirical studies 
predict that, for firms with high agency and asymmetric information problems, 
changes in net worth affect investment. A significantly positive value of the estimated 
coefficient of cash flow would correspond to the suggestion that financing constraints 
are present (see Hubbard, 1998). Nonetheless, since Kaplan and Zingales' (1997) 
paper, an ongoing debate has raised doubts about and criticism of the validity of this 
approach, arguing that investment-cash flow sensitivity may be higher for firms that 
do not face greater costs of external funds (e. g., Cleary, 1999; Kaplan and Zingales, 
2000). 
On the other hand, the literature on financial choices generally considers 
investment as exogenously determined, and it focuses on the relative cost of debt to 
equity, testing the hypotheses of the pecking order versus the trade off theory (e. g., 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003; 
Flannery and Rangan, 2005), as well as market timing (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) and 
the relevance of elements such as taxes and financial distress (Hovakimian et al., 
2001). 
Recently, several qualitative studies, including Graham and Harvey (2001) for 
the US, Bancel and Mitoo (2004) and Brounen et al. (2005) for Europe, have provided 
evidence of the interaction between financial and investment decisions, and maintain 
that financial flexibility, in the form of debt conservatism, is the principal driving 
force of leverage choices by CFOs. For instance, 59% of Graham and Harvey's 
(2001) respondents say that flexibility is important (rating of 3), or very important 
(rating of 4), in enabling them to undertake investment in the future, when 
asymmetric information and contracting problems might otherwise force firms to 
forego profitable growth opportunities. 
This survey's evidence could be interpreted in the light of the arguments by 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Myers (1984), according to whom "real-world 
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problems of financial strategy" (i. e., capital market imperfections) lead firms to "the 
need for preserving flexibility", implying "the maintenance by firms of a substantial 
reserve of untapped borrowing power" (Modigliani and Miller, 1963, p. 442). A 
further corroborating argument in the literature can be found in Myers' (1977) 
seminal paper. He shows how "too much" debt may induce firms to forego profitable 
investment opportunities, even when managers are fully aligned with shareholders' 
interests. 
The aim of this work is to analyze more systematically the interaction between 
low-leverage policy and investment decisions. Taking the ideas set out above as a 
starting point, we investigate the hypothesis that anticipating financial constraints in 
the future, firms may respond by accumulating reserve borrowing power. More 
specifically, by pursuing a policy of low-leverage for a certain number of years, firms 
may accumulate financial flexibility that allows them access to the external market, 
and so be able to raise funds to invest more than their internal resources would permit. 
The first step of our analysis consists in the identification of those companies 
with reserves of borrowing power (RBP). To this end, we initially identify low- 
leverage firms by adopting a "target" approach. This entails the estimation of a 
leverage equation from which the predicted level of debt is calculated: this makes it 
possible to calculate the deviation between actual and predicted level of debt, and to 
define low-leverage firms as those that are below the estimated target. We then 
classify a firm as RBP if it shows a low-leverage policy for three consecutive years 
before the analyzed investment decision. 
After classifying firms, the second step of our analysis investigates whether 
this borrowing power, accumulated in the previous three years, has an impact on 
current investment policy. The prediction is that RBP firms have enough spare debt 
capacity to be able to raise external funds and invest more in the years following the 
conservative financial policy. To investigate this hypothesis, we specify an investment 
model in which we introduce the RBP dummy. According to our "flexibility" 
hypothesis, the RBP dummy should have a positive and significant impact on capital 
expenditure. Furthermore, because RBP firms can, after a period of low leverage, 
raise external funds to finance projects larger than their internal resources, we would 
also expect the impact on the cash flow sensitivity of investment to be negative and 
insignificant. It is important to underline that, in line with Modigliani and Miller 
(1963) and Myers (1984), RBP firms do not use only internal funds, but are also able 
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to go to the external markets and exploit their reserve borrowing power when internal 
funds are insufficient to implement a new project. 
Furthermore, in an attempt to assess the dynamics of firm choices in more 
detail, we also undertake an intertemporal descriptive study of a number of relevant 
firm characteristics. Using this perspective, we expect to detect the following: first, 
RBP firms should show an increase in the level and value of their investments around 
time t; second, in line with the hypothesis of higher ability to raise external funds after 
having accumulated borrowing power, RBP firms should show a sharp increase in 
leverage levels at time t and, accordingly, they should experience an increase in net 
debt issue; third, RBP firms should show a decrease in available liquid resources 
around t, because part of these resources may be invested in new projects. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, unlike previous 
works, our paper is an original attempt to investigate explicitly the impact of a distinct 
leverage policy on the investment decisions of firms. To the best of our knowledge, 
Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990), Bond and Meghir (1994), Lang et al. (1996) and, 
very recently, Aivazian et al. (2005), include debt variables in their investment 
models. However, their analyses focus on how the current availability of external 
finance, such as debt, may influence investment decisions. They do not take into 
account any intertemporal perspective on a specific financial strategy by firms. 
Further, Graham (2000) and Minton and Wruck (2001) observe that conservative 
firms stockpile financial slack or debt capacity in order to finance future discretionary 
expenditures. It should be noted, however, that the focus of these studies is very 
different from ours. Graham (2000) estimates the magnitude of the tax benefits of 
debt. Minton and Wruck (2001) investigate the determinants of financial conservatism 
behaviour. In contrast, the aim of the present work is to analyze explicitly the impact 
of certain financial strategies on investment, by explicitly including the leverage 
policy status in the investment model. 
Second, in defining low-leverage firms we adopt a different methodology than 
previous studies. Graham (2000) infers how aggressively a firm uses debt by 
observing where it locates on its interest benefit functions; while Minton and Wruck 
(2001) classify a firm as being financially conservative (i. e., having low leverage) if 
its annual ratio of long-term debt to total assets is in the bottom 20% of all firms for 
five consecutive years. In our work, in contrast, we estimate the amount of leverage as 
predicted by the dominant capital structure theories. We then control how firms 
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deviate from it, in order to identify the low-leverage firms. One advantage of our 
approach over previous ones is that, by estimating a leverage model, we consider a 
number of firm-specific characteristics that are likely to affect company demand for 
debt. In addition, unlike a fixed cut-off value approach, we account for possible 
changes in the firms' optimal leverage over time, and also the possibility of different 
optimal levels across firms, in line with the methodology adopted by Hovakimian and 
Titman (2001) for capital structure decisions and Iona et al., (2004). Furthermore, in 
estimating the amount of debt for each firm using the GMM-SYS methodology, we 
take into account the issue of the endogeneity and individual heterogeneity among 
variables. This may seriously bias estimations if not properly accounted for. 
We conduct our analysis over a large sample of UK non-financial listed firms 
over the period 1991-2001. We hand-collected detailed information on ownership by 
directors and external shareholders, and board composition, on an annual basis for a 
sample of 1100 UK non-financial listed firms. Economic and market variables are 
from Datastream. Thanks to the availability of these data sets, we are able to estimate 
the influence of ownership characteristics in the optimal leverage model in a panel 
data framework, which represents our work's other original contribution to the 
literature. In addition, our study may shed more light on the relation between leverage 
policy and investment expenditures in the UK market, a question that has been the 
focus of a limited number of papers. To the best of our knowledge, Lasfer (1995), Ozkan 
(2001) and Bevan and Danbolt (2004) provide evidence on the determinants of capital 
structure for UK companies. On the other hand, Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) and 
Bond and Meghir (1994) include debt variables in their investment models for the UK, but 
their main aim is to analyze investment-cash flow sensitivity as a proxy for financial 
constraints. In addition, they do not take into account the ownership effect. 
Our analysis reveals that the low-leverage (LL) policy is a transitory one. 
Following a period of low leverage (two/three years), firms appear able to invest 
significantly more in capital expenditures. We investigate these results in more detail, 
and conduct several robustness checks in various directions. Our intertemporal 
analysis reveals how, consistent with our predictions, RBP firms sharply increase 
their capital investments after acquiring RBP status. They do so by issuing new debt 
and approaching their target leverage. A further interesting aspect is that we detect a 
significant increase of abnormal investment (spikes) by firms after acquiring RBP 
status. Finally, the results appear to indicate that this strategy is value enhancing: we 
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document an increase in average market to book ratio for this group of firms over 
time. 
The rest of the work is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop 
the main hypotheses tested in the leverage and investment models, and we present the 
methodology adopted in our work. Section 3 is dedicated to the presentation of data. 
Section 4 reports the summary statistics and regressions results. Section 5 includes 
robustness checks. Conclusions are in Section 6. 
4.2. Research Design 
4.2.1 Definition of low-leverage firms 
As discussed above, the first step is dedicated to the identification of the low- 
leverage firms that we use instrumentally to define RBP firms. ' There are two main 
ways of proceeding. 
One consists in setting a benchmark value that separates low leverage from 
high leverage. For example, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) consider as "high cash" 
those companies that hold more than 25% of their assets in cash and equivalents. 
Minton and Wruck (2001) use the statistical distribution across firms of the variable 
of interest. They classify firms as "leverage conservative" (i. e., having low leverage) 
when their leverage is in the bottom 20% of the distribution of all firms. We will refer 
to this in the text as the "percentile methodology". 
The alternative specification, as we described in the introduction, starts from 
the idea that firms have a target capital structure that is firm-specific. In this view, low 
leverage is defined in terms of the deviation between the actual level of debt and the 
estimated target. To calculate the target and the potential deviations from it, a 
leverage model must be chosen. We will refer to this as the "target methodology". 
This second methodology appears to be more reliable, for a number of reasons. 
For instance, it is reasonable to believe that the amount of debt in a firm depends on a 
series of firm-specific characteristics. Indeed, a preliminary inspection of the data 
reveals significant differences in total debt in different industries. Moreover, an 
increasing number of studies in the literature corroborate the idea that firms do indeed 
have a target capital structure. According to the figures reported in Graham and 
Harvey (2001), 37% of firms have a "flexible" target debt ratio, while a further 35% 
1 All definitions of variables are provided in Table 2. 
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have a stricter target. In their recent paper, Flannery and Rangan (2005) test the 
predictions of a static trade-off theory (TOT) model versus pecking order theory 
(POT), and the more recent Market Timing hypothesis. Their evidence substantiates 
the survey results of Graham and Harvey (2001), that firms do have a target leverage. 
Further, this approach seems more appropriate in assessing the evolution of the debt 
changes a firm realizes over time. For example, analysis of the data shows how the 
company "Bett Brothers" records a leverage of around 0.0137% in 1997, and 4.22% 
in 1998, which corresponds approximately to a 309% increase in debt ratio. These 
two values belong to the first and second deciles of the distribution, respectively. 
Therefore, despite the considerable increase in leverage, this firm is still classified as 
LL according to the percentile methodology. On the other hand, using the targeting 
approach, we find that while the 1997 observation corresponds to a negative deviation 
from target (i. e., LL status), in 1998 the firm is over the estimated target, and 
therefore loses LL status. 
However, the second approach is not free from drawbacks. Possibly the most 
serious shortcoming lies in the fact that the choice of the leverage model affects the 
estimated target and deviation from it, and ultimately influences the classification of 
firms and the subsequent results of the investment equation. Misspecification of the 
leverage model may result in serious bias of the results that follow. 
As a result of all these considerations, we proceed in the following way. First, 
to minimize the possibility that the results are affected by the choice of a specific 
leverage model, we test our results by using four different leverage model 
specifications. Second, to maintain a "neutral" approach with respect to the definition 
of LL firms, we will use both the target and the percentile methodology, and report all 
the results accordingly. 
4.2.2 Definition of "reserve borrowing power "firms 
In this setting, we start from the specification of a target leverage model. We use a 
partial adjustment model, and we include a widely accepted set of variables that have 
been identified in the literature as potential determinants of leverage. The estimated 
models, in turn, provide us with the fitted value for debt (see Opler et al., 1999 for an 
application to a cash model). In other words, from these estimations we work out what 
financial theory would predict the level of leverage of each company to be. At this 
point, the estimated (fitted) value is compared with the actual value and low/high 
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leverage firms are distinguished, in terms of the deviation between the actual and the 
predicted level. In other words, this entails a two-step procedure in which a predicted 
value is computed using the leverage model estimated at the first step, so that the 
model estimated at the second step then includes the prediction from the first. A 
peculiarity of our case is that our analysis is mostly based on the "behaviour" of the 
residual from the first step estimation, because we require a number of consecutive 
negative deviations (LL) to generate the RBP dummy that is the core of this study. 
We adopt two different methods to assign LL status. The "simple" criterion 
assigns LL status to firms where the actual leverage is lower than the predicted one. 
For robustness purposes, we also utilize a more stringent definition, according to 
which firms are LL only if their (negative) deviation from the target is larger (in 
absolute terms) than at least 25% of all LL firms. 
Finally, in line with our description above, we use two different criteria to 
identify firms with reserve borrowing power. In the first case, the dummy takes the 
value of 1 when we observe at least three consecutive periods in which the firm is 
classified as LL prior to the investment decision (RBP3 and RBPpct3). In the other 
case, we require only two consecutive periods (RBP2 and RBPpct2). 
Z 
For clarity, we now present a more detailed step-by-step description of the 
method followed to classify firms in Table 4.2 Panel A. For simplicity, this example 
describes the RBP3 dummy. Because the leverage model is estimated in first 
difference, the first observation is "lost" (denoted as N/A in the table). Moreover, 
since to assign the RBP status we require at least three consecutive observations in 
which firms are LL, the first available observation to meaningfully discern RBP from 
NRBP firms is the 4th one (corresponding to the 1995 observation in the example). 
Therefore, in Table 4.2A, the observations corresponding to 1992,1993, and 1994 are 
denoted as "not available". This explains how, for the investment model, we are left 
with 4006 observations and 613 firms available. It is worth underlining that, having 
defined the dummy in this way in the investment model, we will investigate the 
relationship between investment at time t and the dummy RBP, which defines a past 
behaviour. 
We report the descriptive classification of firms in Table 4.2B, which shows 
that 277 companies are classified as never having reserve borrowing power (NRBP). 
2 RBP3 and RBP2 refer to LL firms classified using the simple deviation criteria and RBPpc13 and 
RBPpct2 refer to firms being classified as LL if the deviation is larger than 25% of other LL firms. 
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On the other hand, RBP firms account for a total of 270 companies, while 66 are 
always classified as RBP in all the time periods in which they are present in the 
dataset (ARBP). Further, an analysis of the time series properties of the RBP status 
reveals that firms are classified as RBP for an average (median) of 2.64 (2) 
consecutive periods, which confirms the idea that this is a temporary strategy. 
4.2.3 Leverage model hypotheses 
In this section, we describe the hypotheses that provide the theoretical 
underpinning for the choice of variables included in the estimated capital structure 
models. 
4.2.3.1 Specification 1 
The base specification consists in the "classical" Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
four variable model, consisting of size, growth opportunities, profitability and 
tangible assets. 
According to the asymmetric information hypothesis, small firms are 
considered more opaque by potential investors (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) and face 
larger costs in raising external capital. Larger firms, on the other hand, are less 
exposed to asymmetric information problems, and consequently are expected to have 
better access to capital markets. Moreover, these companies are less exposed to the 
probability of bankruptcy (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
Most empirical studies report a positive sign for the relationship between size and 
leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2003). Less conclusive results 
are reported by other authors (Kremp et al., 1999; Ozkan, 2001). We proxy for size 
using the natural logarithm of total assets. 
According to Myers' (1977) underinvestment argument, firms with high 
growth opportunities are expected to have lower levels of leverage. To avoid having 
to pass up profitable investment opportunities in the future, such firms can alleviate 
this problem by shortening the maturity of debt (Myers, 1977; Titman and Wessels, 
1988), or by using convertible bonds (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Warner, 
1979). Titman and Wessels (1988) also point out that firms in growing industries 
incur higher agency costs, since they have more flexibility in making future 
investments. It is also suggested that, although growth opportunities are capital assets 
that add value to a firm, they cannot be collateralized and do not generate current 
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income. They are intangible in nature, and valuable only as long as the firm is alive. 
Their value will fall significantly if the firm faces bankruptcy, which suggests that the 
expected bankruptcy costs for firms with greater growth opportunities will be higher 
(Myers, 1984; Williamson, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1990). Larger expected 
bankruptcy costs would in turn imply lower financial leverage. Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) find a negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage, and 
suggest that this may occur as a result of firms issuing equity when stock prices are 
high. As mentioned by Hovakimian et al. (2001), large stock price increases are 
usually associated with improved growth opportunities, and lead to a lower debt ratio. 
Similar to other studies (e. g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Whited, 1992; Barclay and 
Smith, 1995; and Rajan and Zingales, 1995), this proxy is defined as the ratio of book 
value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to 
book value of total assets. 
To the extent that firms first finance their investments by extinguishing their 
internal funds, as predicted by the pecking order theory, a larger profitability/cash 
flow will be negatively related to leverage. In contrast, according to the trade-off 
theory, a positive relationship would be expected, as a consequence of decreasing 
bankruptcy risks and increasing free-cash flow problems. Following Titman and 
Wessels (1988) and Whited (1992), we measure profitability as the ratio of the 
earnings before interest, tax and depreciation (EBITD) to total assets. 
Tangible assets are likely to have an impact on the borrowing decisions of a 
firm, because they are less subject to informational asymmetries, and they usually 
have a greater value than intangible assets in the event of bankruptcy. Additionally, 
moral hazard risks are reduced when the firm offers tangible assets as collateral, 
because this constitutes a positive signal to creditors, who can request the selling of 
these assets in the case of default. As such, tangible assets constitute a good collateral 
for loans and are expected to be positively related to leverage. Moreover, as 
underlined above, it must be taken into account that a large presence of tangible assets 
may also be a proxy for relative low growth options. Most empirical studies conclude 
that there is a positive relation between collaterals and the level of debt (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Kremp et al., 1999; Frank and Goyal, 2002). Inconclusive results are 
reached by Titman and Wessels (1988). Following Rajan and Zingales (1995) and 
Booth et al. (2001), we define collateral as the ratio of total fixed assets to total assets. 
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4.2.3.2 Specification 2 
In the second specification, the standard Rajan and Zingales (1995) regression 
is augmented with ownership control variables, under the hypothesis that agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders may be important determinants of 
leverage choices. We include executive ownership, blockholding and the ratio of non- 
executives on total board. 
Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), the influence of managerial incentives 
and discretion on capital structure choices has attracted considerable attention, and 
different and contrasting views have been proposed. On the one hand, some authors 
have proposed theories under which managers prefer to keep debt ratios low, to 
reduce risk and protect their undiversified human capital (Fama, 1980), or to alleviate 
the pressure that comes with interest payment commitments (e. g., Jensen, 1986). On 
the other hand, according to Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988)), managers 
may actually prefer higher leverage, in order to inflate their voting power and reduce 
the possibility of a takeover. Furthermore, according to Leland and Pyle's (1977) 
signalling hypothesis, managers may actually choose higher leverage, to convince 
investors of their ability to generate sufficient earnings to repay their debt. Research 
on this issue provides some evidence that entrenched managers, i. e., managers who 
are able to act in their own self-interest, prefer lower leverage ratios. Friend and Lang 
(1988) and Mehran (1992) find that managers with discretion tend to choose lower 
leverage. Consistent with this, Berger et al. (1997) show that leverage levels are lower 
when managers do not face pressure from disciplining mechanisms. However, given 
the contrasting theoretical views on the relation between the extent of manager 
shareholder agency conflicts and the choice of capital structure, it is difficult to 
predict a priori the direction of the relationship. 
3 
Increasing emphasis has recently been placed on the role of board 
composition, as a possible corporate governance tool that could help to regulate 
managerial discretion. It is a general view that the board of directors is more 
independent as the number of non-executives increases. Non-executive directors 
should be independent "advisors" and act as "delegated monitors" by the shareholders 
of the actions of executive managers. To the extent that non-executive directors 
' In line with other studies (Kim and Sorensen, 1986; Crutchley et al., 1999), and to account for the 
possibility that the relationship may be a non-linear one, in an unreported test we also specify a 
quadratic relationship. Results in the estimated target and deviations and following investment models 
are virtually unaltered. 
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perform a monitoring and disciplining function over executives, we may expect to 
detect an impact on leverage decisions. It is difficult, however, to predict exactly the 
direction of causality. As Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue in their paper, the 
board of directors could be endogenously determined in response to the agency 
conflicts inside the firm. It could be argued that firms with more outside-dominated 
boards may have lower manager-shareholder conflicts. This, in turn, may 
counterbalance the managers' preference for lower debt, and result in higher levels of 
leverage. However, if non-executive owners are exercising an effective degree of 
monitoring of executives, we 'may also expect a negative relationship under the 
hypothesis that, as we also discuss below, managers use leverage as a signal to the 
market. To the extent that the market perceives an outsider-dominated board as a 
signal of reduced agency conflicts, then managers do not need to use (high) leverage 
as a signal of their commitment to the market. We approximate board composition by 
the fraction of non-executive directors on total board. 
As Stiglitz (1985) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue, large shareholders 
may have greater incentives to be involved in the control process than smaller ones, 
because they can more easily bear the high fixed costs of collecting information on 
management behaviour, given the large proportion of resources invested in the firm. 
In general, when control rights are concentrated in the hands of few investors with 
extensive cash flow rights, a concerted action is easier than when control rights are 
dispersed. Similar conclusions are reached by Zeckhauser and Pound (1990), who 
argue that the mere presence of a large shareholder often acts as a signal to the market 
that managers are less able to expropriate the firm's resources, thus avoiding the need 
for managers to increase debt level as a signal. For example, Sudarsanam (1996) 
provides evidence that large block acquisitions in the UK market are value-enhancing 
events, consistent with the hypothesis of the market's expectations of reduced agency 
costs. In line with these arguments, we would expect higher ownership by non- 
managerial shareholders to result in a lower proportion of debt in the capital structure 
of firms. However, other studies such as Holderness (2003) reports little evidence that 
blockholders affect leverage. In our work, we use the sum of all large external 
shareholders that hold more than 3% of the shares in each company as a proxy for 
blockholding. 
118 
4.2.3.3 Specification 3 
As indicated above, in a third specification we also include other potential 
control variables, to take into account the "financial status" of firms. We include 
dividend payments, debt maturity, cash holding and non-debt tax shield. These 
variables have been linked to capital structure decisions in different works. 
According to Easterbrook (1984), dividend policy is also an instrument that 
firms can use to reduce managerial discretion. It is argued that dividend payouts play 
a role in mitigating equity agency costs, by facilitating capital market monitoring of 
the firm's activities and performance. Higher dividend payouts increase the likelihood 
that the firm will have to sell common stock in primary capital markets. This, in turn, 
will induce scrutiny of management by investment banks, securities exchanges and 
capital suppliers. Also, dividends commit the firm's management to pay out cash to 
shareholders, and cutting dividends may, in turn, provide a negative signal to the 
market. A negative sign could then be predicted, to the extent that different control 
mechanisms are alternated to reduce manager shareholder conflicts (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996). 
A number of studies have also underlined the interdependence of the leverage 
and maturity mechanisms, and have reached opposite conclusions on the direction of 
this relationship. On the one hand, Barclay et al. (2003) argue that, as short debt 
maturity can reduce the cost of underinvestment problems, it may allow firms to 
increase optimal leverage. On the other hand, Johnson (2003) argues that shortening 
the maturity of debt can also increase liquidity risk, and may therefore constitute an 
incentive for firms to reduce optimal leverage. It is then difficult ex ante to predict the 
sign of this relationship. In our study, maturity is defined as the ratio of total loans 
repayable after one year to total debt. 
In the literature on cash holding policy, it is argued that one motive for holding 
cash arises because raising funds from the external market can be very costly for firms 
that need prompt liquidity. As a consequence, cash may be used as a buffer against 
the possibility of having inadequate funds to implement valuable projects. In this 
sense, leverage can be seen as a substitute to cash (Opler et al., 1999), and therefore a 
negative link could be predicted. We define cash as the ratio of total cash and 
equivalents to total assets. 
Finally, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) show that if non-debt tax shields exist, 
then firms are likely not to use fully debt tax shields. In other words, firms with large 
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non-debt tax shields have a lower incentive to use debt from a tax shield point of 
view, and thus may use less debt. Nonetheless, a large non-debt tax shield may 
indicate a relatively large presence of fixed assets. This variable may also be a proxy 
for low growth options, and this may imply a positive relationship. Following Titman 
and Wessels (1988), we use the ratio of annual depreciation expense to total assets as 
a proxy for non-debt tax shields. 
4.2.4 Estimation methodology: Leverage 
All leverage models are estimated using the GMM-SYS methodology, which 
allows us to control for a number of econometric issues simultaneously. First, it 
allows us to control for the potential endogeneity of regressors. Endogeneity arises 
because shocks that affect corporate gearing are also likely to affect regressors such as 
cash holding, maturity or dividend choices. Moreover, endogeneity may arise from 
cross causality. For example, it may be argued that it is leverage decisions that affect 
the company's cash holding or dividend policy, rather than the other way around. 
A further reason for endogeneity arises from the possibility that firm-specific 
characteristics may be correlated with the explanatory variables. 
4 
As a consequence, in this work we estimate the following model: 
L. E =GY1ý, crit_] +1 =IYkXit 
+'/i 171 +uit (1) 
where rl; is a proper fixed effect that accounts for the correlation existing between 
firm-specific characteristics and regressors, and ilt represents a firm-invariant time 
effect which is able to account for macro-economic factors (such as market shocks). 
For the moment, we assume the idiosyncratic term u, t to be homoschedastic and 
serially uncorrelated. 
Following the seminal work of Arellano and Bond (1991), we take the first 
differences of the model and then use suitable lagged levels of the dependent 
variables as instruments. If we first difference model 1, we obtain 
k 
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Because the validity of the GMM relies heavily on the absence of serial correlation of 
higher order, two tests of correlation in the error term of order one and two are 
included in the results (ml and m2). 
° Preliminary diagnostic checks confirm that firm fixed effects appear to be important in explaining 
leverage ratios. 
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The choice of an appropriate set of instruments is tested via the Sargan test of 
over-identifying restrictions, which tests the null hypothesis of the absence of 
correlation between the instruments and the error term. Rejection by the Sargan test 
would cast doubt on the validity of the instruments. 
Another concern arises when there is a high degree of persistence in the data. s 
Under such conditions, Arellano and Bover (1995) propose an estimator that 
considers the equation in levels, with both lagged first-differenced and lagged level 
terms as instruments in the first-difference equation. This procedure is examined in 
detail by Blundell and Bond (1998), who illustrate significant asymptotic efficiency 
gains in this GMM-SYS estimator. They also emphasize that, when weak instruments 
are present, the finite sample bias of the GMM-DIFF is likely to be in the direction of 
the WG estimator. 
In the light of all the issues described above, we used the GMM-SYS 
methodology for this analysis. Unreported tests confirm how, in line with this 
econometric theory, the autoregressive parameter's coefficient for the GMM-SYS lies 
between the OLS and Within Group ones, while the GMM-DIFF one seems affected 
by the weak instrument problem, as the coefficient is close to the WG one. 
4.2.5 Investment model hypotheses 
In their seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller (1963) noted that, despite the 
existence of some tax advantages for debt financing, firms tend not "to use the 
maximum possible amount of debt in their capital structure" because of limitations 
from lenders, which lead to "the need for preserving flexibility". Graham (2000) 
reports corroborating evidence that firms do not fully exploit the potential tax benefits 
of leverage. In 1984, Myers proposed a modified version of the pecking order theory, 
in which he maintains that firms, even if they cover part of normal investment with 
new borrowing, have two main reasons to restrain themselves from issuing debt: to 
avoid the costs of financial distress and to maintain financial slack. 
Taking these ideas as a starting point for our analysis, we test empirically the 
hypothesis that, in imperfect capital markets, firms may anticipate potential financial 
constraints from creditors in the future by accumulating reserve borrowing power at 
present. As in Myers (1984), reserve borrowing power means that they are able to 
5A preliminary analysis of the data confirms the presence of persistency. 
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issue debt if they need more funds than the accumulated internal ones to implement 
positive growth opportunities. 
To evaluate whether a low leverage is the result of a corporate policy rather 
than a temporary shock, we require firms to be classified as RBP on the basis of the 
definitions provided above. Therefore, through a policy of LL for a certain number of 
years, firms may accumulate financial flexibility that allows them to have access to 
the external markets, and to raise the necessary funds to invest in valuable projects in 
the future. As a consequence, we predict that the RBP dummy should have a positive 
and significant impact on the capital expenditure of firms. 
Furthermore, in the earlier investment literature, the sensitivity of investments 
to cash flow was used to assess the degree of capital market imperfections (Fazzari et 
al., 1988; Hoshi et al., 1991; Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; amongst many 
others). However, there is an ongoing debate about the interpretation of this 
sensitivity parameter. As we argued earlier, the underpinning idea is that 
imperfections introduce a wedge between the costs of external and internal funds. 
Firms facing higher informational imperfections experience a wider wedge, and 
therefore they are more financially constrained. On the one hand, Fazzari et al., 
(1988) argue that, for more financially constrained firms, investment is more sensitive 
to cash flow. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) provide an opposing perspective. They 
screen a set of annual reports for a sub-sample of low-dividend payout firms, and 
conclude that investment-cash flow sensitivity can be higher for unconstrained firms. 
Moreover, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Cleary (1999), Erickson and Whited 
(2000), and Alti (2003) present evidence indicating that measurement problems 
associated with Tobin's q may affect the sensitivity of investments to the availability 
of internal funds. 
To the extent that investment-cash flow sensitivity indeed contains 
information about financial imperfections and, thus, the accessibility of firms to 
external markets, then this sensitivity should be insignificant for RBP firms. This is 
because these companies can raise external funds at time t to finance projects larger 
than their internal resources, thanks to the borrowing power accumulated in the 
previous years. 
In addition, to corroborate our predictions, we may expect to find evidence of 
the following characteristics in an intertemporal perspective. First, RBP firms are 
expected to show an increase in the level and value of their investments around time t. 
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Second, in line with the hypothesis of higher ability to raise external funds after 
having accumulated borrowing power, RBP firms should show a sharp increase in 
leverage levels at time t and, accordingly, they should experience an increase in net 
debt issue. Third, RBP firms should show a decrease in available liquid resources 
around t, because part of these resources may be invested in new projects. 
4.2.6 Estimation methodology: investment model 
Four broad classes of investment model can be identified in the literature: the 
neoclassical model, the sales accelerator model, the Tobin's q model and the Euler- 
equation model. Each of these approaches is subject to criticism. However, most 
testing has been conducted in the context of q-models, in which average Tobin's q is 
used to control for the investment opportunities available to firms. 
For the purposes of comparison with previous work, we decided to adopt the 
investment model used in Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990), augmented by leverage 
status variables. Therefore, capital expenditures are regressed on Tobin's q and cash 
flow. Moreover, instead of partitioning the sample into different groups of firms, and 
running separate regressions for each of them, we include the leverage status dummy, 
both as a regressor on its own and interacted with cash flow, in the attempt to 
investigate whether RBP firms have indeed different investment expenditures. 
We are aware that estimating q-models is not without problems. A potentially 
serious issue is that Tobin's q will only include future expectations if the conditions 
indicated by Hayashi (1982) to approximate marginal q with average q hold: firms are 
price takers in perfectly competitive industries, there are constant returns to scale, and 
the stock market value correctly measures the fundamental expected present value of 
the firm's future net cash flows. In practice, these conditions may not be fulfilled. For 
instance, in the presence of a stock market bubble, Tobin's q would not capture all 
relevant information about the expected future profitability of current investment. 
Therefore, cash flow would be positive because of the expectations that are not 
captured by Tobin's q. 
As above, we employ the GMM-DIFF technique in a dynamic framework, 
similar to that proposed by Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) and Bond et al. (2004) 
to control for endogeneity and individual heterogeneity. The estimated model is as 
follows: 
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 + 73RBP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RBP,., + 77, +17, + v (3) 
qj is an unobserved firm-specific time-invariant effect, 17, is a time-specific firm- 
invariant effect and, finally, v;, is a disturbance term which is assumed to be serially 
uncorrelated with mean equal to zero. 
In line with the vast majority of works on this issue, all variables in the 
investment model are standardized on capital stock, which is measured on a 
replacement cost basis. For the first observation, replacement cost is assumed equal to 
the historic cost of total net fixed assets, adjusted for inflation. For the following 
observations, a standard perpetual inventory method process is adopted as follows: 
K,, = K_, (l - 8) + I , where 
8 is the rate of depreciation, assumed to be 0.08.6 
A further reason for standardizing on capital stock, rather than total assets, as 
the proxy for Q, is to attempt to mitigate the potential endogeneity between the 
leverage and investment models that may occur as a consequence of the leverage 
status variable having been obtained by regressing leverage on mtbv. 
4.3 Data 
The sample used in this analysis is constructed as follows. In the initial stage, 
a random sample of around 1100 listed non-financial firms was selected from 
Datastream constituent lists. Ownership data were hand-collected from the Price 
Waterhouse Corporate Register (December issue) for the period 1991-2001 (Marchica 
and Mura, 2005). Economic and market data were downloaded from Datastream. 
However, in order to compute the capital stock on a replacement cost basis, we 
needed to collect information even before 1991. This is because we employed a 
standard perpetual inventory method that requires the first available information in 
each time series of total net fixed assets as a proxy for the starting replacement value 
of capital stock. 
To be able to follow companies over time from two different datasets, a 
considerable effort went into tracking all the name changes (and also defunct 
companies) in the period. This information was collected mainly from the London 
Stock Exchange Yearbook, which reports systematic information on name changes, 
entries removed from the companies section, companies in liquidation, and companies 
in receivership and in administration. Moreover, as a further check, the Companies 
6 For this purpose data from Datastream from 1968 were employed. 
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House website was used. This is an online facility that provides various types of 
information on companies (including name changes). 
To run the empirical analysis, we undertook a number of steps. First, the 
dataset was cleaned of outliers. The ownership part of the dataset was thoroughly 
inspected in several directions. For example, we double-checked that the sum of all 
the shares collected did not sum to more than 100. In cases where they did, we tried to 
crosscheck the information with other issues of the Hemscott volumes (using either 
the September edition of the same year or the March edition of the following year), 
and/or with the London Stock Exchange Yearbook, which also contains some 
ownership information. When it proved impossible to find coherent information from 
the different sources of data, this observation was dropped from the sample. After 
running these tests for the ownership side of the dataset, we also checked for outliers 
in the "economic" variables, as reported in Datastream. As there is no fixed rule for 
dealing with outliers, data were trimmed to the 99% percentile, as a general rule of 
thumb. The trimmed data were then always benchmarked with descriptive statistics 
reported in other established papers. 
7 
When the issue of outliers had been addressed, firms in the broadcasting sector 
and public utilities were excluded because of the peculiarities in their operational and 
regulatory conditions. Firms with dual class shares were also excluded, because they 
violate the "one share one vote" rule. Furthermore, missing firm-year observations for 
economic variables were dropped. Finally, in line with the indications specified by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), only firms with at least five consecutive years of 
observations were kept. This left us with an unbalanced panel of 677 firms and 5660 
observations for the leverage model. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4.3. 
4.4. Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Leverage model 
We start our analysis by estimating the leverage models, in order to identify 
the LL firms through the target methodology. As we discussed above, for robustness 
purposes, we analyze three alternative models, using a set of variables that have been 
identified in the literature as potential determinants of leverage. Table 4.4 shows the 
results for each model. The adopted methodology is the GMM-SYS. Results for OLS, 
Particular care was placed in benchmarking the variables in the investment model. As Table 3 shows, 
our figures are in line with Bond et al. (2004) and Benito and Young (2002). 
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WG and GMM-DIFF, unreported for brevity reasons, show that the estimates of the 
lagged dependent variable are upward biased, downward biased and close to the fixed 
effect regression, respectively, for each model. 8 In line with Bond's (2002) and 
Arellano and Bover's (1995) arguments, the GMM-SYS is the preferred 
methodology. The estimation period is between 1991 and 2001. We report three test 
statistics: (1) Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, which is asymptotically 
distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity; (2) First order 
autocorrelation of residuals, which is asymptotically distributed as standard normal 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation; and (3) Second order autocorrelation of 
residuals, which is distributed as standard normal N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. GMM estimation reveals that the coefficient of the lagged cash holding in 
all the specifications is positive and significantly different from zero. The reported 
adjustment coefficient X (i. e., (1- 8) ) is about 0.317, which seems to provide evidence 
that the dynamic nature of our model is not rejected. Moreover, it indicates that 
companies take, on average, about three years to close the gap with their target. This 
would corroborate our choice of examining the leverage behaviour of firms in our 
sample for three consecutive years before analyzing their investment decisions. This 
result is similar to that reported recently by Flannery and Rangan 2005) for US firms, 
and is lower than that reported by Ozkan (2001) for the UK, possibly due to the 
difference in the methodology. 9 
As far as the interpretation of the other coefficients is concerned, most of the 
results in all models seem in line with the predictions. We detect a positive and 
significant impact of size. Larger firms are less exposed to asymmetric information 
and expected bankruptcy problems and, consequently, they seem to have better access 
to external capital markets. This is in line with the majority of findings in the capital 
structure literature (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Flannery and 
Rangan, 2005). In the same way, firms with larger collateral may be able to afford to 
have a larger amount of debt, as reported in Rajan and Zingales (1995), Kremp et al. 
(1999), Frank and Goyal (2003) and Flannery and Rangan (2005). Furthermore, 
profitable firms seem to borrow significantly less, consistent with the POT 
hypothesis, which predicts that firms prefer to use their internal funds first, and then 
' Values for the lagged dependent variable are 0.766 for OLS, 0.470 for WG and 0.521 for GMM- 
DIFF. All estimations were carried out using STATA 9. 
9 Indeed the results of this paper are similar to what we obtain when we use the GMM-DIFF estimator. 
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raise external finance to implement their investment. Similar results are shown by 
Ozkan (2001), for UK companies, and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Frank and 
Goyal (2003) and Flannery and Rangan (2005). 
As far as the financial variables added to the basic Rajan and Zingales model 
are concerned, the negative and significant coefficient of cash seems to support the 
transaction costs motive for holding cash. It could be also explained in the light of the 
POT hypothesis, interpreting cash as an alternative proxy for internal funds. 
On the other hand, the positive and significant relation between maturity and 
leverage is consistent with the results documented by Johnson (2003): that is, long- 
term debt is associated with lower liquidity risk, which positively affects leverage. 
In addition, dividends and non-debt tax shield show the predicted sign, 
although they are not significant, while growth opportunities do not seem to play a 
significant role in determining the level of leverage. 
Finally, among the ownership variables, blockholding and board composition 
seem to be relevant in leverage decisions. 
The result for blockholding is consistent with various interpretations. On the 
one hand, it may be evidence that leverage and outside shareholding are alternative 
agency control mechanisms. Therefore, a larger percentage of stakeholding in the 
hands of a non-managerial owner reduces the need for aligning incentives, such as 
direct equity holding by managers. Alternatively, this result could be interpreted in 
terms of the strategic alignment hypothesis, where blockholders are aligned with 
managers' interests and, consequently, prefer less than optimal leverage. 
10 
The results reported tend to support the view that firms with outside- 
dominated boards are likely to experience an increase in the monitoring of executives, 
and therefore a reduction in the agency costs of external finance. 
4.4.2 Investment model 
We now turn to the investment model estimations, to verify whether firms, 
having accumulated reserve borrowing power (RBP), are able to raise external funds 
to implement some valuable growth opportunities. 
Table 4.5 shows the results of the investment model, and analyzes the 
behaviour of the different set of dummies that describe RBP firms. It reports the 
10 This result appears to be in line with what we showed in Chapter 2. 
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results that follow the calculation of the RBP dummies, using the "target 
methodology" with the most complete leverage model (i. e., Specification 3 above). 
Column A reports the results of the investment model for the entire sample of firms. 
We observe a positive and significant relationship between investments and Q, which 
is consistent with the prediction of the investment theory: that growth opportunities 
play a relevant role in investment decisions. The coefficient for cash flow is positive 
and significant, which may suggest the presence of capital market imperfections that 
may result in firms depending, at least partially, on available internal funds to invest. 
This is in line with the results reported in Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990), Blundell 
et al. (1992) and Vogt (1994). 
The dummy indicating RBP status is always positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that these companies seem to invest significantly more than the 
others after an accumulation period of two (Specifications B through E) or three years 
(Specifications F through I). In fact, every alternative proxy of RBP has a positive and 
significant impact on capital expenditure. 
Furthermore, we find that investment cash flow sensitivity, as represented by 
the interaction terms, is always negative, possibly confirming what we found above: 
investments for firms that accumulate reserve borrowing power are less sensitive to 
the availability of internal funds. This is further corroborated by the fact that, in two 
cases out of four (Specifications E and G), this interaction term is also statistically 
significant. To the extent that significant and positive cash flow sensitivity represents 
the company's financial constraints, this would imply that these firms' ability to 
invest is not jeopardized by asymmetric and agency costs problems with investors. 
To provide a more complete picture of the behaviour of RBP companies, we 
further investigate the intertemporal characteristics of these firms, immediately before 
and after the time where their investment decisions are analyzed. To this end, we 
compute descriptive statistics for the three sub-samples of firms. In more detail, we 
plot the average values for the most important variables (such as investments, 
investment spikes, leverage, deviation from target, net debt issued and so on) at t-2... t- 
I... t... t+l... t+2. 
4.4.3 Firm behaviour in time 
Figure 4.1 presents the set of graphs describing the firms' choices and actions 
in time. We start by defining t=0 as the time when RBP firms are assigned a value of 
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1. We analyze both their behaviour, in terms of investment and financial decisions, 
and their characteristics, in terms of growth opportunities, dividend policy and size 
before and after this defining moment (from t-2 to t+2). 
Furthermore, we differentiate the trends of RBP firms from those of two other 
types of firm. The first, as discussed above, refers to ARBP companies that never 
change their LL strategy. The second is our "control group", constituted by firms that 
are never classified as RBP throughout the entire period (NRBP). 
The first graph (Graph 1 a) shows the trend for capital expenditures. Prior to t, 
RBP firms appear to invest less then the other two groups. Nonetheless, between t-1 
and t, they appear to experience an important and sudden increase in their 
investments, which seem to decrease slowly again after t. Both ARBP and NRBP, on 
the contrary, show a steady and a decreasing level of investment, respectively. This 
may support the hypothesis that RBP firms have used their accumulated borrowing 
capacity to make more investments. 
To corroborate further our argument, Graph lb analyzes the value of the "non- 
routine investments", in line with Mayer and Sussman (2004). "Non-routine 
investments", or "spikes", are those capital expenditures that are larger in value than 
what appears to be the norm in the firm's life. To identify these spikes, we proceed as 
follows. First, we identify investments over a period of three years of data. We 
calculate the average value of investments only in the extreme years, excluding the 
central one (i. e., (It_I + It+i)/2). This would represent the "norm" investment. Then, we 
define a spike if the investment value in the central year t is at least twice the average 
of these two extremes. 
" Once these spikes have been identified, we plot their average 
value for the three groups of firms. Graph lb indicates how, between t-1 and t+l,. 
RBP firms experience "non-routine investments" in a larger magnitude than other 
companies. This further supports the initial idea that RBP firms make "big" capital 
expenditure after having reinforced their capacity to raise external finance, in order to 
avoid having to pass up valuable growth opportunities. 
The subsequent graphs shed more light on how firms finance these 
extraordinary investments. Figure 4.1c contains a plot of capital structure patterns. It 
is evident that, after a limited reduction of leverage between t-2 and t-1, firms 
suddenly and sharply increase their total borrowing between t-1 and t+2. We can also 
" The same exercise was performed using a period of five rather than three years and delivers similar 
conclusions. 
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see, from the next graph, that this sudden increase corresponds to a decline in the gap 
between actual and predicted leverage. From time t, firms are much closer to their 
target, as the values for the deviations are closer to zero. In addition, Graph le 
confirms this trend, as RBP firms appear to suddenly and markedly issue new (net) 
debt between t-1 and t. In t+1 and t+2, their net debt issue decreases slightly, but 
remains positive and significantly larger than for the other two groups. This further 
corroborates our initial hypothesis that, after a period of borrowing restraint, RBP 
firms are more able to exploit the external markets, thanks to their maintained 
financial slack. Figure 4.1 If provides additional interesting insight: it reveals a slight 
increase also in the net equity issues of RBP companies around t, although, overall, 
net equity issues are decreasing, as for the other two groups of firms. 
Figure 4.1 g shows that RBP firms decrease their stock of cash. The decrease in 
cash holding is more marked (though slight) between t and t+2, which may indicate 
an increased use of liquid assets to finance new projects. 
Interestingly, Figure 4.1h shows an increasing trend of the market-to-book 
ratio for RBP firms, which may represent the positive expectations of investors in the 
market. Some caution is necessary, but this evidence may suggest that accumulating 
borrowing power seems to be value-enhancing behaviour, because it enables firms to 
implement their projects generally, both in intangible and capital expenditures. This 
deduction seems particularly sound when we compare the market-to-book ratio trend 
for RBP companies with the trend of the other two groups of firms that also show 
lower levels of investments. 
However, it must also be underlined that expenditures in R&D grow only until 
time t (Graph 1 i), and there subsequently appears to be a sharp drop in such types of 
investment. 
Finally, Graphs 11 and Im show how firms appear to keep their dividend 
payments relatively stable over time, and also maintain relatively constant size. 
Overall, the results in this section seem to support the hypothesis that an 
accumulating borrowing power strategy increases the ability of firms to have better 
access to the external markets, and to raise the necessary funds to increase their 
investments, especially capital expenditures. 
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4.5. Robustness Checks 
As we argued earlier in the text, we took several steps to test the soundness of 
the results, and to investigate whether they are a consequence of the leverage models 
chosen. The results of all these checks are presented and discussed below. 
First, we run all the investment estimations and the intertemporal descriptive 
analysis as above, using both a) more parsimonious leverage models (Specification 1 
and 2 above); and b) a more complete model that also includes taxes, R&D and 
capital expenditures. 
Second, we re-run the complete set of regressions and tests using a longer time 
series, to investigate whether results are driven by some "shock" specific to the period 
under analysis that is not controlled for by year dummies. 
Moreover, as we discussed in the introduction, to test in full the degree of 
dependence of our results on the choice of leverage model, we re-run all the analysis 
using the "percentile" methodology, because it does not entail the estimation of a 
capital structure equation. 
Finally, we discuss the possibility of alternative interpretations of our set of 
results. 
4.5.1 Investment results using different leverage models 
Table 4.6 reports the results from all the alternative leverage models outlined 
above. For brevity, we include only one definition of RBP (RBP3) and its relative 
interaction with cash flow (interRBP3). The results of the different definitions of RBP 
status are similar to those presented here, and are omitted for brevity. 
The findings in Table 4.6 seem virtually unaltered, irrespective of the leverage 
model. Even if we control for the effect of R&D and capital expenditures, as in 
Graham (2000), and taxes, as in the capital structure study by Lasfer (1995), the 
trends identified before remain unchanged. The dummy indicating the RBP status is 
always statistically significant and positive, while the interaction with cash flow 
remains statistically insignificant, corroborating the fact that at time t, RBP firms 
invest more than the others; and that, at least at this time, they do not appear to be 
particularly affected by the presence of financial constraints, probably due to their 
previously accumulated ability to access the external market. 
All the alternative leverage specifications reported in Table 4.7 deliver very 
similar results. In Figure 4.2, therefore, we report the analysis of firm behaviour in 
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time according to Model 4 in Table 4.6. The added value of showing this particular 
set of results is that we have allowed for a longer time series in the leverage model 
(1985-2001). This, in turn, implies a longer time series available to analyze the 
investment decisions as well. Therefore, in this set of graphs we study the evolution of 
firm choices between t-6 and t+6. 
Some minor differences are apparent from the previous set of figures 
presented in Figure 4.1. For instance, leverage for RBP firms is never lower than for 
ARBP ones; and deviation from target of RBPs becomes even larger than for ARBPs 
at t-2. Despite these variations however, the main picture remains robust and 
consistent. 
It is interesting to note how, in Graph d, RBP firms tend to be very close to 
their target leverage for the entire period, with the exception of the years 
corresponding to a large investment (around time t): at this stage, they appear to 
reduce their leverage, possibly to accumulate reserve borrowing power (Figure 4.2a), 
and they then increase their total borrowing again. Figure 4.2b also confirms that, 
following a period of LL status, firms are now able to finance more "abnormal" 
investments ("spikes") than before. Further, Graph 2e provides another interesting 
insight: it indicates that firms undergo a period of debt repurchase before starting new 
net debt issues between t-2 and t. These findings seem in line with the argument and 
the results in Mayer and Sussman's (2004) study, which shows how, in the longer 
term, financing patterns are more consistent with the trade-off theory. In their work, 
Mayer and Sussman provide clear evidence of capital structures reverting back to 
previous levels of leverage after an abnormal investment. Moreover, and consistent 
with previous results, average market to book ratio appears to increase in time. 
One interesting difference with respect to Figure 4.1 is that, according to this 
specification, RBP firms appear to be more cash rich than NRBP ones (Figure 4.2g). 
This is probably because cash holding policy is not explicitly accounted for in this 
"Rajan and Zingales" model, and it is therefore part of the estimated residual (i. e., the 
predicted deviation from target). 
4.5.2 Investment results using the percentile methodology 
In an attempt to fully verify the extent to which the above mentioned results 
may result from any sort of misspecification of the leverage model, we also replicate 
all the above analysis adopting the "percentile methodology": this does not entail 
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estimating any leverage model, but, rather, as discussed earlier, consists in assigning 
LL status by using the distribution of leverage across firms each year. Firms are 
classified as LL when (in each year) they belong to the bottom three deciles of the 
leverage distribution. As we stated in our earlier discussion, to assign the RBP status, 
we require firms to be in the bottom three deciles for at least three consecutive years 
prior to the investment decision. If firm A is classified as low-leverage for 1991,1992 
and 1993, it is assigned a value of 1 in 1994 to capture its "flexible" status in the 
previous three years (RBPpct3). For robustness purposes, we also compute a parallel 
set of results, using another dummy that takes the value of 1 if the company belongs 
to the bottom three deciles for two rather than three consecutive years (RBPpct2). 
As Table 4.2B shows, when we follow this methodology, we obtain a lower 
number of companies that are classified as RBP (176), while there are 385 NRBP 
firms. Fifty-two firms are always classified as low-leverage (ARBP). Despite these 
differences in classification, it appears that firms adopt this strategy only temporarily, 
since companies are classified as RBP for an average (median) of 3.02 (3) consecutive 
periods. This figure is larger than that obtained using the target method. As we 
discussed above, this may be because the former is more stringent in assessing the 
evolution of firm's leverage in time, which makes it more difficult for firms to change 
status. 
Similarly to what we described above, the results in Table 4.7 confirm what 
we would expect from the extant literature. We observe a positive and significant 
relationship between investments and Q across all specifications, which is consistent 
with the hypothesis that growth opportunities play a relevant role in investment 
decisions. The cash flow sensitivity parameter is positive and statistically significant, 
which may indicate the presence of capital market imperfections that affect 
companies' investment policy. 
However, both dummies indicating firms with reserves of borrowing power 
(RBP2 and RBP3) are significant and positive, indicating an increased ability to 
invest. The interaction with cash flow is statistically insignificant though still 
negative, which may confirm that asymmetric and agency costs do not particularly 
affect firms' ability to invest. 
Figure 4.3 describes firm behaviour in time around the (hypothesized) 
investment decision. As before, t refers to the first year when firms are assigned RBP 
status. Some differences from previous results can be noted. First, according to this 
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specification, RBP firms seem always able to invest more than the other companies, 
whereas, with the targeting method, we reported RBP firms below the others before t, 
then investing above NRBP and ARBP from t onwards. Also, the increase in net 
equity issues appears more pronounced with the percentile methodology than with the 
target methodology. Further, the estimated impact on firm value appears to differ. In 
this case (Graph 3g), RBP firms appear to persistently outperform the other two 
groups, whereas in Figure 4.1 Graph g we detect a clear increasing trend in mtbv over 
the entire period under analysis. 
Nonetheless, the results generally confirm previous findings, in that firms 
experience an increase in investments around t (Graph 3a) and an increase in their 
investment spikes (Graph 3b). This appears to be linked to a leverage policy that 
suddenly and sharply increases between t-1 and t+2, mostly as a result of new net debt 
issues (Graph 3d). Cash holding appears decreasing, especially starting from t-1, as 
before, and, similarly to what was previously detected, R&D expenses appear to 
increase around t but then suddenly decrease (Graph3h. ). It must be underlined that, 
unlike what we previously detected, the proxy for market to book value does not 
increase in time; and, moreover, firms that are classified as RBP in this way appear to 
always display a higher average than the other two sub-groups. 
4.5.3 Alternative interpretation of results 
In this section, we discuss some other potential interpretations of our results. 
In particular, a low-leverage policy may be interpreted as the expression of the 
difficulty firms have in raising external capital. Alternatively, a low level of leverage 
may be driven by managerial entrenchment. 
4.5.3.1. Financial flexibility or financial constraint? 
It could be argued that firms may be characterized by low leverage not as a 
result of a policy, but rather as a consequence of the difficulty of raising more external 
debt. In other words, it could be argued that leverage may be viewed as a proxy of 
accessibility to external capital (John, 1993). Under this perspective, it is possible to 
interpret low-leverage firms as financially constrained rather than financially flexible, 
because they are incapable of raising more capital on the external market. 
An argument, based on the analysis of the coefficients of cash flow between 
sub-samples can be produced against this view. We split firms between RBP and 
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NRBP ones, and analyze whether investment cash flow sensitivities differ between 
the two groups. 
A typical approach in the investment literature consists in identifying firm 
characteristics that are a priori considered signals of financial constraints. For 
example, firm size is so used, based on the idea that small firms are more opaque and 
therefore face more asymmetric information. Dividends were also so used, following 
Fazzari et al. 's (1988) intuition that low dividend payments can be viewed as an 
expression of a firm's financial constraints (also see Devereux and Schiantarelli, 
1990; Hoshi et al., 1991; amongst many others). Accordingly, to provide more insight 
on this issue, we split the sample between RBP and NRBP firms. We would expect 
that, if LL is an expression of financial constraints rather than flexibility, the 
coefficient for cash flow should be larger in magnitude, positive and statistically 
significant for RBP firms. In contrast, if RBP is an expression of flexibility, we would 
expect a lower, and possibly insignificant, coefficient for cash flow, suggesting a 
lower degree of dependence on the availability of internal funds to invest. Table 4.8 
Column A reports results for the whole sample, while Column B shows the estimated 
coefficients for NRBP firms (i. e., those that are never classified as LL for at least 
three consecutive years). 12 Finally, Column C reports results for RBP firms. It can be 
noted that firms that are classified as having reserve borrowing power show an 
estimated cash flow coefficient that is insignificant and lower than NRBP firms. 
Following the interpretation of cash flow sensitivities as proxies for financial 
constraints, the results for RBP firms seem to suggest that those companies are less 
(or no more) exposed to capital market imperfections than those firms that never show 
a low-leverage policy for at least three consecutive years. This may imply that a 
(persistent) low-leverage policy does not necessarily imply that firms systematically 
experience difficulties in raising funds from the external markets. 
Further, some of the findings from the intertemporal analysis discussed above 
may corroborate this view. For instance, to the extent that dividends or size are 
meaningful proxies of financial constraints (e. g., Fazzari et al., 1988), we would 
expect to find that RBP firms belong to the bottom deciles of dividend distribution 
more systematically than NRBP firms, if leverage is interpreted as a proxy of 
12 Results for firms that are always classified as RBP (ARIP) are not reported, since no explanatory 
variable is significant. This may be due to the very low number of observations available in total for 
this sub-sample of firms. 
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financial constraints. However, Figures 4.1. j and l. k show that RBP firms pay, on 
average, more dividends than NRBP ones. Our own calculations reveal that, of 969 
observations belonging to the bottom three deciles of dividends, about 54% of them 
pertain to NRBP firms while 46% belong to RBP. Similar arguments could be made 
regarding firm size. These arguments may corroborate the view that RBP firms are 
not necessarily more exposed to market imperfections than others. 
Moreover, some authors have argued that financially constrained firms are 
expected to have higher incentives to hold large cash reserves (Fazzari et al., 1996; 
Kim et al., 1998; Hovakimian and Titman, 2003). In other words, firms anticipating 
future financial constraints in the external capital market may, as a reaction, tend to 
accumulate substantial cash holdings. This does not appear to be our case either. From 
Figure 4.1. g we can see that RBP firms do not appear to be cash rich when compared 
to the other sub-samples. This would be inconsistent with the previous argument, and 
would make it unlikely that these firms are following a conservative leverage policy 
because of the difficulty of raising money in the external market. 
4.5.3.1. Financial flexibility or managerial entrenchment? 
The relationship between leverage and the likelihood of expropriation by 
managers depends on whether debt constrains or facilitates this expropriation. On the 
one hand, some authors have proposed theories under which managers prefer to keep 
debt ratios low, to reduce risk and protect their undiversified human capital (Fama, 
1980), or to alleviate the pressure that comes with interest payment commitments 
(e. g., Jensen, 1986). On the other hand, according to Harris and Raviv (1988) and 
Stulz (1988), managers may prefer higher leverage in order to inflate their voting 
power and reduce the possibility of a takeover. Furthermore, according to Leland and 
Pyle's (1977) signalling hypothesis, managers may choose higher leverage to 
convince investors of their ability to generate sufficient earnings to repay their debt. 
Therefore, it is not necessarily unambiguous to conclude that a low-leverage 
policy may be driven by the presence of managerial entrenchment issues inside the 
firm. Nonetheless, to the extent that entrenched managers prefer a suboptimal level of 
leverage, we would expect an adjustment in those variables that represent conflicts 
between managers and shareholders that correspond to the dramatic change detected 
in the amount of debt held by RBP firms. We would expect, therefore, a structural 
break in executive ownership, blockholding and/or board composition. We may also 
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expect a sharp variation in the dividend payout, as an alternative control mechanism 
to leverage. 
In Figure 4.4, we plot trends in executive ownership, blockholding and ratio of 
non-executives on total board, for RBP, NRBP and ARBP firms (4.4a, 4.4b and 4.4c). 
No significant "break" is documented in these variables. Figures 4.1. j, 4.2. j and 4.3. i 
show how dividends also remain relatively constant in time. In other words, no 
significant change is detected in any of these variables. 
Further, a sound and consistent result from the ownership and performance 
literature is that we would expect a significantly lower firm valuation in the presence 
of managerial entrenchment (i. e., during low-leverage periods). An examination of the 
average market to book ratios for RBP firms in Figures 4.1. g, 4.2. g and 4.3. g, 
however, provides no evidence of sharp increase in market to book when there is a 
change in the leverage policy. On the contrary, depending on the specification, a 
steadily increasing average firm value (Figures 4.1 .g and 4.2. g) or, a relatively stable 
but larger than other groups average firm value (Figure 4.3. g), is detected for these 
companies. 
Overall, this evidence does not appear to be consistent with the view that low- 
leverage may be driven by managerial entrenchment issues. 
4.6. Conclusions 
The focus of this work was to systematically investigate the interactions 
between a specific capital structure characteristic, that is, low-leverage policy, and the 
capital expenditures of firms. Our argument, based on the ideas of Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) and Myers (1984), maintains that those firms that anticipate financial 
constraints in the future respond to these potential constraints by accumulating reserve 
borrowing power. In fact, through a policy of low leverage for a certain number of 
years (t-n ... t-1), companies may accumulate 
financial flexibility that allows them to 
have access to the external market at time t (RBP firms), and to be able to raise funds 
to invest more than their internal funds would allow them to do. 
To investigate whether this hypothesis is supported by the actual behaviour of 
a large sample of UK non-financial listed firms between 1991 and 2001, we 
conducted two types of analyses. First, we estimated an investment model augmented 
by those variables that represent the leverage policy status, that is, RBP dummies and 
their interaction with the cash flow sensitivity. Second, we described the 
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intertemporal behaviour of RBP firms, in terms of their investment and financial 
decisions, and their characteristics, in terms of growth opportunities, dividend policy 
and size before and after the analyzed investment decision. 
Our findings contrast with Graham (2000), in that low-leverage (LL) policy 
appears to be transitory. On average, firms maintain this status for an average of 2.6 
consecutive years. Further, RBP firms are able, after a period of LL, to invest 
significantly more in capital expenditures. 
Our intertemporal analysis tends to corroborate our predictions, revealing that, 
after a period of two/three years of being LL, RBP firms sharply increase their 
amount of capital expenditures with respect to the previous years, and they are able to 
invest "better". Indeed, we identify an increase in investment "spikes" after firms 
acquire RBP status, and an increase in average market to book ratio. In addition, we 
provide evidence that, after being LL, firms close the deviation from their target 
leverage via new net debt issues. 
Thanks to a robustness check over a longer time series, we are able to show 
that, in fact, these firms have a long-term financing pattern that is more consistent 
with the trade-off theory. In other words, it seems that their capital structures revert 
back, after an abnormal investment, to those levels of leverage that preceded the 
accumulation period of borrowing power. 
Furthermore, they appear to experience a reduction in internal funds (cash), 
and seem to be able to steadily increase their average value through this policy. 
Finally, we provide several robustness checks of alternative leverage model 
specifications, and also different methodologies to define LL. The results are similar 
in all cases, and support the soundness of our initial predictions. 
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Table 4.1. Variables definitions. 
Panel A. Economic variables 
Lev Ratio of total debt to total assets 
Mtbv Ratio of book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of 
e ui to book value of assets 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
Collateral Ratio of fixed assets to total assets 
Profitability Ratio of the earnings before interest, tax and depreciation (EBITD) to total assets 
Cash Ratio of total cash and equivalents to total assets 
Maturity Ratio of loans repayable after one year to total debt 
Div Ratio of total payment dividend to total assets 
Ndts Ratio of annual depreciation expense to total assets 
Spike Value It is defined over a pattern of three years of investment data. The average value of 
investments is calculated in the extreme years. The spike exists in this pattern only if 
the investment value in the central year is at least twice the average of the extremes. 
Debt Issue Ratio of net debt issued in each year to total assets 
Equity Issue Ratio of net equity issued in each year to total assets 
R&D Research and Development expenditures on total assets 
Capital Expenditures Capital Expenditures on total assets 
Tax Total tax charge divided by pre-tax profits 
I Due to changes in company accounts definitions in 1991, until 1991 it is equal to the 
total new fixed assets; from 1991 it is equal to the sum of payments for fixed assets 
and the net of fixed assets of subsidiaries. 
K 
Capital stock is measured on a replacement cost basis. For the first observation, the 
replacement cost is assumed equal to the historic cost of total net fixed assets, 
adjusted for inflation. For the following observations, a standard perpetual inventory 
method process is adopted as follows: 
K;, = K,, _1 
(1-8)+I;, 
, where 
8 is the rate of depreciation assumed to be 0.08. 
CF Cash flow equal to the operating profits before tax, interest and preference dividends 
lus de reciation of fixed assets 
IK Investment to capital stock 
CFK Cash flow to capital stock 
Q Book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of 
equity to capital stock 
RBP2 
Dummy equal to 1 if a company is identified as low-leverage for the two 
consecutive years before the analyzed investment decision, and 0 otherwise 
interRBP2 Interaction term between RBP2 and CFK 
RBPpct2 
Dummy equal to 1 if a company has a negative deviation from its target larger than 
at least 25% of all undershooting firms for the two consecutive years before the 
analyzed investment decisions, and 0 otherwise 
interRBPpct2 Interaction term between RBPpct2 and CFK 
RBP3 
Dummy equal to I if a company is identified as low-leverage for the three 
consecutive years before the analyzed investment decision, and 0 otherwise 
interRBP3 Interaction term between RBP3 and CFK 
RBP ct3 
Dummy equal to I if a company has a negative deviation from its target larger than 
at least 25% of all undershooting firms for the three consecutive years before the 
analyzed investment decisions, and 0 otherwise 
interRBPpct3 Interaction term between RBPpct3 and CFK 
Panel B. Ownership variables 
an Sum of ordinary shareholdings by all directors (%) 
Blockholding Sum of all external shareholdings above 3% 
Ratio The proportion of non-executive directors on total board 
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Table 4.2. Classification of firms. Panel A. 
Firm id year deviation LL-status RBP 
AAA 1991 N/A N/A N/A 
AAA 1992 < 1 N/A 
AAA 1993 < 1 N/A 
AAA 1994 < 1 N/A 
AAA 1995 > 0 1 
AAA 1996 > 0 0 
AAA 1997 < 1 0 
AAA 1998 < 1 0 
AAA 1999 < 1 0 
AAA 2000 < 1 1 
AAA 2001 < 1 1 
This table provides a brief example, showing how the RBP dummy was generated. Deviation 
represents the difference between the predicted target leverage and the actual value. LL stands for low- 
leverage. 
Table 4.2. Classification of firms. Panel B. 
NRBP RBP ARBP TOTAL 
Target method 277 270 66 613 
Percentile method 385 176 52 613 
This table reports the classification of firms between never having been classified as having reserve 
borrowing power (NRBP), having been classified as having attained reserve borrowing power (RBP) 
and those which are always classified as reserve borrowing power (ARBP). 
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Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics. 
Mean St. dev. 25 `h perc Median 75 `h perc 
Lev 0.17 0.13 0.07 0.16 0.25 
Mtbv 1.50 0.80 0.99 1.29 1.75 
Size 11.27 1.80 9.98 11.05 12.40 
Collateral 0.34 0.21 0.19 0.31 0.46 
Profitability 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.18 
Cash 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.14 
Maturity 0.47 0.34 0.11 0.50 0.76 
Dividends 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Ndts 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 
Man 10.05 15.79 0.18 2.12 13.28 
Blockholding 31.63 18.75 16.77 30.20 45.17 
Ratio 0.41 0.16 0.33 0.42 0.50 
IK 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.18 
CFK 0.32 0.22 0.19 0.29 0.42 
Q 2.78 2.64 1.18 1.89 3.39 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables included in both leverage and investment 
models. LEV is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets; Mtbv is equal to the ratio of book value of 
total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of total assets; 
Size represents the natural logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices; Collateral is defined as the ratio of 
Fixed Assets to total assets; Profitability is the ratio of the earnings before interest, tax and depreciation 
(EBITD) to total assets; Man is equal to the sum of ordinary shareholdings held by executive directors 
(%); Blockholding is the sum of the external (non-managerial) shareholdings above 3%; Ratio is equal to 
the proportion of non-executives to total number of directors; Cash is defined as the ratio of total cash and 
equivalents to total assets; Maturity represents the ratio of loans repayable after one year to total debt; 
Dividends is the ratio of ordinary dividends net of Advance Corporation Tax to total assets; Ndts (Non- 
Debt Tax Shield) is defined as the ratio of annual depreciation expense to total assets. IK is defined as 
the ratio of investment to capital stock; CFK is equal to the ratio of cash flow to capital stock; Q 
represents the ratio of market value of assets to capital stock. 
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Table 4.4. Leverage models. 
Spec.! Spec. 2 Spec. 3 
lev1_, 0.700*** 0.717*** 0.682*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
mtbv 0.012 0.013 0.002 
[0.119] [0.229] [0.305] 
size 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
collateral 0.071 ** 0.093*** 0.058** 
[0.036] [0.002] [0.033] 
profitability -0.114* -0.099* -0.131*** 
[0.073] [0.097] [0.003] 
man 0.001* 0.00 
[0.097] [0.218] 
blockholding -. 000062 -0.003** 
[0.236] [0.043] 
ratio 0.053 0.039* 
[0.130] [0.082] 
cash -0.073** 
[0.045] 
maturity 0.045*** 
[0.000] 
dividends -0.16 
[0.527] 
ndts -0.25 
[0.140] 
Observations 5660 5660 5660 
Number of firms 677 677 677 
Implied adj. Factor 0.300 0.283 0.317 
Sargan test 334.27 382.58 478.98 
[0.354] [0.205] [0.221] 
ml test -12.79*** -12.78*** -12.46*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
m2 test -0.68 -0.65 -0.72 
[0.495] [0.515] [0.471] 
This table presents GMM-SYS regressions predicting leverage choices. The estimation period is 1991- 
2001. In GMM estimations all the regressors are dated at time [t], except for the lagged dependent 
variable at [t-l]. The models are a linear system of the first differenced and levels equations. The 
instruments are the levels dated [t-2... t-5] of all regressors for the first differenced equations and the first 
differences dated [t-2] for the level equations. In GMM model time dummies are included. Asymptotic 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are used in all the estimations. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity; ml and m2 are test statistics for first and second order autocorrelations in residuals, 
respectively, distributed as standard normal N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation; the adjustment 
factor is calculated from the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. Lev is defined as the 
ratio of total debt to total assets; mtbv is equal to the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book 
value of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of total assets; size represents the natural 
logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices; collateral is defined as the ratio of Fixed Assets to total assets; 
profitability is the ratio of the earnings before interest, tax and depreciation (EBITD) to total assets; man 
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is equal to the sum of ordinary shareholdings held by executive directors (%); blockholding is the sum of 
`-the external (non-managerial) shareholdings above 3%; ratio is equal to the proportion of non-executives 
to total number of directors; cash is defined as the ratio of total cash and equivalents to total assets; 
maturity represents the ratio of loans repayable after one year to total debt; dividends is the ratio of 
ordinary dividends net of Advance Corporation Tax to total assets; ndts (Non-Debt Tax Shield) is defined 
as the ratio of annual depreciation expense to total assets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4.5. Investment models. 
A B C D E F G H I 
IK1_I 0.108*** 0.100*** 0.097*** 0.098*** 0.103*** 0.094*** 0.099*** 0.101***0.111*** 
[0.001] [0.002] [0.008] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] 
1CFK 0.150* 0.121 0.167** 0.144* 0.162** 0.123 0.204** 0.134* 0.150** 
[0.057] [0.138] [0.044] [0.084] [0.044] [0.124] [0.018] [0.097] [0.046] 
Q 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
RBP2 0.064*** 0.113*** 
[0.000] [0.009] 
interRBP2 -0.158 
[0.159] 
RBPpct2 
interRBPpct2 
RBP3 
interRBP3 
RBPpct3 
interRBPpct3 
Observations 4006 4006 4006 
Number of 
0.062*** 0.137*** 
[0.000] [0.010] 
-0.221 * 
[0.092] 
0.082*** 0.202*** 
[0.000] [0.001] 
-0.375*** 
[0.009] 
0.036* 0.104 
[0.065] [0.125] 
-0.206 
[0.207] 
4006 4006 4006 4006 4006 4006 
firms 613 613 613 613 613 613 613 613 613 
Sargan test 58.55 62.90 95.78 63.23 83.81 62.71 92.31 59.20 70.14 
[0.529] [0.374] [0.210] [0.363] [0.393] [0.380] [0.304] [0.505] [0.777] 
ml test -7.84 -7.60 -7.13 -7.79 -7.60 -7.65 -7.48 -7.80 -8.07 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
m2 test -1.00 -0.81 -0.86 -1.10 -1.13 -1.12 -0.99 -1.03 -0.94 
[0.318] [0.419] [0.389] [0.271] [0.260] [0.261] [0.322] [0.303] [0.349] 
This table shows the GMM results for the investment model with the leverage status dummies computed from the estimation of 
the "complete" leverage model (that is, R&Z augmented by the ownership and other financial characteristics). The estimation 
period for GMM is 1994-2001, depending on the availability of leverage status dummies. GMM is the model in the first 
differences with levels dated [t-2, t-5] of all regressors as instruments. In GMM model time dummies are included. Asymptotic 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are used in all the estimations. P-values are reported in parentheses. Sargan test is a 
test of overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity; ml and m2 are test statistics for 
first and second order autocorrelations in residuals, respectively, distributed as standard normal N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. 1K is defined as the ratio of investment to capital stock; CFK is equal to the ratio of cash flow to capital stock; Q 
represents the ratio of market value of assets to capital stock; RBP2 is a dummy equal to I if a company is identified as low- 
leverage for the two consecutive years before the analyzed investment decision and 0 otherwise; RBP3 is a dummy equal to I if a 
company is identified as low-leverage for the three consecutive years before the analyzed investment decision and 0 otherwise; 
RBPpct2 is a dummy equal to I if a company has a negative deviation from its target larger than at least 25% of all undershooting 
firms for the two consecutive years before the analyzed investment decisions and 0 otherwise; RBPpct3 is a dummy equal to I if a 
company has a negative deviation from its target larger than at least 25% of all undershooting firms for the three consecutive years 
before the analyzed investment decisions and 0 otherwise; interRBP2 is the interaction term between RBP2 and CFK; interRBP3 
is the interaction term between RBP3 and CFK; interRBPpct2 is the interaction term between RBPpct2 and CFK; interRBPpct3 
is the interaction term between RBPpct3 and CFK. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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Table 4.8. Investment model: splits of the sample. 
A B C 
1K1_j 0.108*** 0.082* 0.104** 
[0.001] [0.089] [0.040] 
1CFK 0.150* 0.188* 0.13 
[0.057] [0.065] [0.127] 
Q 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.027*** 
[0.000] [0.008] [0.002] 
Observations 4006 1720 1561 
Number of firms 613 277 270 
Sargan test 58.55 66.61 67.05 
[0.529] [0.260] [0.248] 
ml test -7.84 -5.08 -5.19 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
m2 test -1.00 -0.50 -0.75 
[0.318] [0.378] [0.453] 
This table shows the GMM results for the investment model. Specification "A" refers to the whole 
sample; specification "B" refers only to NRBP firms; specification "C" refers to RBP firms. The 
estimation period for the GMM is 1994-2001. GMM is estimated in first differences with levels dated [t- 
2, t-5] of all regressors as instruments. Time dummies are always included. Asymptotic standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity are used in all the estimations. P-values are reported in parentheses. Sargan 
test is a test of overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity; 
ml and m2 are test statistics for first and second order autocorrelations in residuals, respectively, 
distributed as standard normal N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. IK is defined as the ratio of 
investment to capital stock; CFK is equal to the ratio of cash flow to capital stock; Q represents the ratio 
of market value of assets to capital stock. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
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Appendix 4.1: The Partial Adjustment Model 
The underlining assumption of a partial adjustment model is that firms have a LEV 
target (LEV *; t) that is a function of Kfrm-specific characteristics, 
k) 
and a (l k-1ßkXku 
disturbance term, (u11). 
k 
LEV;, ' _ ßk 
X 
kit + uu 
k=I 
(Al) 
Firms try to adjust their current LEV holding level to be closer to their target. This 
produces a partial adjustment process as follows: 
LEV - LEV;, _, =A 
(LEV,; 
- LEVI) ;, _(A2) 
where LEV,, is the current LEV holding, (LEV;; - LEV_, 
) is the target change and A is the 
adjustment factor or, in other words, what can effectively be adjusted. 
If we substitute the function (Al) in the partial adjustment equation (A2) and include 1; 
and rat, we obtain our model (A3) 
k 
LEV;, =SLEVI_1 +E ykXkil +t +17, +v (A3) 
k=1 
where now 8= (1- A), yk = 2/3k and v = Au . From the estimated coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable, thus, we derive the estimated adjustment factor A for our sample. ?. can take 
any value between 0 and 1. If %=1 there is an immediate adjustment (LEV,, = LEV,, ) which, in 
turn, means that both the costs of adjustment are very low and the costs of being off-target are 
relatively high. On the other hand, if ? =0, implying LEV,, = LEV,, _,, 
the costs of adjustment 
are so high that firms cannot change their actual LEV holding level. This may also imply that 
the costs of being away from the target are negligible. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
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The aim of this study has been to provide more insights into our understanding of a 
number of issues pertaining to the evolution of ownership characteristics in the UK market, 
to the impact of agency costs on firm performance and to the links between the financial 
and investment decisions of firms. Our work contains a number of important and original 
aspects that potentially contribute to the literature on several grounds. 
Chapter 2 presented a series of stylized facts of both direct and ultimate ownership 
structure and board composition for a unique database, which we hand-collected for this 
thesis, for a large sample of UK non-financial listed firms between 1991 and 2001. This 
work significantly contributes to the existing body of knowledge, by extending and 
complementing existing US evidence (Denis & Sarin, 1999) on the evolution of ownership 
and governance systems. The detailed investigation performed in Chapter 2 documented 
that substantial changes in ownership structures are not uncommon, and that the classic 
argument of ownership stability may not fully apply in the UK case. These changes have 
involved several different aspects of the shareholding and governance of firms. For 
instance, managerial ownership shows a sharp decreasing trend, driven mainly by executive 
shareholding. On the other hand, ownership by outsiders seems to increase when it is less 
than 45% in the first year in which firms entered the sample. Above that level, it decreases 
sharply. In addition, average board size displays a mean reversion pattern around the 
average size of seven members, with an increasing number of non-executives over time. 
Other interesting facts were revealed by the analysis of the ultimate ownership structure of 
a sub-sample of our firms. For example, widely held firms are decreasing over time at each 
cut-off level, which suggests a possible re-concentration process in UK ownership. 
Additionally, the presence of complex structures, such as pyramids, multiple control chains 
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and cross-holdings, is far from negligible. This is not entirely in line with what we were led 
to expect by the arguments of the law and finance literature on the degree of minority 
protection in common law countries. 
In Chapter 3, we provide significant contributions to the literature. We directly 
investigated how agency relations between managers and outside shareholders affect the 
financial performance of firms. More specifically, the focus is on the role of non-executive 
directors, and we investigated in detail whether they act independently from executives in 
determining firm performance. To this end, we first tested the relationship between board 
ownership and firm value. Then we divided the board of directors between executives and 
non-executives, and we tested whether ownership by non-executives is also a relevant 
factor. We also checked if the mere presence of outside directors on the board was 
significantly linked to firm value, by introducing a proxy for board composition. We 
exploited the documented evolution in ownership characteristics to investigate this link, 
using the GMM methodology (Arellano and Bond, 1991). In contrast with the previous 
literature, this technique enabled us to produce a set of systematic results, which are robust 
both to the endogeneity of all the explanatory variables, and to the presence of 
unobservable heterogeneity, an issued that has affected all previous studies in this field. 
Moreover, in endogenizing not only managerial ownership but also all the ownership 
structure of firms, we tested whether the presence and identity of a large shareholder, 
besides firm capital and financial structure, has an impact on firm performance. 
Our analysis revealed a cubic relationship between executive ownership and 
financial value. No significant relationship was detected between ownership by non- 
executives and performance. This result casts doubt on the efficacy of direct equity 
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ownership as an alignment mechanism for outside directors. However, a positive and 
significant effect of the ratio of non-executives to total board is reported. A negative 
relation between performance and blockholding is detected, and no evidence is consistent 
with the efficient monitoring hypothesis for institutional investors; whereas investment in 
physical capital, cash flow and dividend payments are all reported to exert a positive 
impact. Finally, no significant impact of company size, debt ratio or RD expenditures was 
detected. 
In Chapter 4, we empirically investigated the hypothesis that firms, anticipating 
financial constraints in the future, may respond by accumulating reserve borrowing power. 
More specifically, we analyzed whether, by employing a policy of low leverage for a 
certain number of years, firms may accumulate financial flexibility that enables them to 
have access to the external market in the future, and to be able to raise funds to invest more 
than their internal resources alone would allow. The analysis in Chapter 4 provides a set of 
original and important results. 
First, we report how a low-leverage policy is a transitory one. Following a period of 
low leverage, firms that have accumulated reserves of borrowing power appeared able to 
make significantly more capital expenditures. Estimation results of the investment equation 
confirmed that firms that are classified as having accumulated reserve borrowing are able to 
invest more. Moreover, our results reveal that the interaction of this dummy with the cash 
flow parameter is consistently negative and generally insignificant. This further 
corroborates the hypothesis that these firms may not be any more constrained in their 
investment decisions than other firms. We also performed a set of intertemporal descriptive 
analyses of firms' choices around the investment decision moment, which also revealed 
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how, consistent with econometric results, firms with reserves of borrowing power sharply 
increase their capital investments after acquiring RBP status. They are reported to do so by 
issuing new debt and approaching their target leverage. An additional interesting aspect is 
that we detected a significant increase of abnormal investment (spikes) by firms after 
acquiring RBP status. A further important insight of these results is that they appear to 
indicate that this strategy is value enhancing, as documented by the increasing average 
market to book ratio for this group of firms. We further investigated these results by 
conducting several robustness checks in different directions. These confirm the previous set 
of results. We replicated all the above analyses with different leverage models (which are 
used instrumentally to define low-leverage firms and therefore reserve borrowing power 
firms), and all the results appear consistent. 
Several lines for future research can be identified within the framework described 
above. 
First, it would be interesting to develop a more formal analysis of the evolution of 
ownership characteristics that we documented in Chapter 2. For example, through a model 
of the determinants of insider ownership, we could investigate in more detail the issue of 
the opposite trends in executive and non-executive shareholding. 
Second, a natural extension of our work would be to investigate the potential impact 
of ultimate ownership structures on firm value. Ultimate ownership in fact can be viewed as 
as an alternative manifestation of agency conflicts inside firms. Ultimate controllers are 
expected to be expropriators of minority investors, because, unlike managers, they cannot 
be aligned. This generates an entirely different set of agency conflicts, and these have been 
shown to be greater than those investigated at the direct ownership level (Bebchuck et al., 
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2000). The literature on ultimate ownership structure has so far provided very few 
empirical studies of the impact of ultimate controllers on corporate performance (Claessens 
et al., 2002) and other corporate decisions (Faccio et at., 2001). Given the evidence, 
provided in Chapter 2, that complex structures in the UK market are not negligible, an 
original approach would be to empirically investigate their potential impact on firm 
performance. A further contribution that this study might provide would be the analysis of 
this link, taking into account the possibility that complex structures may be endogenously 
determined, an issue that is discussed in Claessens et al. (2002). Indeed, because of lack of 
data, the existing body of work was conducted in a cross-sectional framework only. 
Appropriate econometric techniques should then be adopted in this case. This, in turn, 
could be achieved by extending our biannual panel data to an annual one. 
Third, as far as investment choices are concerned, a potential extension to our work 
would be to model a joint determination of different financial policies. A recent branch of 
the literature has provided some evidence for the possibility that firms may adopt 
alternative policies to leverage, in order to achieve financial flexibility. For instance, 
Jagannathan et al. (2000) focus on dividend payouts and stock repurchase decisions, and 
show how firms with less volatile cash flows opt for larger dividend payments, whereas 
firms with larger cash flow volatility rely more on stock repurchases. This result tallies with 
the view that the flexibility inherent in repurchase programs is one reason why they are 
sometimes used instead of dividends. On the other hand, Childs et al. (2005) theoretically 
investigate the relationship between leverage and maturity choices in firm financing, and 
argue that financial flexibility encourages the choice of short-term debt, thereby 
dramatically reducing the agency costs of underinvestment and overinvestment problems. 
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Therefore, in spite of the estimation issues that could arise in adopting simultaneous 
partial adjustment models, one way to extend the framework of Chapter 4 would be to 
incorporate other financial instruments, such as cash holding, dividend policy and debt 
maturity, that firms may use in pursuing a financial flexibility policy. 
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